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THE CONSTITUTIONAL FUTURE OF RACE-
NEUTRAL EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE DIVERSITY
AND AVOID RACIAL ISOLATION IN
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS
KIMBERLYJENKINS ROBINSON*
Abstract: In 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 that the racial classifications
used by school districts in Seattle and Louisville to create diverse schools
were unconstitutional. Justice Kennedy provided the deciding vote but
also noted that school districts could pursue diversity and avoid racial iso-
lation through race-neutral alternatives. He asserted that it was unlikely
that race-neutral alternatives would be subject to strict scrutiny but articu-
lated no rationale for this assertion. This Article argues that, after Parents
Involved, school districts will focus on race-neutral efforts to create diverse
schools because the decision leaves very little room for racial classifica-
tions that would survive strict scrutiny. This Article further contends that
governments should be given wide latitude to adopt race-neutral efforts
to avoid racial isolation and create diverse schools because these efforts
will help school districts accomplish the goals of the Equal Protection
Clause while avoiding many of the potential harms of racial classifications.
In light of how Parents Involved will push districts to focus on race-neutral
efforts to achieve diversity and avoid racial isolation, this Article confronts
the key issues that will determine the future of efforts to provide diverse
elementary and secondary schools.
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This Nation has a moral and ethical obligation to fulfill its historic commit-
ment to creating an integrated society that ensures equal opportunity for all of
its children.
-Justice Kennedy, concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment, in Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1'
INTRODUCTION
Racial isolation in public schools has increased in recent years. 2 At
the same time, five justices on the Supreme Court of the United States
recently reaffirmed the importance of racially integrated elementary
and secondary schools and viewed as compelling interests "avoiding ra-
cial isolation" and "achiev[ing] a diverse student population." 3 In the
2007 case Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No.
1, however, the Court held that the race-based student assignment plans
adopted by the school boards in Seattle, Washington, and Louisville,
Kentucky, to promote racial integration violated the Equal Protection
Clause because they were not narrowly tailored. 4 The decision will in-
fluence the future actions of many schools districts because "[h] undreds
of school districts across the country have adopted some variation of
these plans .... ,,5 Although the Court held the plans unconstitutional,
Justice Kennedy, in a concurring opinion, heralded the paramount im-
portance of the unfinished national agenda of ensuring equal educa-
1 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2797 (2007).
2 See GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, THE HARVARD CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, His-
TORIC REVERSALS, ACCELERATING RESEGREGATION, AND THE NEED FOR NEW INTEGRATION
STRATEGIES 14 (2007). This Article adopts the federal definition of racial isolation,
whereby a school is racially isolated if more than fifty percent of its enrolled students are
minorities. See 34 C.F.R. § 280.4 (2008).
3 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2797 (2007)
(Kennedy,J., concurring in part and in thejudgment); id. at 2835 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
4 Id. at 2759-60 (majority opinion).
5 Amy Stuart Wells & Erica Frankenberg, The Public Schools and the Challenge of the Su-
preme Court's Integration Decision, 89 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 178, 178 (2007); see also RICHARD D.
KAHLENBERG, THE CENTURY FOUND., RESCUING BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: PROFILES
OF TWELVE SCHOOL DISTRICTS PURSUING SOCIOECONOMIC SCHOOL INTEGRATION 42 (2007)
(noting that "[i]t is estimated that hundreds of school districts now use race in student
assignment" and that "many districts have adopted race-conscious student assignment
plans voluntarily, and these are the districts which may wish to look for a viable race-
neutral alternative"). But seeJames E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Voluntary Integration, 121
HARV. L. REv. 131, 132 (2007) ("The truth is that racial integration is not on the agenda of
most school districts and has not been for over twenty years.").
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tional opportunity and an integrated nation. 6 Justice Breyer, along with
three additional members of the Court, noted the many remedial, edu-
cational, and democratic interests promoted by the racial integration of
schools.
7
Despite the Parents Involved decision, many school districts remain
committed to pursuing diversity and avoiding racial isolation. 8 Al-
though no one has calculated the exact number of districts that con-
sider race in student assignments, in 2007 education scholars estimated
that between 100 and 1,000 districts consider race in some manner to
determine where children attend school.9 The overwhelming majority
of the nation's school districts do not consider race in student assign-
ments; however, the efforts of the hundreds of school districts that
presently pursue racial integration will undoubtedly impact the lives of
a significant number of schoolchildren, even if only some of those dis-
tricts continue their efforts after Parents Involved.10 In fact, recent evi-
dence indicates that, although some districts abandoned efforts to
promote diversity after the Parents Involved decision, many school dis-
tricts continue to pursue diversity but have adjusted their approach to
doing so.11 Furthermore, educators continue to try to comprehend the
ruling and its implications for the legality of student assignment plans
that seek to promote diversity and avoid rational isolation.12 Moreover,
surveys reveal that a substantial majority of Americans favor diverse
schools over segregated schools and believe that the government
should take additional steps to create diverse schools. 13
6 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2791-92, 2797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and in
the judgment).
7 Id. at 2820-22 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
8 See, e.g., KAHLENBERG, supra note 5, at 42 (noting that "across the country, school dis-
tricts are not giving up" on racial integration); Mark Walsh, Use of Race Uncertain for Schools,
EDUC. WK., July 18, 2007, at I (quoting an attorney for numerous school boards who stated
that "she was hearing a commitment [from school districts] to do whatever could pass legal
muster to keep schools racially diverse").
9 Ryan, supra note 5, at 144; see also Richard D. Kahlenberg, A New Way on School Integra-
tion, CENTURY FOUNDATION ISSUE BRIEF (Century Found., New York, N.Y), Nov. 28, 2006,
at 1, available at http://www.tcf.org/publications/education/schoolintegration.pdf (citing
Sam Dillon, Schools' Efforts Hinge on Justices' Ruling in Cases on Race and School Assignments,
N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2006, at 11); Amit R. Paley & Brigid Schulte, Court Ruling Likely to
Further Segregate Schools, Educators Say, WASH. PosT,June 30, 2007, at A4.
10 Ryan, supra note 5, at 146.
11 See Emily Bazelon, The Next Kind of Integration, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2008, § MM, at 38;
Susan Eaton, Diversity's Quiet Rebirth, EDUC. WK., Aug. 18, 2008, http://www.edweek.org/
ew/articles/2008/08/18/Oleaton-com.html.
12 See Eaton, supra note 11.
13 See id.
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School districts may seek to reduce racial isolation and create di-
verse schools by adopting one of two approaches. The first, referred to
herein as a race-neutral approach, involves a student assignment plan
that does not classify individual students on the basis of race but instead
seeks to pursue diversity or avoid racial isolation through indirect
means. Examples of such efforts include (1) student assignment plans
that integrate based on socioeconomic status, (2) drawing school at-
tendance zones to bring diverse groups together, and (3) offering
magnet programs. The second approach uses an express racial classifi-
cation to assign some students to schools.
Districts that pursue the second approach must develop a student
assignment plan that is consistent with the requirements set forth in
Parents Involved. Justice Kennedy's opinion, which has been described as
the opinion that will determine the future of school integration, 14 af-
firms that the Equal Protection Clause does not necessarily preclude
elementary and secondary schools from considering race as one factor
among many when assigning students to schools.'1 Nevertheless, some
have speculated that districts that continue to use racial classifications
will face great difficulty in interpreting and satisfying Parents Involved. 1 6
This Article demonstrates how Parents Involved and the Supreme
Court's requirements for strict scrutiny make any consideration of race
in student assignments so difficult and impractical that very few dis-
tricts, if any, are likely to choose to continue to consider the race of in-
dividual students when they assign students to schools.
The narrow legal avenue available for using a racial classification
will encourage those districts that want to create diverse schools and
avoid racial isolation to adopt a race-neutral approach. Some districts
have implemented new student assignment plans that adopt a race-
neutral approach. For instance, in May 2008, the Jefferson County
14 Kevin Brown, Reflections on Justice Kennedy's Opinion in Parents Involved: Why Fifty
Years of Experience Shows Kennedy Is Right, 59 S.C. L. REv. 735, 735 (2008).
15 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and in the judg-
ment).
16 See, e.g., Craig R. Heeren, "Together at the Table of Brotherhood". Voluntary Student As-
signment Plans and the Supreme Court, 24 HARV. BLAcKLETTER L.J. 133, 165-66, 175 (2008);
Ryan, supra note 5, at 138; Walsh, supra note 8, at 1 (noting that one advocate for urban
districts contended that districts face slim prospects for pursuing diversity and that "[flor
all intents and purposes, the court said that you can use race, but we dare you to come up
with a solution that passes muster" (internal quotation marks omitted)). Some even con-
tend that Parents Involved prohibits the use of a racial classification in voluntary student
assignment plans. See, e.g., Jonathan Fischbach et al., Race at the Pivot Point: The Future of
Race-Based Policies to Remedy Dejure Segregation After Parents Involved in Community Schools,
43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 491, 494 (2008).
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School Board in Louisville, Kentucky, whose plan was invalidated in Par-
ents Involved, voted unanimously to approve a new student assignment
plan that seeks to maintain the district's racial and economic diversity.17
The plan divides the district into two zones based upon the racial com-
position, income, and educational level of the neighborhoods. 18 Tradi-
tional elementary schools will not be permitted to enroll less than 15
percent or more than 50 percent of students from neighborhoods with a
higher percentage of minorities than the district-wide average and with
education and income levels below the district-wide average. 19 The plan
also seeks to ensure students receive a similar educational experience at
each school by providing "substantially uniform educational resources
to all schools."20 The plan will take effect for the 2009-2010 school year
and applies to students in grades one through twelve, with limited ex-
ceptions. 21 Prior to Parents Involved, some districts already had adopted
race-neutral efforts to avoid racial isolation and achieve diversity. For
example, the approach proposed in Louisville resembles the student
assignment plan used in Berkeley, California.2 2 The school district in
Wake County, North Carolina, likewise uses a socioeconomic integration
plan to promote integration and diversity.23
Such efforts may face increased legal pressure after the Parents In-
volved decision. 24 Consider that, in Milton, Massachusetts, the school
district recently adopted a plan that redrew student attendance bounda-
ries for its elementary schools. 25 The plan sought to address the
17 Antoinette Konz & Chris Kenning, Desegregation: The New Proposal; Jefferson Schools
Unveil Plan to Keep Diversity, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.),Jan. 29, 2008, at Al;Jeffer-
son County Public Schools, About Us, It's Unanimous! School Board Votes to Approve New
Assignment Plan, http://www.jefferson.kyschools.us/aboutus/studentassigplan.html (last
visited Feb. 18, 2009).
18 Konz & Kenning, supra note 17;Jefferson County Pub. Sch., supra note 17.
19 Konz & Kenning, supra note 17; Jefferson County Pub. Sch., supra note 17 (noting
that the student assignment plan will not apply to special or alternative schools).
20 Jefferson County Pub. Sch., supra note 17.
21 Id. (identifying schools to which the plan does not apply and highlighting that the
superintendent will seek approval for additional recommendations for middle and high
schools).
22 Konz & Kenning, supra note 17. The current and past efforts to integrate the
schools in Berkeley, California, are explained at the school district's website at http://www.
berkeley.net/index.php?page=student-assignment-plan.
23 KAHLENBERG, supra note 5, at 3, 8, 10 (noting that approximately forty school dis-
tricts are pursuing class integration in student assignment and that one of the primary
reasons that school districts adopt such plans is because class integration "can often pro-
duce a fair amount of racial integration").
24 See Joseph Pereira, School Integration Efforts Face Renewed Opposition-Supreme Court
Ruling Sways Milton Battle; Off to Private School, WALL ST.J., Oct. 11, 2007, at Al.
25 Id.
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achievement gap between African American and white children in the
district by better integrating the schools. 26 Some parents responded
with hostility to the plan and are exploring their options for suing the
district over the plan. 27 Similarly, some parents in the Bibb County
School District, which encompasses Macon, Georgia, threatened legal
action against the district for a school redistricting plan that seeks to
integrate the schools.2 8 Parents in both communities point to Parents
Involved decision as providing a strong legal basis for their suit.29
Districts that implement a race-neutral student assignment plan
will face an uncertain legal terrain about how such efforts will be scru-
tinized. Justice Kennedy in Parents Involved asserted that "it is unlikely"
that these approaches would be subject to strict scrutiny because they
do not treat students differently on the basis of a racial classification.3 0
He did not, however, articulate a theory for why these efforts will not be
subject to strict scrutiny, nor did he indicate the appropriate standard
of review for these plans. 31
Legal opinion on the legality of these plans currently appears
mixed. Although proponents contend that race-neutral plans are con-
stitutional because they do not rely on the race of individual students,32
opponents argue that such plans are unconstitutional because they use
other factors as a proxy for race.3 3 Parents Involved has galvanized the
latter group, which claims the case as support for invalidating such
plans.34 Scholars also disagree over how the Court will review race-
neutral efforts. 35 Justice Kennedy's statement in Parents Involved that
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Pereira, supra note 24.
30 127 S. Ct. at 2792 (KennedyJ, concurring in part and in the judgment).
31 See id. Justice Kennedy did provide some insights on this issue by citing to a voting
rights decision. See id. (citing Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 958 (1996)). This Article explains
the insights that may be drawn from this citation. See infra notes 473-477 and accompany-
ing text.
52 See Konz & Kenning, supra note 17; see also KAHLENBERC, supra note 5, at 3 ("Al-
though the Court struck down plans in Louisville and Seattle, which used race as a factor
in student assignment, it is clear that using a race-neutral alternative-such as family in-
come-is perfectly legal.").
33 See Konz & Kenning, supra note 17.
3 See id. (noting that the attorney who challenged the Louisville plan contends that
the plan is unconstitutional); Pereira, supra note 24.
35 Compare Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Can Michigan Universities Use Proxies for Race After the Ban
on Racial Preferences?, 13 MICH.J. OF RACE & L. 277, 279-80 (2007) (arguing that strict scru-
tiny applies to race-neutral government action), and Kim Forde-Mazrui, The Constitutional
Implications of Race-Neutral Affirmative Action, 88 GEo. L.J. 2331, 2347-48 (2000) (arguing
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strict scrutiny may not apply to race-neutral efforts, 36 along with the
four dissenting justices' view that a less demanding standard than the
traditional understanding of strict scrutiny should have applied to the
Seattle and Louisville student assignment plans,3 7 indicates that the ap-
propriate legal standard for analyzing race-neutral efforts to achieve
diversity and avoid racial isolation remains far from resolved. For those
districts that remain committed to diverse schools, resolution of the
applicable legal standard for race-neutral efforts will determine
whether they continue the battle for integration or must waive the
white flag of defeat. Moreover, the issue of how to integrate public
schools will grow in importance in the coming years as minority stu-
dents soon will make up more than 40 percent of the school-age popu-
lation and as African American and Latino students increasingly attend
suburban schools that previously had not been responsible for educat-
ing such students. 38 Furthermore, the decision on the appropriate
standard of review will guide how courts analyze the full array of race-
neutral government action, including efforts in employment, the
criminal justice arena, housing, and so on. 39
This Article contends that governments should be given wide lati-
tude to adopt race-neutral efforts to avoid racial isolation and create
diverse schools because these efforts will help districts ensure the sub-
stantive equality that the Equal Protection Clause was meant to accom-
plish while avoiding many of the harms of racial classifications. There-
that past precedent will likely lead courts to apply strict scrutiny to race-conscious efforts to
increase the number of minority students admitted to a university), with R. Richard Banks,
The Benign-Invidious Asymmetry in Equal Protection Analysis, 31 HASTINGS CoNsT. L.Q. 573,
578 (2003) ('There is ample reason to conclude, however, that the Court would not apply
strict scrutiny to race-neutral policies intended to benefit disadvantaged racial minori-
ties."), and Kathleen M. Sullivan, After Affirmative Action, 59 OHIo ST. L.J. 1039, 1054
(1998) (asking whether "the goal of increasing racial diversity [should] trigger constitu-
tional skepticism when decoupled from race-specific means" and responding that
"[s]trong arguments suggest that it should not.... [R]ace-neutral proxy devices for seek-
ing racial diversity should not be understood at the outset as implicating a racially dis-
criminatory purpose").
36 127 S. Ct. at 2792 (KennedyJ., concurring in part and in the judgment).
37 Id. at 2819 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("I believe that the law requires application here
of a standard of review that is not 'strict' in the traditional sense of that word, although it
does require the careful review I have just described.").
38 See Wells & Frankenberg, supra note 5, at 187 (citing NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUc. STATIS-
TIcS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDuc., DIGEST OF EDUC. STATISTI cS 72 tbl.40 (2006), available at http://
nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d06/tables/dtO6_- 040.asp).
39 See Banks, supra note 35, at 581; see also Forde-Mazrui, supra note 35, at 2334.
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fore, Justice Kennedy correctly asserted in Parents Involved that strict
scrutiny should not be applied to race-neutral measures.40
This Article develops this argument in three parts. Part I explains
how districts that want to harness the benefits of diverse school set-
tings41 and avoid the harms of racial isolation have very little opportu-
nity after Parents Involved to consider the race of individual students
when assigning students to schools. 42 Part II explores the legal and
scholarly landscape on how race-neutral actions should be treated and
explains why strict scrutiny should not be applied to these actions, as
Justice Kennedy correctly suggested in Parents Involved.4s Part III exam-
ines the competing understandings of the purpose and scope of the
Equal Protection Clause and argues that an antisubordination interpre-
tation of this clause should guide its application. 44 It then reviews the
evidence on the harms of racial isolation and the benefits of integra-
tion and argues that racial isolation has a subordinating effect while
integration can help to remedy that effect. 45 Next, it identifies the
harms and costs associated with a racial classification and explains why
a race-neutral approach avoids most of these harms. 46 It argues that
race-neutral efforts to create diverse schools and avoid racial isolation
can help governments fulfill one of the central goals of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause while avoiding most of the harms of racial classifications.
Thus, it concludes that the law should provide ample room for school
districts to adopt these efforts. 47 To accomplish this, courts should ap-
ply a meaningful interpretation of rational basis review to student as-
signment plans that have the benign purpose and effect of avoiding
racial isolation and advancing diversity.48
40 See 127 S. Ct. at 2792.
41 WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM CONSE-
QUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 219 (1998)
("[D]iversity extends well beyond race and encompasses differences in background, socio-
economic status, country or region of birth, point of view, and religion."); NAT'L ACAD. OF
EDUC., RACE-CONSCIOUS POLICIES FOR ASSIGNING STUDENTS TO SCHOOLS: SOCIAL SCIENCE
RESEARCH AND THE SUPREME COURT CASES 8 (Robert L. Linn & Kevin G. Welner eds.,
2007).
42 See infra notes 49-114 and accompanying text.
43 See infra notes 115-226 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 233-307 and accompanying text.
45 See infra notes 308-417 and accompanying text.
46 See infra notes 418-461 and accompanying text.
47 See infta note 460 and accompanying text.
48 See infra notes 462-503 and accompanying text.
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I. How PARENTS INVOLVED VIRTUALLY CLOSED THE DOOR ON RACIAL
CIASSIFICATIONS IN STUDENT ASSIGNMENT PLANS
For those districts that want to reap the benefits of avoiding racial
isolation and creating diverse schools, Parents Involved virtually closes
the door on the use of the race of individual students to make student
assignments to schools. 49 In that case, both the Seattle and Louisville
plans at issue sought to keep the racial composition of some schools
within a specific range tied to their respective districts' racial composi-
tions. 50 The Court held that neither a remedial interest nor the interest
in creating a diverse student body, which the Court held to be compel-
ling in higher education in the 2003 case of Grutter v. Bollinger,51 could
justify the Louisville or Seattle student assignment plans.5 2 The Court
further held that the Seattle and Louisville student assignment plans
failed two of the narrow tailoring requirements of strict scrutiny.53 First,
both plans affected the attendance location of only a small number of
students. 54 As a result, the Court rejected the districts' assertions that
the plans were necessary to achieve their objectives because the plans'
racial classifications had a minimal impact on school enrollment. 55 In-
stead, the plans' limited impact indicated that alternative approaches
would accomplish the same goals. 5 6 Second, the districts failed to dem-
onstrate that they had examined race-neutral alternatives to the racial
classifications. 5 7 Therefore, the plans were unconstitutional.58
Before turning to the Court's challenging interpretation of the
narrow tailoring requirements, it is worth noting that, after Parents In-
volved, districts that seek to integrate their schools currently stand on
49 See 127 S. Ct 2738, 2751-54, 2759-61 (2007).
50 Id. at 2746. The plaintiffs in Parents Involved challenged a plan for assigning students
to Seattle's high schools under which entering ninth grade students ranked their high
school preferences from all of the district's high schools. Id. at 2746-47. After giving pref-
erence to those students with a sibling who attended the school, the district applied a ra-
cial tiebreaker that sought to keep each school within ten percentage points of the dis-
trict's white/nonwhite racial balance of 41 percent white and 59 percent nonwhite. Id. at
2747. If a school was not within this range, the district assigned students to the school that
resulted in the school reflecting this balance. Id. Under the Louisville student assignment
plan, all non-magnet schools were required to enroll no fewer than 15 percent black stu-
dents and no more than 50 percent black students. Id. at 2749.
51 539 U.S. 306, 328, 334-39 (2003).
52 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2752-54.
53 Id. at 2759-61.
54 Id. at 2759-60.
55 Id. at 2760.
56 Id. at 2759.
57 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2761.
58 Id. at 2746.
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firmer ground on the compelling interest prong of strict scrutiny.59 Jus-
tice Breyer's dissent provided a thoughtful analysis of why the interests
of diverse educational settings and avoiding racial isolation are compel-
ling. 60 Justice Kennedy agreed that these interests are compelling. 61
Therefore, five of the current Supreme Court justices (Justice Kennedy
and the four dissenting justices) would affirm the compelling nature of
these goals. 62
If the Court later shifts closer to the view held by those in the plu-
rality, however, districts will face a steep uphill, and most likely losing,
battle to convince the Court that these interests are compelling. The
plurality opinion in Parents Involved unequivocally condemned any
plans with racial goals linked to the district's demographics. 63 Further-
more, even if districts tie their plans to social science evidence on the
benefits of diversity and avoiding racial isolation in the future, they
might nonetheless fail to convince the Parents Involved plurality that
these interests are compelling. The plurality opinion in Parents Involved
defined the goal of the 1954 Supreme Court case Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation64 as nonracial student assignments and denounced racial classifi-
cations in student assignments as actions that inflict substantial harms
on the nation, such as generating hostility and conflict between the
races. 65 The plurality embraced the removal of race from government
consideration as its "ultimate goal" and criticized racial balancing for
preventing government from treating people as individuals. 66 These
arguments embrace a colorblind Constitution that would likely reject
diversity and avoiding racial isolation as compelling interests. Under a
colorblind Constitution, sanctioning thesc interests as compelling
would thwart efforts to eradicate race from government actions and
would encourage governments to treat individuals on the basis of race,
thereby generating further racial antagonism. 67
59 Id. at 2797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and in the judgment); id. at 2820-24
(Breyer,J., dissenting).
60 Id. at 2820-24 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
61 Id. at 2797 (KennedyJ, concurring in part and in the judgment).
62 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and in the judg-
ment); id. at 2835 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
63 See id. at 2757-58 (plurality opinion).
64 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
65 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2767-68 (plurality opinion).
66 Id. at 2757-58 (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495
(1989) (plurality opinion)).
67 The justices in the plurality need not deny the importance of diversity and avoiding
racial isolation in elementary and secondary education to decline to find these interests
compelling. Instead, they need only to find that the potential harms of endorsing these
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Districts that want to use a racial classification to achieve diversity
and to avoid racial isolation will encounter tremendous difficulty satisfy-
ing the Court's narrow tailoring requirements, particularly after Parents
Involved.6 Even if the Court formally holds that diversity and avoiding
racial isolation are compelling interests, the majority's narrow tailoring
analysis leaves at best a limited set of circumstances under which dis-
tricts may adopt a racial classification to achieve these interests.69 First,
the "necessity requirement" represents one of the chief obstacles a dis-
trict will encounter when it tries to satisfy the narrow tailoring prong of
strict scrutiny.70 In order to show that a racial classification is necessary,
a district must prove that it can neither achieve diversity nor avoid ra-
cial isolation without the classification. 7' Thus, the necessity require-
ment dovetails with the requirement that a district show its "serious,
good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives. "72 A dis-
trict could meet this standard by developing careful documentation of
the race-neutral options it examined and the ineffectiveness or nonfea-
sibility of those options in meeting its objectives when compared with a
racial classification. 73 Parents Involved held that both Seattle and Louis-
ville failed to meet this requirement. 74 While a former superintendent
and former president of the school board conceded that the district
had not studied or examined race-neutral alternatives, including re-
goals as compelling outweigh their benefits. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476
U.S. 267, 276 (1986) (plurality opinion) (rejecting societal discrimination as a compelling
interest while recognizing that "[n]o one doubts that there has been serious racial dis-
crimination in this country").
68 Some scholars correctly anticipated that the narrow tailoring requirements of strict
scrutiny would prove too difficult for school districts. See, e.g., Deborah N. Archer, Moving
Beyond Strict Scrutiny: The Need for a More Nuanced Standard of Equal Protection Analysis for K
Through 12 Integration Programs, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 629, 638 (2007) ("Navigating the
Grutter framework may prove too difficult for public secondary and elementary schools.");
David I. Levine, Public School Assignment Methods After Grutter and Gratz: The View from San
Francisco, 30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 511, 518 (2003) (arguing that, after Grutter, districts
will have "significant difficulty meeting the narrow tailoring prong of the strict scrutiny
analysis").
69 Even before the Parents Involved decision, scholars had argued that plans to integrate
elementary and secondary schools should not be subject to the Court's current approach
to strict scrutiny. See Archer, supra note 68, at 664; James E. Ryan, Voluntary Integration: Ask-
ing the Right Questions, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 327, 339-44 (2006).
70 See, e.g., Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2759-60.
71 See id
72 Id. at 2760 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339).
73 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339.
74 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2760 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339).
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placing race with class or using a student lottery,75 Louisville did con-
tend that the board had considered several race-neutral approaches,
including a lottery and socioeconomic criterion, and that the board
had concluded that the schools would no longer be racially integrated
under these approaches.76 Thus, the judgment in Parents Involved sends
a message to districts that a thorough review of numerous race-neutral
alternatives should be undertaken and that the evidentiary basis for
rejecting these alternatives must be identified and recorded. 77
Even if a district considers race-neutral alternatives, the necessity
requirement will create a difficult burden for a school district to meet
for several reasons. First, a district must define the racial composition
that it requires to achieve the benefits of diversity or to avoid racial isola-
tion. 78 A court would likely require social science evidence to demon-
strate that the educational and other benefits that the district seeks to
achieve require a specific racial composition or at least some minimal
enrollment of students from various racial groups.79 One difficulty with
meeting this standard may be that, although the research shows persua-
sive evidence of benefits from diversity and avoiding racial isolation
when contrasted with racially isolated or nondiverse schools, research
does not (yet) establish the composition of students needed to achieve
these benefits.80 Without an understanding of the mix of students that
must be brought together to achieve the benefits of diversity or of avoid-
75 Joint Appendix at 224a-25a, 253a-59a, Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (Nos. 05-
908, 05-915), available at 2006 WL 2468689.
76 Brief of Respondent at 3, 8, 47-48, Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (Nos. 05-908,
05-915), available at 2006 WL 2944684.
77 See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2760.
78 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 335.
79 See id. ("[T]he Law School's concept of critical mass is defined by reference to the
educational benefits that diversity is designed to produce.").
80 NAT'L ACAD. OF EDUC., supra note 41, at 2. The National Academy of Education's
report on race-conscious policies noted that the committee on Social Science Research
Evidence on Racial Diversity in Schools reviewed the studies cited in the briefs for the Par-
ents Involved cases that argued that a minimum percentage of minority enrollment between
fifteen to thirty percent would avoid these harms and
determined that the research does not support the conclusion that any par-
ticular percent enrollment is sufficient to avoid the harms associated with ra-
cial isolation or that there is a specified relationship between increased diver-
sity and educational benefits as the percent moves from 15 to 30 percent
[which some Parents Involved briefs had argued was sufficient] and beyond.
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ing racial isolation, a district will face an almost insurmountable obstacle
in proving that a racial classification is necessary in the Court's eyes.81
A closely related challenge a district may face in showing that a
racial classification is necessary arises from the fact that districts often-
times achieve some diversity and avoid some racial isolation from race-
neutral efforts. 82 The plurality in Parents Involved criticized the Louis-
ville and Seattle districts for just this shortcoming.8 3 For example, it dis-
approved of the use of a racial classification to determine enrollment at
one Seattle high school that decreased minority enrollment and in-
creased white enrollment because "[w]hen the actual racial breakdown
is considered, enrolling students without regard to their race yields a
substantially diverse student body under any definition of diversity."84
The majority similarly condemned both districts' use of racial classifica-
tions in student assignments because the districts indicated that the
classifications had a minimal impact on diversity and avoiding racial
isolation.8 5 When a district has achieved some diversity or avoided some
racial isolation without a racial classification, it must show why its
schools need the additional marginal increase in diversity or the addi-
tional ability to avoid racial isolation to achieve its goals. 86
Even if research does establish the racial composition required to
achieve the benefits of diversity or to avoid the harms of racial isolation
and the district can establish that a racial classification is necessary to
achieve this racial composition, the Court might label the specified lev-
els an unconstitutional quota.87 Precedent indicates that the Court will
not countenance the use of fixed racial goals that establish seats that are
81 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330.
82 See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2756 (plurality opinion).
83 Id. ("In each case the extreme measure of relying on race in assignments is unneces-
sary to achieve the stated goals, even as defined by the districts.").
84 Id. at 2756-57. The plurality also stated:
[A] t Franklin High School in Seattle, the racial tiebreaker was applied because
nonwhite enrollment exceeded 69 percent, and resulted in an incoming ninth-
grade class in 2000-2001 that was 30.3 percent Asian-American, 21.9 percent
African-American, 6.8 percent Latino, 0.5 percent Native-American, and 40.5
percent Caucasian. Without the racial tiebreaker, the class would have been
39.6 percent Asian-American, 30.2 percent African-American, 8.3 percent La-
tino, 1.1 percent Native-American, and 20.8 percent Caucasian.
Id. at 2756.
85 Id. at 2759-60 (majority opinion).
86 See, e.g., id. at 2756-57 (plurality opinion).
87 See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334.
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"reserved exclusively for certain minority groups."8s Therefore, when a
school district seeks to establish that its goal of diversity or avoiding ra-
cial isolation requires it to consider race in student assignments, it may
be caught between the Scylla of insufficient evidence on the racial com-
position needed to accomplish these goals and the Charybdis of suffi-
cient specificity on these issues that renders its program a quota in the
Court's eyes.
To avoid this dilemma, a school district could attempt to chart a
course of action based upon the Court's instructions in Grutter, in
which the Court upheld the University of Michigan Law School's efforts
to achieve a critical mass of minority students and rejected arguments
that the admissions program operated as a quota.8 9 Grutter indicates
that the Court may approve of "minimum goals for minority enroll-
ment" when those goals embody "a range demarcated by the goal it-
self."90 Such goals must operate flexibly and must permit the considera-
tion of competing goals, so that a student that does not further the
goals is not foreclosed from enrollment. 91 For example, if a district
seeks to achieve diversity in its schools, to show sufficient flexibility in its
use of a racial classification the district would be required to undertake
a nonmechanical consideration of an array of factors and thus enable
all students to be eligible for all seats in a school. 92 Even absent exami-
nation of the broad array of factors that define diversity, a district that
seeks to avoid racial isolation similarly would need to maintain flexibil-
ity in the goals it sets and the operation of its program. 93
88 Croson, 488 U.S. at 496; see also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334 ("To be narrowly tailored, a
race-conscious admissions program cannot use a quota system-it cannot 'insulat[e] each
category of applicants with certain desired qualifications from competition with all other
applicants.'" (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317 (1978) (plu-
rality opinion)); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317 (plurality opinion) (criticizing the student admis-
sions plan for the University of California at Davis medical school for preventing whites
from competing for seats set aside for minority candidates).
89 539 U.S. at 337.
90 Id. at 335 (quoting Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 495 (1986)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)) (emphasis omitted); see also Ryan,
supra note 69, at 340-41 ("The formalistic definition of quotas, in any event, seems merely to
require that plans establish rough goals or ranges of permissible enrollments, which most
plans already do and which is easy enough to fix in plans that do not.").
91 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334-35.
92 See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2753; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334-35; see also Parents In-
volved, 127 S. Ct. at 2792-93 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and in the judgment) (noting
that racial composition represents only one aspect of a diverse student body).
93 See Ryan, supra note 69, at 340-41 ("The formalistic definition of quotas, in any
event, seems merely to require that plans establish rough goals or ranges of permissible
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School districts that adopt a racial classification also must be mind-
ful that, although Parents Involved held that the Seattle and Louisville
student assignment plans were not necessary because they only affected
where a small number or percentage of students attended school, 94 to
satisfy the narrow tailoring requirements a district also must prove that
its student assignment plan does "not unduly harm members of any ra-
cial group. '95 This requires a district to show that the student assign-
ment plan inflicts "the least harm possible" to those who sought to ob-
tain but ultimately were denied the benefit. 96 A district might address
this requirement by distributing the burden of the racial classification
fairly evenly among racial groups based on the proportions of each ra-
cial group within the district. This could be a difficult requirement to
meet, however, if one racial group is more geographically isolated in a
district than other groups and thus integrating this group requires it to
forego its neighborhood schools and to travel to distant schools more
often than other racial groups. Furthermore, many school districts ex-
perience substantial disparities in quality between schools. Therefore,
once again, a district trying to meet the narrow tailoring requirement
could be caught between the rock of showing that its student assign-
ment plan determines where a significant number or percentage of stu-
dents attends school and the hard place of imposing too great a burden
on those who are denied the school of their choice based on race. 97
Moreover, even if a district desires to implement a plan similar to
the one in Grutter, it faces substantial difficulty in operationalizing such
a plan for elementary and secondary schoolchildren. Like most school
districts, those that have implemented voluntary integration plans typi-
cally do not assign students on the basis of merit and do not undertake
an individualized review of each student (with the exception of a small
number of magnet and examination schools).98 Therefore, school dis-
tricts would have to overhaul their student assignment policies to un-
dertake the kind of holistic review that the Court upheld in Grutte.9
This would require the expenditure of substantial resources and ad-
ministrative effort that a school district might not have available in its
enrollments, which most plans already do and which is easy enough to fix in plans that do
not.").
94 127 S. Ct. at 2759-60.
95 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341.
9 Id. (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 308 (plurality opinion)).
97 See id. at 334; NAT'L ACAD. OF EDUC., supra note 41, at 2.
98 See Ryan, supra note 69, at 341 ("Only a few selective examination or magnet schools
come close to considering individual students and basing decisions on merit.").
99 See id. at 342.
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budget. Furthermore, as some have recognized, it would be ridiculous
to require school administrators to undertake such detailed review of
scores of very young schoolchildren. 100
The Court also could disapprove of a district's student assignment
plan that seeks to avoid racial isolation because it focuses on racial
group membership rather than on indivi~ual stil .nts. Justice Ken-
nedy's approval of the use of a racial classification appears only to envi-
sion an approach "informed by Grutter" but tailored to the elementary
and secondary context, in which a district undertakes "if necessary, a
more nuanced, individual evaluation of school needs and student char-
acteristics that might include race as a component."10' Kennedy did not
hide his disdain for government use of racial classifications when he
stated that "[r]eduction of an individual to an assigned racial identity
for differential treatment is among the most pernicious actions our
government can undertake."'1 2 The majority in Parents Involved distin-
guished the affirmative action program in Grutter from the Seattle and
Louisville plans by the failure of the latter to treat each student "as an
individual, and not simply as a member of a particular racial group." 10 3
The plurality contended that the plans' race-based treatment of stu-
dents conflicted with the districts' objective of ensuring sufficient diver-
sity in the student body to enable students to see their classmates from
other races as individuals and not just members of a racial group. 10 4
Thus, these opinions in Parents Involved soundly denounce those gov-
ernment actions, solely based on race, that fail to employ an individual-
ized consideration of students. 105
This position clashes with the recognition by Justice Kennedy and
the four dissenting justices that avoiding racial isolation is a compelling
interest.10 6 The dispositive factor for avoiding racial isolation is race-
100 See id.; Levine, supra note 68, at 521.
101 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2793 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and in the judg-
ment).
102 Id. at 2796.
103 Id. at 2753; see also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337 ("When using race as a 'plus' factor in
university admissions, a university's admissions program must remain flexible enough to
ensure that each applicant is evaluated as an individual and not in a way that makes an
applicant's race or ethnicity the defining feature of his or her application. The importance
of this individualized consideration in the context of a race-conscious admissions program
is paramount.").
104 Id. at 2759 (plurality opinion).
105 See id. at 2753, 2759; id. at 2796 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and in the judg-
ment).
106 See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and in the
judgment); id. at 2835 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
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unadorned and unaccompanied. Given this fact, James Ryan has rec-
ognized that the requirement for individualized, holistic review should
not be applied to plans that seek to avoid racial isolation.'0 7 In light of
the approval of avoiding racial isolation as a compelling interest by five
members of the Court in Parents Involved, the Court could recognize in
the future that, unlike diversity, preventing racial isolation requires dis-
tinguishing between and assigning students on the basis of their race 108
and that the benefits of avoiding racial isolation outweigh the harms
that a lack of individualized consideration may engender. 1°9 Alterna-
tively, Justice Kennedy might require districts to consider how to avoid
racial isolation along with a variety of other factors, or he might only
approve of efforts to avoid racial isolation through race-neutral
means. 110 This would enable the Court to downplay the use of race as it
has preferred to do in the past.'11
Ultimately, this analysis reveals that a school district seeking to use
a racial classification faces a series of difficult hurdles to satisfy the
Court's narrow tailoring requirements. The difficulty of meeting these
requirements may have led Justice Breyer to contend that although
many school districts that consider race in making student-assignment
or transfer decisions have found the consideration of race to be critical
and "sometimes necessary," these districts oftentimes will find their ef-
forts unlawful under the majority's opinion and always will find their
efforts unlawful under the plurality's approach. 112 Furthermore, even
when a district decides to adopt a racial classification, it will use it only
in very rare circumstances given Justice Kennedy's contention that
school districts must not adopt racial classifications on a widespread
basis.113 Thus, commentary on Parents Involved generally agrees that the
Court has either closed the door on or left only a narrow opening for
107 Ryan, supra note 69, at 341.
108 See id. at 342 ("If reducing racial isolation and increasing racial integration are con-
sidered constitutionally permissible goals, it would seem to follow that race alone-and
not each student's overall potential to enhance diversity-can and should form the basis
for decisions.").
109 See id.
110 See id. at 343 ("[C]ourts-and ultimately the Supreme Court-may nonetheless see
value in at least requiring that race not be the only factor that guides student assign-
ments.").
III See id. ("One sees in Grutter and Gratz, and Bakke before them, evidence of a belief
that it is better if the use of race is hidden rather than overt.").
112 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2835 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court's
opinion has transformed strict scrutiny from "strict to fatal in fact" (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
115 See id. at 2797 (KennedyJ., concurring in part and in the judgment).
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using racial classifications in student assignment plans.114 Therefore,
districts that pursue diverse schools and seek to avoid racial isolation
overwhelmingly will focus on race-neutral approaches. Part II explores
what Supreme Court precedent and scholarly opinion tells us about the
constitutionality of race-neutral student assignment plans.
II. THE LEGAL AND SCHOLARLY LANDSCAPE OF RACE-NEUTRAL
GOVERNMENT ACTION
The U.S. Supreme Court has not directly confronted the legality of
race-neutral actions. (Again, a race-neutral action does not consider the
114 See John Brittain et al., Racial Disparities in Educational Opportunities in the United
States, 6 SEATTLEJ. FOR SOC. JUST. 591, 610 (2008) ('The Court left a small window for the
use of narrowly tailored race-conscious measures."); Heeren, supra note 16, at 133 ('This
Article concludes that race-based plans remain constitutionally permissible after [Parents
Involved], but only with exacting standards school districts will find difficult if not impossi-
ble to meet or in circumstances where the plan is largely ineffective at effecting change in
school composition."); Rene M. Landers, Massachusetts Health Insurance Reform Legislation:
An Effective Tool for Addressing Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Health Care?, 29 HAMLINE J.
PUB. L. & POL'Y 1, 17 (2007) ("Even though Justice Kennedy provided the fifth vote to
invalidate the Seattle and Louisville school assignment programs, his reasoning kept the
notion that race-based programs have constitutional validity alive, albeit on life support.");
Ryan, supra note 5, at 148 (2007) (noting that, for districts that continue to pursue integra-
tion, the Parents Involved decision "takes one means of accomplishing that goal off the
table"); David A. Strauss, Little Rock and the Legacy of Brown, 52 ST. LouIs U. LJ. 1065, 1083
(2008) ("[Tlhe plurality in Parents Involved all but declared that racial classifications may
never be used .... The Court has never before come so close to declaring the use of race
unconstitutional across the board."); William E. Thro, The Constitutional, Educational, and
Institutional Implications of the Majority and Concurring Opinions in Parents Involved for
Community Schools, 231 ED. L. REP. 495, 496 (2008) ("Except in those previously segre-
gated districts that have not been declared unitary by the federal courts, school officials
may not utilize race in making individual student assignments. School districts that pres-
ently do so must change their policies.... [R]acial integration will be difficult, if not im-
possible, to achieve."); Lauren E. Winters, Colorblind Context: Redefining Race-Conscious Poli-
cies in Primary and Secondary Education, 86 OR. L. REv. 679, 719 (2007) ("Parents, a plurality
opinion, does not prohibit primary school officials from considering race in deciding
whether students may attend the school of their choice; however, the reality is that Justice
Kennedy's concurring opinion severely limits the ability to use race as a tool for eliminat-
ing de facto segregation."); Alexandra Villarreal O'Rourke, Note, Picking Up the Pieces After
PICS: Evaluating Current Efforts to Narrow the Education Gap, 11 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 263,
264-65 (2008) ("Ultimately, Justice Kennedy provided the crucial fifth vote necessary to
invalidate two school districts' race-conscious student assignment plans under the Equal
Protection Clause. Given this outcome and the prevailing Justices' views about Brown, the
PICS decision appears to forbid any use of race in student assignment plans."); Walsh, su-
pra note 8, at 1 (noting the comments of education attorneys who allege that the decision
signals to educators that the time to consider race in student assignments has ended and
one advocate for urban districts contended that "[f]or all intents and purposes, the court
said that you can use race, but we dare you to come up with a solution that passes mus-
ter").
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race of individuals but rather is taken "at least in part 'because of,' not
merely 'in spite of"' a racial goal.)115 As the Court has not addressed the
issue of what standard ofjudicial review applies to such actions, this Part
analyzes Supreme Court precedent that will likely influence the Court's
decision on what standard of review to apply to race-neutral government
action and surveys scholarly opinion on this issue.116 This Part con-
cludes that, contrary to the opinion of some scholars, the Court proba-
bly will not apply strict scrutiny to a race-neutral student assignment
plan.117 In addition, this Part reveals how intermediate scrutiny and a
meaningful interpretation of rational basis review can serve some of the
same functions as strict scrutiny. 18
In deciding on a student assignment plan, a school district might
adopt a racial goal that shapes how it makes assignments at all of its
schools, as did the Seattle and Louisville districts. 119 Alternatively, a dis-
trict also may focus on ensuring that a magnet school or other special-
ized school enrolls a diverse student body or may strive to achieve di-
versity when it decides the location of a new school. 120
A school district might also adopt a student assignment plan to
achieve a variety of educational (rather than racial) goals.121 In those
instances, the plan should be judged according to the criteria used in
the plan. 122 For example, if a school district adopts a class integration
plan that considers a student's socioeconomic class for the purpose of
developing middle class schools, then precedent dictates that rational
basis review would apply.123 In 1995, the Supreme Court, in Adarand
115 See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991) (quoting Pers. Admin'r of
Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1976)); see also id. at 362 ("Equal protection analysis
turns on the intended consequences of government classifications. Unless the government
actor adopted a criterion with the intent of causing the impact asserted, that impact itself
does not violate the principle of race neutrality.").
116 See infra notes 124-224 and accompanying text.
117 Instead, this Article agrees with the majority of scholars who conclude that the
Court will not apply strict scrutiny to race-neutral government action. See infra notes 219-
223 and accompanying text.
118 See Parents Involved in Cmty Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2797
(2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and in the judgment); id. at 2835 (Breyer, J., dis-
senting); infra notes 137-181 and accompanying text.
119 See Ryan, supra note 5, at 145.
120 See id.
121 See KAHLENBERG, supra note 5, at 37 (describing a district that pursues class integra-
tion).
122 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50-53 (1973) ("Only
where state action impinges on the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights or liber-
ties must it be [subject to strict scrutiny].").
125 See id. at 18-28.
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Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, considered the constitutionality of a contract-
ing program that provided highway contracts to disadvantaged busi-
nesses and included a rebuttable race-based presumption to make
some certification determinations. 124 The Court agreed that, because
the elements of the challenged contracting program were based on
disadvantage rather than race, they were race neutral and thus subject
to "the most relaxed judicial scrutiny."' 125
Legal precedent and scholarly opinion send mixed signals about
the constitutionality of race-neutral government action. For instance,
Kim Forde-Mazrui has argued that some of the Court's past cases can
be read to indicate that the Court will apply strict scrutiny to a race-
neutral law that serves a "benign" racial purpose because that purpose
is still discriminatory.126 He noted that the Court in the 1976 case Wash-
ington v. Davis established that strict scrutiny applies to a government
action with a discriminatory purpose whether that action is race-neutral
or a race-based classification. 127 He pointed to the 1979 case Personnel
Administrator v. Feeney as the case that defined "discriminatory purpose"
as requiring a showing that the government actor "'selected or reaf-
firmed a particular course of action at least in part because of, not
merely in spite of, its adverse effects upon an identifiable group."' 128
Furthermore, in 1989 the Court in City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co.
established that strict scrutiny applies to all state racial classifications
without regard to the race of the group that is benefited or harmed by
the racial classification, 129 and Adarand extended this rule to all federal
racial classifications.130 He explained that Croson and Adarand defined
discrimination as including actions that benefited minorities at the ex-
pense of whites. 131 Therefore, he concluded that
when a legislature or public university intentionally seeks to
admit minority students through race-neutral means, such as
disadvantage-based preferences, it has taken a course of action
"because of' and not merely "in spite of" its effect on racial
minorities. Such efforts, therefore, should trigger the same
124 515 U.S. 200, 212-13 (1995).
125 Id.
126 Forde-Mazrui, supra note 35, at 2346-48.
127 Id. at 2347 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244-45 (1976)).
128 Id. (quoting Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279) (internal quotation marks omitted).
129 Id.
i0 Id. at 2347-48.
i11 Forde-Mazrui, supra note 35, at 2347-48.
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strict, and usually fatal, scrutiny applicable to admission poli-
cies that rely on racial classifications.
132
Others also contend that the Court will or should apply strict scrutiny
to race-neutral government actions or that such efforts should be
struck down. 133
A. Why Strict Scrutiny Is Unnecessary to Uncover Illegitimate Motives
Several arguments support why a court or scholars might believe
that strict scrutiny represents the appropriate standard. Effective review
of race-neutral efforts to increase diversity and avoid racial isolation,
however, does not demand the application of strict scrutiny. The Su-
preme Court has noted that strict scrutiny enables it to separate racial
classifications that seek to achieve a benign goal from those that seek to
achieve an invidious one. For example, the plurality in Croson stated
that:
[a] bsent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for
such race-based measures, there is simply no way of determin-
ing what classifications are "benign" or "remedial" and what
classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of
racial inferiority or simple racial politics. Indeed, the purpose
of strict scrutiny is to "smoke out" illegitimate uses of race by
assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important
enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool. 134
The Court has reaffirmed this view and its inability to distinguish im-
proper motives from benign motives absent strict scrutiny.135 In the
same fashion, a lower court reviewing a race-neutral plan to enhance
diversity and avoid racial isolation might believe that it similarly needs
132 Id. at 2348.
133 See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Narrow Tailoring, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1781, 1791-92 (1996) (con-
tending that strict scrutiny would apply to race-neutral action because of the program's
racial motivation); Chapin Cimino, Class-Based Preferences in Affirmative Action Programs After
Miller v.Johnson: A Race-Neutral Option, or Subterfuge?, 64U. CHI. L. REv. 1289, 1310 (1997)
(arguing that class-based preferences violate the principle against subterfuge in the voting
rights cases and thus would be found unconstitutional); Fitzpatrick, supra note 35, at 279-
80 (arguing that that the Court should apply strict scrutiny to race-neutral classifications,
inter alia, because the failure to do so would render it too easy to circumvent antidiscrimi-
nation laws by using racial proxies).
13 City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion).
135 SeeJohnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 506 (2005); Adarand, 515 U.S. at 226; see also
Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2764 (plurality opinion) (stating that past Supreme Court
decisions "clearly reject the argument that motives affect the strict scrutiny analysis").
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to apply strict scrutiny to be able to distinguish a benign goal from an
invidious one. 13 6
The Court has demonstrated, however, that it can uncover ille-
gitimate motives without applying strict scrutiny. Even before the ad-
vent of "strict scrutiny," the Court demonstrated its ability to uncover
illegitimate motives through its equal protection analysis. In 1886, in
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a San
Francisco ordinance that forbade the operation of a laundry business
without the approval of the city's board of supervisors. 13 7 The Court
held that, although the text of the law was "fair on its face, and impar-
tial in appearance," the unequal application of the law to deny those of
Chinese ancestry the opportunity to operate a laundry business while
granting that privilege to others violated the Equal Protection
Clause. s38 Rather than apply strict scrutiny, the Court assessed the ef-
fect of the board's exercise of discretion. 39 Although the Court rarely
struck down laws under the Equal Protection Clause until the 1950s,140
it did not require strict scrutiny to uncover illegitimate motives when it
began to use the Clause to combat discrimination.14 1
136 The fact that the school district is not explicitly considering race does not guaran-
tee that the racial goal that it seeks to achieve is a benevolent one. Instead, a district could
seek to divide students through a race-neutral mechanism, just as school districts that op-
posed the Court's ruling in Brown sought to evade its mandate by enacting freedom of
choice plans or other plans that left segregation in place without explicitly requiring it.
MARK G. YUDOF ET AL., EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW 373 (4th ed. 2002) (explain-
ing that, among the devices to resist desegregation after Brown, "[t]he most important of
these devices was the pupil assignment law, which purported to assign pupils to schools on
the basis of considerations and characteristics other than race. In practice, such laws per-
petuated one-race schools").
137 See 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886).
138 Id. at 373.
139 Id.
140 See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927) (referring to the Equal Protection Clause
as "the last resort of constitutional arguments"); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 668 (3d ed. 2006) ("The promise of [the Equal
Protection Clause] went unrealized for almost a century as the Supreme Court rarely
found any state or local action to violate the [clause] until the mid-1950s.").
141 See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 32 (1971) (up-
holding lower court's order to school board to desegregate its schools); Green v. County
Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 441-42 (1968) (holding that school board's "freedom of choice"
plan, tinder which primary and secondary students could choose their school, represented
an effort to avoid compliance with Brown because the board had foregone far more effec-
tive means of desegregation); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1958) (invalidating
state's efforts to delay school desegregation, despite state's purported goal of "promot[ing]
the public peace by preventing race conflicts"); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 140, at
668 ("Since Brown, the Supreme Court has relied on the equal protection clause as a key
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Furthermore, the Court's use of intermediate scrutiny and rational
basis review demonstrate that strict scrutiny does not represent the only
standard employed under the Equal Protection Clause that enables the
Court to distinguish benign motives from illegitimate ones. 142 For ex-
ample, in its 1975 ruling in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, the Court applied
intermediate scrutiny to a statute that provided social security benefits
to widows but not to widowers; the government argued the statute's
purpose was to compensate women for the financial difficulties they
face in supporting their families. 143 Upon investigation of the actual
purpose, however, the statute and legislative history revealed that con-
gressional intent in providing benefits only to women was "to permit
women to elect not to work and to devote themselves to the care of
children" -a purpose that "in no way is premised upon any special dis-
advantages of women." 144 The Court explained that it "need not in
equal protection cases accept at face value assertions of legislative pur-
poses, when an examination of the legislative scheme and its history
demonstrates that the asserted purpose could not have been a goal of
the legislation."1 45 Even though the Court has approved of statutes that
reduce the disparities in financial conditions between women and
men, 146 it did not allow the government's mere recitation of this objec-
tive to deter its examination of Congress's actual motive. 147 Instead, it
used intermediate scrutiny to uncover an improper motive that led to
the statute's invalidation. 148
Similarly, in the 1980 case Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Insurance Co.,
the Court held that a classification that sought to provide for financially
needy surviving spouses by paying benefits to all female surviving
spouses while requiring men to prove dependency did not substantially
provision for combating invidious discrimination and for safeguarding fundamental
rights.").
142 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420
U.S. 636, 648 (1975).
143 420 U.S. at 618.
144 Id. at 648.
145 Id. at 648 n.16; see also Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 84 (1979) (rejecting statute
in which benefits were provided to families when the father had lost his job but not the
mother, because the classification was designed to reduce costs rather than the objective
proffered by Congress).
146 See, e.g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317-20 (1977) ("Reduction of the dispar-
ity in economic condition between men and women caused by the long history of dis-
crimination against women has been recognized as ... an important governmental objec-
tive [sufficient to withstand scrutiny under the equal protection component of the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause].").
147 Id.
14S Id.
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further the important objective of the statute because that objective
could be served absent the differential treatment. 149 The Court re-
jected the state legislature's assertion that the financial conditions of
employed men and women validated automatically giving the benefit to
widows and instead found that the administrative convenience driving
the state's actions represented an insufficient justification for a gender
classification. 150 Therefore, intermediate scrutiny again proved ade-
quate to uncover an ulterior and ultimately illegitimate motive. 151
The Court also has used rational basis review to uncover impermis-
sible motives and thus strike down government action, although it has
rarely struck down laws as unconstitutional under this test.152 Rational
basis review represents the minimum standard that a law must meet to
be consistent with the Equal Protection Clause. 153 It requires that a law
be rationally related to a legitimate government purpose, and those
who challenge a law reviewed under this standard bear the burden of
proving that the law represents an arbitrary or irrational government
action. 154 The government may proffer any legitimate purpose to sup-
port the legislation even if that purpose does not represent the actual
purpose of the legislation. 155
The Court found an impermissible motive behind the law at issue
in its 1996 case Romer v. Evans. There, the Court applied rational basis
review to strike down a Colorado law repealing legislation that had pro-
tected homosexuals and bisexuals from discrimination and that pre-
vented the government from protecting such individuals in the fu-
ture. 156 The Court concluded that animus toward homosexuals and
bisexuals motivated the law and, therefore, that the law lacked the le-
149 446 U.S. 142, 150-52 (1980).
150 Id.
151 See id.
152 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 140, at 689; Goodwin Liu, Brown, Bollinger, and Beyond,
47 How. L.J. 705, 767 (2004) ("[T he Court has shown itself capable of applying rigorous
scrutiny through rational basis review to policies that impinge on important interests or
potentially vulnerable groups.").
153 See, e.g., Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 14 (1988) (noting that, under ra-
tional basis review, a government actor need only show that "the classification scheme em-
bodied in the [law] is 'rationally related to a legitimate state interest'" (quoting City of
New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976)); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 140, at
672, 677.
154 Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 331-32 (1981).
155 See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).
156 Romer, 517 U.S. at 635 ("We must conclude that Amendment 2 classifies homosexu-
als not to further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else. This
Colorado cannot do.").
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gitimate purpose required by rational basis review. 157 Similarly, the
Court held in the 1973 case U.S. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno that
a congressional intent to exclude "hippies" from the food stamp pro-
gram did not supply a legitimate government interest for a statute that
excluded households in which an unrelated individual lived. 158 Like-
wise, the Court also held in the 1985 case City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Liv-
ing Cente, Inc. that "an irrational prejudice against the mentally re-
tarded" had led Cleburne, Texas, to withhold a special-use permit from
a group home for mentally retarded individuals and that the denial
failed rational basis review. 159
Some contend that the foregoing cases represent a more demand-
ing or heightened interpretation of rational basis review. 16° The Court
itself has admitted that its rational basis jurisprudence has been less
than consistent or uniform, 161 and it has rarely and unpredictably in-
voked this more substantial version. 162 Despite its inconsistent applica-
157 Id. at 634-35.
158 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
159 473 U.S. 432, 446, 450 (1985). Although Cleburne can be characterized as a case in
which the Court applied the rational basis test with more "bite" than it typically applies for
rational basis review, the decision "also can be seen as a straightforward application of
rational basis review: Drawing a distinction between a home for the mentally disabled and
all other facilities is based on nothing other than irrational prejudices and thus fails even
deferential scrutiny." CHEMERINSKY, supra note 140, at 688.
160 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation of Antigay Discourse
and the Channeling Effect ofJudicial Review, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1327, 1383-84 (2000) (referring
to rational basis review of Romer as more scrutinizing than normal rational basis review and as
"rationality plus"); Nan. D. Hunter, Living with Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REv. 1103, 1104 (2004)
(describing the analysis in Romer as heightened rational basis review); Barry P. McDonald, If
Obscenity Were to Discriminate, 103 Nw. U. L. REv. 72, 82 (2008) (noting that the Court in Romer
used a "heightened" rational basis review); Mark Strasser, Rebellion in the Eleventh Circuit: On
Lawrence, Lofton, and the Best Interests of Children, 40 TULSA L. REv. 421, 436 (2005) (agreeing
with Justice O'Connor that the Supreme Court sometimes uses heightened rational basis
review and referring to Cleburne as an example); Erica Williamson, Moving Past Hippies and
Harassment: A Historical Approach to Sex, Appearance, and the Workplace, 56 DuKE L.J. 681, 719
n.180 (2006) (acknowledging the use of heightened rational basis review and referring to it
as a form of judicial activism); The Supreme Court, 2005 Term-Leading Cases: Redistricting-
Partisan Gerrymandering, 120 HARv. L. REv. 243, 253 n.60 (2006) (referring to the analysis in
Romer v. Evans, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., and United States Department of
Agriculture v. Moreno as heightened rational basis).
161 SeeU.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 176-77 n.10 (1980).
162 See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REv. 481, 517 (2004)
("[D]ivergent emphases [in rational basis review] reflect a persistent tension about the
nature of rational basis review, which has left the doctrine with a somewhat unpredictable
feel and, at times, without sufficient focus on whether a meaningful connection exists be-
tween government action and the purported justifications for that action."); Jeffrey M.
Shaman, The Evolution of Equality in State Constitutional Law, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 1013, 1028
(2003).
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tion, the Court can employ rational basis review to uncover illegitimate
motives, even if that review is a bit more rigorous than usual.
In fact, the Court understands rational basis review in part as a
standard that seeks to reveal when a government actor attempts to dis-
advantage a particular group because of a hostility or prejudice toward
that group. 163 As the Court explained when it applied rational basis re-
view in Moreno, "[I]f the constitutional conception of 'equal protection
of the laws' means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare
... desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a
legitimate governmental interest."'164
These cases establish that a court need not cling to strict scrutiny
as the sole means available to uncover improper motives; courts can
uncover an improper motive regardless of the standard that is ap-
plied. 165 A court, therefore, need not decide the level of scrutiny that it
will apply to determine if an improper or illegitimate motive exists. In-
stead, as proposed below, a court could examine the motive behind the
race-neutral action as a preliminary matter and then apply rational ba-
sis review to those actions that serve a benign purpose and do not use a
suspect classification, such as gender. 166
B. Why Strict Scrutiny's Analysis of the Connection Between the Classification
and the Objective Is Unnecessary to Uncover Government Action
Motivated by Stereotype of Prejudice
Another argument favoring the application of strict scrutiny to a
race-neutral student assignment plan is that it enables courts to ensure
such a close fit between the racial classification and its goal that little or
no room remains for a racial stereotype or prejudice to have motivated
the government actor. 167 Here again, strict scrutiny does not represent
the only standard that can uncover illegitimate stereotypes or preju-
dices through its examination of the fit between the government action
and its alleged goal. In fact, the Court's justification for using interme-
diate scrutiny in the context of a sex classification 168 closely mirrors
that for using strict scrutiny. The Court has explained, in requiring a
substantial relationship between a sex classification and its objective,
that "[t]he purpose of requiring that close relationship is to assure that
163 See Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534.
164 Id. (emphasis added).
165 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 635; Weinberge, 420 U.S. at 648.
166 See infra notes 462-503 and accompanying text.
167 See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (plurality opinion).
168 SeeCraigv. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
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the validity of a classification is determined through reasoned analysis
rather than through the mechanical application of traditional, often
inaccurate, assumptions about the proper roles of men and women. 169
In Croson, the narrow tailoring analysis was justified on similar grounds
when the Court explained that "[t]he [strict scrutiny] test also ensures
that the means chosen 'fit' this compelling goal so closely that there is
little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was illegiti-
mate racial prejudice or stereotype." 170
Case law reveals that the examination of the relationship between
the ends and the means required by both intermediate scrutiny and
rational basis review can serve to prevent government actors from pur-
suing policies motivated by prejudice or stereotype. 171 For example, in
the 1977 case Califano v. Goldfarb, the Supreme Court struck down a
federal statutory provision that required a man to prove that he re-
ceived at least half of his support from his wife to receive survivors'
benefits based upon his wife's earnings while a woman automatically
received benefits determined by her husband's earnings. 172 The Court
noted that female workers could not receive less protection for their
spouses than men "at least when supported by no more substantial jus-
tification than archaic and overbroad generalizations, or old notions,
such as assumptions as to dependency, that are more consistent with
the role-typing society has long imposed than with contemporary real-
ity." 173 Because women and men were similarly situated, the Court held,
their dissimilar treatment based upon a stereotype violated their right
to equal protection of the laws. 174
In the 1979 case Orr v. Orr, the Supreme Court held unconstitu-
tional a statute that required alimony to be paid to women but not to
men. 75 The Court concluded that because Alabama already conducted
individualized hearings to assess the relative financial circumstances of
the spouses, even if sex were a sufficiently reliable proxy for need, pro-
viding assistance to needy spouses would in no way be hindered if Ala-
bama determined alimony payment based on this individualized as-
sessment.17 6 In fact, such hearings provide a much more accurate
169 Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725-26 (1982).
170 Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (plurality opinion).
171 Eg., Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 65 (1982); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 281-82
(1979); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 207 (1977).
172 Califano, 430 U.S. at 207.
173 Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
174 Id.
175 440 U.S. at 281-82.
176 Id.
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assessment of an individual's needs. 177 The Court held that the sex-
based classification "carries with it the baggage of sexual stereotypes"
and thus could not survive intermediate scrutiny. 178
Although the Supreme Court rarely strikes down laws under ra-
tional basis review, in the 1982 case Zobel v. Williams, it held unconstitu-
tional an Alaska law that determined the amount of state dividends
from national resources to be disbursed to state residents based on how
long they had lived in the state because "Alaska ha[d] shown no valid
state interests which [were] rationally served by the distinction it
[made] between citizens" based on whether they lived in the state prior
to 1959.179 The Court held that the state's desire to encourage indi-
viduals to move to and remain in Alaska and to prudently manage the
state's natural resources did not rationally relate to granting benefits to
those who lived in the state twenty-one years before the law was en-
acted.'80 Because its review of the statute revealed an impermissible
motive to disfavor new residents, the Court found that the Alaska stat-
ute violated the Equal Protection Clause. 181
Undoubtedly, both intermediate scrutiny and rational basis review
can be criticized for permitting governments to act based upon stereo-
types and prejudicial behavior. Some argue the Court's application of
intermediate scrutiny perpetuated stereotypes, 182 for example, when
the Court upheld the exclusion of women from combat as the basis for
upholding a male-only draft registration policy 83 and when the Court
refused to invalidate a statutory rape law premised on the notion that
young men could consent to sexual intercourse but young women were
legally incapable of the same consent.184 Rational basis review also can
177 Id.
178 Id. at 283.
179 457 U.S. at 65.
180 Id. at 61-62. The Court also noted that any state interest in discouraging people
from moving to the state would encounter substantial constitutional obstacles. Id. at 62.
181 Id. at 65.
182 See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 140, at 762 ("[1]n some cases the Court has up-
held laws benefiting women even though they seem to be based on stereotypes."); LAUR-
ENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1572-77 (2d ed. 1988) (arguing that
several Supreme Court decisions that upheld sex classifications, such as the males-only
draft registration and a statutory rape law, are examples of "courts invoking a legacy of
female subordination to men to justify further gender discrimination," thereby requiring
"women to trade liberty for protection against men").
185 SeeRostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 76-77, 81-82 (1981).
184 See Michael M. x: Super. Ct., 450 U.S. 464, 466 (1981); id. at 494-95 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he law was initially enacted on the premise that young women, in contrast
to young men, were to be deemed legally incapable of consenting to an act of sexual inter-
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be criticized for allowing the government to act upon its prejudices,
such as when the Court upheld a city regulation that excluded from
employment with the local transit authority individuals enrolled in a
program that supplied them with methadone (which is used to counter
the physical manifestations of heroin addiction), despite evidence that
the substantial majority of those who were enrolled in the program for
at least one year were free from drug use. 185
Strict scrutiny, however, is subject to the same criticism. In fact, the
Supreme Court itself has noted that strict scrutiny can allow an illegiti-
mate classification to survive, stating in Adarand that "Korematsu dem-
onstrates vividly that even 'the most rigid scrutiny' can sometimes fail to
detect an illegitimate racial classification." 186 The Court's decision to
uphold the admissions policy at the University of Michigan Law School
in Grutter has been criticized as perpetuating stereotypes about minority
students. 187 This criticism is proof that no legal standard will guarantee
that the Court will uncover all stereotypes and prejudices. 188
C. Why Other Arguments for Applying Strict Scrutiny to
Race-Neutral Actions Are Unpersuasive
One might also argue that strict scrutiny should apply to race-
neutral efforts to create diverse schools and avoid racial isolation so
that courts examine government actions that pursue a racial goal under
a consistent legal standard. Since its decision in Adarand to overrule the
application of a less rigorous standard to benign federal racial classifi-
course. Because their chastity was considered particularly precious, those young women
were felt to be uniquely in need of the State's protection.").
185 N.Y Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 575, 594 (1979). Furthermore, the dis-
sentingjustices noted the disparate impact of the law given the fact that sixty-three percent
of methadone users are black and Hispanic. Id. at 600 (White,J, dissenting).
186 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 236 (citing Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223
(1944)).
187 See, e.g., L. Darnell Weeden, Back to the Future: Should Grutter s Diversity Rationale Ap-
ply to Faculty Hiring? Is Title VII Implicated?, 26 BERKELEY J. EMp. & LAB. L. 511, 527-28
(2005). According to Weeden:
[U]nder Grutter, qualified minority students with lesser academic credentials
receiving a racial preference are likely to be viewed as inferior students in the
academic community. The Grutter opinion is a dangerous precedent because
its rationale for admitting qualified students with lesser academic credentials
based on their racial group status perpetuates a stereotypical group status
view that those students received the racial preference, and are thus not
qualified on their own merit to be at the law school.
188 See id.
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cations, the Court has identified the consistency of applying strict scru-
tiny to racial classifications as a reason for rejecting arguments for ap-
plying a different standard to federal versus state racial classifications
and for using a different standard based upon the race of the individu-
als who are helped or harmed by the classification. 189 Few would find it
remarkable for the Court to apply strict scrutiny to a race-neutral action
that sought to divide students of different racial groups, particularly
given its past invalidation of facially race-ji -:tral actions that sought to
disadvantage minorities. 190 Therefore, tht cive for consistency in the
standard applied to all racial goals could lead a lower court to apply
strict scrutiny to race-neutral actions. 191
Furthermore, although a race-neutral approach does not use a
racial classification to achieve its goal, it still involves government action
"based on race" because the ultimate objective remains a racial one.192
Thus, in the 1978 Supreme Court case of Regents of the University of Cali-
fornia v. Bakke, Justice Powell explained the justification for applying
strict scrutiny by stating that "[r] acial and ethnic distinctions of any sort
are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial ex-
amination. 193 An effort to promote diversity and avoid racial isolation
could still be characterized as "based on race" and as a racial distinction
even though a school board has not adopted an explicit racial classifica-
tion. 194
Although a court might garner the above reasons for applying
strict scrutiny to race-neutral efforts, strict scrutiny does not represent
the only effective standard for reviewing the constitutionality of such
actions or the only possible reading of the Supreme Court's past deci-
sions. The above analysis demonstrates that, when necessary, even ra-
tional basis review can uncover illegitimate motives and actions based
189 See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 226-27 (rejecting the Metro Broadcasting opinion's deviance
from "congruence between the standards applicable to federal and state racial classifica-
tions" and from "consistency of treatment irrespective of the race of the burdened or
benefited group"); Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94 (plurality opinion) (reaffirming that "the
standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of
those burdened or benefited by a particular classification").
190 See, e.g., Green, 391 U.S. at 441-42 (invalidating a "freedom of choice" plan that
maintained racially segregated schools); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 365 (1915)
(overturning voting requirement that determined voter eligibility on whether one's grand-
father had been eligible to vote before the Fifteenth Amendment was passed).
191 See Green, 391 U.S. at 441-42; Guinn, 238 U.S. at 365.
192 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289-91 (1978) (plurality
opinion).
193 Id.
194 See id.
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on stereotypes. 195 In addition, the Court does not always apply strict
scrutiny when a government actor considers race.196 For instance, "the
Court has held that the consideration of race in legislative redistricting
does not automatically trigger strict scrutiny as 'the theory of strict
scrutiny [has] yielded to the need for an electoral system that is equally
open to members of minority groups."' 1 97 Instead, the Court only ap-
plies strict scrutiny when race predominates over other race-neutral
districting principles, such as compactness and contiguity. 198 Therefore,
a decision to decline to apply strict scrutiny to race-neutral student as-
signment plans would not be inconsistent with the totality of the
Court's jurisprudence that addresses the influence of race in govern-
ment decisionmaking. 199
More importantly, by examining whether a government actor that
used a racial classification could have achieved its objective through a
race-neutral approach, the Court has encouraged governments to
adopt race-neutral policies to achieve racial goals by signaling that it
views such action with less skepticism. 200 Otherwise, the Court has
merely encouraged government actors to adopt one constitutionally
suspect approach for another.201 For example, in Croson, in striking
down the City of Richmond's minority contracting set-aside, the Court
noted an array of alternatives that the city could have adopted to
195 See supra notes 153-165 and accompanying text.
196 See Archer, supra note 68, at 655 ("Despite its seemingly definitive language in Ada-
rand, the Supreme Court has not automatically applied strict scrutiny to all governmental
uses of race, influenced, in part, by the tradition of deference afforded to the governmen-
tal entity or the nature of the legislation.").
197 Id. at 656 (quoting Pamela S. Karlan, Easing the Spring: Strict Scrutiny and Affirmative
Action After the Redistricting Cases, 43 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1569, 1603 (2002)).
198 See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 962 (1996); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 907 (1996);
Miller v.Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 646 (1993).
19 See Bush, 517 U.S. at 962; Hunt, 517 U.S. at 907; Miller, 515 U.S. at 916; Reno, 509
U.S. at 646.
200 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003) ("Narrow tailoring... require[s]
serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives that will achieve the
diversity university seeks."); Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237-38 (noting that it was remanding for
the lower courts to address whether Congress considered any race-neutral means); Croson,
488 U.S. at 509-10 (plurality opinion) (holding that the city had a variety of race-neutral
alternatives available "to increase the accessibility of city contracting opportunities to small
entrepreneurs of all races" because altering the requirements for the contracts "would
have (had] little detrimental effect on the city's interests"); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ.,
476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (1986) (plurality opinion) (noting that narrow tailoring requires a
government actor to examine whether a nonracial approach would accomplish the objec-
tive).
201 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339; Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237-38; Croson, 488 U.S. at 509,
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achieve its goal of increasing minority contractors without adopting a
racial classification.20 2 The Parents Involved majority also emphasized
race-neutral alternatives by holding the assignment plans unconstitu-
tional in part because the districts had failed to demonstrate that they
had examined race-neutral alternatives to the racial classifications that
they had adopted.203 The Court's repeated insistence that race-neutral
measures should be examined and adopted instead of a racial classifica-
tion undermines the conclusion that the Court will apply strict scrutiny
to race-neutral government action. 20 4
Ultimately, a court that decides that strict scrutiny represents the
appropriate legal standard for race-neutral actions may see its decision
as moving the nation one step closer to a colorblind approach to the
Constitution. The Parents Involved plurality's depiction of Brown I and
Brown II as opinions focused on ensuring that schools admit students
"on a nonracial basis"205 embraces this approach in refusing to recog-
nize any constitutionally significant distinction between the racial classi-
fications struck down in Brown, which sought to divide students by race,
and the efforts of Seattle and Louisville to bring together students of
different races.20 6 For those who subscribe to the colorblind Constitu-
tion, courts should invalidate the indirect pursuit of a racial goal just as
they should invalidate the direct pursuit of such a goal.2 0 7
As noted above, however, the Court's support for race-neutral ap-
proaches to achieve a racial goal reveals that it does not view the pursuit
of racial goals as illegitimate.208 To the contrary, the Court in Adarand
acknowledged that "[t] he unhappy persistence of both the practice and
the lingering effects of racial discrimination against minority groups in
this country is an unfortunate reality," and noted that "government is
202 Croson, 488 U.S. at 509-10.
203 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2761 (2007).
204 See id.
205 Id. at 2767 (plurality opinion) (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S.
294, 300-01 (1955)).
206 See Goodwin Liu, "History Will Be Heard": An Appraisal of the Seattle/Louisville Deci-
sion, 2 HARV. L. POL'y REV. 53, 61 (2008) (criticizing the plurality in Parents Involved for
failing to acknowledge the distinction between the use of race in Brown v. Bd. of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954), that "was an expression of racial hostility, a public humiliation, and a
badge of inferiority not only for her but for all black children" and the use of race to bring
students of diverse backgrounds together in Louisville that merely served as "an inconven-
ience and perhaps a significant disappointment" to the original plaintiff who was denied
admission to an elementary school in Louisville because of the district's racial guidelines).
207 See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2767 (plurality opinion).
208 See id. at 2761, 2767.
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not disqualified from acting in response to it."2°9 Racial goals must be
pursued with careful attention to the approach adopted, which may
only include a racial classification when necessary. 210 Also, one way to
help reduce the relevance of race is to ensure that individuals are ex-
posed to a broad cross section of people.
Furthermore, the adoption of a colorblind approach to the Consti-
tution today would ignore the structural inequalities that converge in
racially isolated schools to create inferior educational opportunities. 211
Because "[s]trict scrutiny is virtually always fatal to the challenged
law, '212 its application to race-neutral efforts would condemn growing
percentages of minority students to racially isolated schools. The future
of such schools is clear because "[d]espite the valiant efforts of soine
educators and policy makers to improve racially isolated schools in poor
communities of color, history and research demonstrate that this is not a
winning strategy for closing the achievement gap and expanding oppor-
tunity. '213 Because research demonstrates that "ongoing segregation
maintains the unequal status quo,"214 a decision to apply a nearly in-
surmountable legal standard to race-neutral efforts to prevent racially
isolated schools will exacerbate the inequality that eviscerates the educa-
tional and professional opportunities of many minority students. 215
Moreover, applying strict scrutiny to race-neutral efforts to achieve
diversity or avoid racial isolation would effectively end not only those
efforts but also a host of other efforts to achieve racial equality. Richard
Banks has noted that this concern extends to efforts to narrow the racial
achievement gap, to improve minority voter participation, and to repeal
a law that disenfranchises felons because it disproportionately harms
African American men.2 16 He insightfully notes that "[t]he prospect of
applying strict scrutiny to these sorts of measures would cut against the
view, shared by many, that the government should be able to play some
209 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237.
210 See id.
211 See Wells & Frankenberg, supra note 5, at 183 ("It is this centrality of structural ine-
quality and its relationship to racial segregation that four of the five Supreme Court jus-
tices who made up the majority in the Parents Involved decision completely denied in put-
ting forth their 'colorblind' argument.").
212 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 140, at 671; see also Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV.
1, 8 (1972) (describing strict scrutiny as "strict in theory and fatal in fact" (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).
213 Wells & Frankenberg, supra note 5, at 187.
214 Id.
215 See id.
216 Banks, supra note 35, at 580-81.
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role in narrowing racial disparities in, for example, political participa-
tion, education, employment, and health."217 A decision to apply strict
scrutiny to race-neutral government action would handcuff the gov-
ernment's ability to address any concerns about racial inequality in
American society.218 Clearly, such an approach should be avoided when
viable alternatives exist that protect the competing interests at stake.
Therefore, this Article agrees with those scholars who contend that
the Court should not apply strict-scrutiny to race-neutral government
action. 219 For instance, when Kathleen Sullivan considered whether
"the goal of increasing racial diversity [should] trigger constitutional
skepticism when decoupled from race-specific means," she indicated
that "[s]trong arguments suggest that it should not.... [R]ace-neutral
proxy devices for seeking racial diversity should not be understood at
the outset as implicating a racially discriminatory purpose."220 Richard
Banks agrees that strict scrutiny should not apply to race-neutral action
to diversify schools because of the benign purpose behind such action
and the absence of "a racially discriminatory means." 221 Other scholars
similarly argue that the Court will not or should not apply strict scrutiny
to race-neutral actions. 222 In fact, the majority of scholars reach this
217 Id. at 581; see also Forde-Mazrui, supra note 35, at 2334.
218 See Banks, supra note 35, at 581.
219 Forde-Mazrui offers a different interpretation of the implications of the Court's
preference for race-neutral action. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 35, at 2351. He contends that
the Court's endorsement of race-neutral actions in Croson suggests that it may uphold the
legality of race-neutral action by holding that race-neutral affirmative action satisfies strict
scrutiny. Id.
220 Sullivan, supra note 35, at 1054.
221 Banks, supra note 35, at 584.
222 See, e.g., Elizabeth Jean Bower, Answering the Call: Wake County's Commitment to Diver-
sity in Education, 78 N.C. L. REv. 2026, 2043 (2000) ("Davis instructs that despite a racially
disproportionate impact, a court is not likely to infer a discriminatory purpose from a
facially race-neutral classification. Absent this inference, the classification would not trig-
ger heightened scrutiny and the rational basis standard would apply."); Andrew M. Carlon,
Racial Adjudication, 2007 BYU L. REv. 1151, 1199 (arguing that it is appropriate to exempt
race-neutral action from strict scrutiny); Heeren, supra note 16, at 180 (contending ihat a
race-neutral plan will be subject to rational basis review); Stylianos-loannis G. Koi,atzis,
Affirmative Action in Education: The Trust and Honesty Perspective, 7 TEx. F. ON C.L. & C.R.
187, 270 (2002) ('The very same Court that has generally demonstrated skepticism about
the explicit consideration of race has suggested that the use of race-neutral means would
not need to meet the requirement of strict scrutiny."); Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action,
107 YALE L.J. 427, 449 (1997) ("To be sure, standardized tests and welfare programs are
facially race-neutral, and strict scrutiny does not apply to race-neutral laws in the absence
of some showing of an invidious racial purpose."); Girardeau A. Spann, Neutralizing Grut-
ter, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 633, 642 (2005) ("Grutter evidences a clear Supreme Court pref-
erence for race-neutral over race-conscious efforts to ameliorate the plight of racial mi-
norities. Race-neutral affirmative action is subject to only rational basis review, but race-
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conclusion. 223 Similarly, several lower courts have declined to apply
strict scrutiny to race-neutral government action.224
In conclusion, the important point is that the Court appears to
have implicitly placed its imprimatur on a race-neutral approach to
achieve a racial goal by repeatedly urging governments to consider
such approaches instead of racial classifications. 225 The Court's encour-
agement of race-neutral government action recognizes that these
measures do not involve the same harms as racial classifications. In-
stead, the manner in which the government's goal is pursued can sub-
stantially influence the Court's review of such efforts. 226 Part III of this
Article explores the relative harms of racial classifications and the rela-
tive benefits of race-neutral actions and explains why this implicit as-
sumption in the case law is correct.
III. WHY GOVERNMENTS SHOULD BE GIVEN WIDE LATITUDE TO ADOPT
RACE-NEUTRAL STUDENT ASSIGNMENT PLANS THAT
SEEK TO AVOID RACIAL ISOLATION AND PROMOTE DIVERSITY
AND A DOCTRINAL PROPOSAL TO ACHIEVE THIS GOAL
This Part argues that courts should provide schools districts with
wide latitude to adopt race-neutral efforts to avoid racial isolation and
promote diversity because these efforts can help to advance the pur-
pose of the Equal Protection Clause while avoiding some of the harms
conscious affirmative action is subject to strict equal protection scrutiny."); L. Darnell
Weeden, Creating Race-Neutral Diversity in Federal Procurement in a Post-Adarand World, 23
WHIrrIER L. REV. 951, 978-79 (2002) (arguing that "race-neutral governmental policies
designed to neutralize societal discrimination may be implemented under the rational
basis standard of review"); Winters, supra note 114, at 722-23 (arguing that rational basis
review would apply to a socioeconomic integration plan even if the district used class to
achieve racial integration).
Furthermore, before the Parents Involved decision, some argued that strict scrutiny
should not apply to the use of racial classifications to integrate public elementary and sec-
ondary schools. See, e.g., Archer, supra note 68, at 664. Presumably, scholars that held this
view would agree that courts should not apply strict scrutiny to race-neutral efforts to
achieve diversity or avoid racial isolation. Similarly, several lower courts have declined to
apply strict scrutiny to race-neutral government action. See Banks, supra note 35, at 579-80
(summarizing several cases where courts declined to apply strict scrutiny to race-neutral
government action).
22 Carlon, supra note 222, at 1155 (noting that the scholarship on the constitutionality
of race-neutral action generally rejects the view that strict scrutiny will apply to race-neutral
government action).
24 See Banks, supra note 35, at 579-80 (summarizing several cases where courts de-
clined to apply strict scrutiny to race-neutral government action).
225 See supra notes 200-204 and accompanying text.
226 See Ryan, supra note 69, at 343.
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of racial classifications. Section A examines the purpose of the Equal
Protection Clause; it argues that the interpretation of that clause should
not be limited to the U.S. Supreme Court's current anticlassification
focus, but rather that it should include an antisubordination analysis.227
Section B explains why racial isolation in schools has a subordinating
effect and how diversity in schools can help to address this effect.2 28 It
also shows how race-neutral government efforts to avoid racial isolation
and promote diversity can help advance an antisubordination interpre-
tation of the Equal Protection Clause.229 Section C argues that race-
neutral efforts to avoid racial isolation and promote diversity can avoid
some of the harms of racial classifications. 2 30 Section D concludes that
once courts conduct a threshold inquiry into the purpose and effect of
race-neutral student assignments plans, they should apply rational basis
review to benign efforts to avoid racial isolation and enhance diversity
because these efforts help to accomplish the purpose of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause while avoiding some of the harms of racial classifica-
tions.23 1 It further notes that a meaningful application of rational basis
review that does not abdicate all judicial review of race-neutral efforts
could still uncover any hidden illegitimate motive or stereotyping that
lies behind a race-neutral plan. 232
A. The Purpose of the Equal Protection Clause
What equal protection requires can be interpreted in a variety of
ways. 233 In 1954 in Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court em-
227 See infra notes 233-307 and accompanying text.
228 See infra notes 308-359 and accompanying text.
229 See infra notes 360-417 and accompanying text.
230 See infta notes 418-461 and accompanying text.
231 See infta notes 462-503 and accompanying text.
232 See infta notes 478-481 and accompanying text.
233 JUDITH A. BAER, EQUALITY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION: RECLAIMING THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT 102 (1983); JAMES A. KUSHNER, GOVERNMENT DISCRIMINATION:
EQUAL PROTECTION LAW AND LITIGATION § 22 (2007) ("Ultimately, the constitutional
definition remains relative, and its applicability through the equal protection clause and as
augmented by congressional civil rights statutes, Byzantine. The Court's decisions have
reflected equality of opportunity, status, and treatment."); WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 21 (1988); Derek
W. Black, The Contradiction Between Equal Protection's Meaning and Its Legal Substance: How
Deliberate Indifference Can Cure It, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 533, 534 (2006) (noting the
ambiguity of the phrase equal protection under the law and that "[flrom Plessy v. Ferguson
to Grutter v. Bollinger, no question has been more central to racial and social justice, or
more complex, than what it means to deny someone equal protection under the law.
Though offering a conciseness that intimates simplicity, neither the courts nor the public
have reached a full understanding of this phrase's import in regard to race. Rather, the
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braced equal educational opportunity as the central obligation of the
Equal Protection Clause in the education context.234 Although justices
disagreed in Parents Involved over what equal educational opportunity
requires, they agreed that equal educational opportunity lies at the
heart of Brown.2 35 Justice Kennedy described Brown's objective as one of
"equal educational opportunity. '" 236 The plurality characterized Brown
as holding "that segregation deprived black children of equal educational
opportunities regardless of whether school facilities and other tangible
factors were equal, because government classification and separation
on grounds of race themselves denoted inferiority.'" 237 Justice Breyer
similarly viewed racial equality in educational opportunities as the core
promise of Brown.238 Thus, although it fundamentally disagreed over
how equal educational opportunity may be realized consistent with the
Constitution, the Parents Involved Court interpreted the Equal Protec-
tion Clause to require equal educational opportunity.2 39
The Parents Involved opinions can be read to track one of the cen-
tral divides over how the Equal Protection Clause defines equality.240 In
debating how Brown defined equal educational opportunity, Justice
Kennedy and the dissenting justices contended that Brown recognized
meaning has been approximated, changed and, as of late, assumed or ignored."); Owen
M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 108 (1976) ("The
words-no state shall 'deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws' -do not state an intelligible rule of decision."); Ronald Turner, The Voluntary School
Integration Cases and the Contextual Equal Protection Clause, 51 How. LJ. 251, 257 (2008)
("[The] Equal Protection Clause... is an abstract moral and political phrase .... As such,
the clause does not contain a definitive definition of 'equal protection' and does not spec-
ify what acts or omissions fall within or outside of the clause's command.").
234 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) ("In these days, it is
doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the
opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to pro-
vide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.").
23s5 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2767
(2007) (plurality opinion); id. at 2791 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and in the judg-
ment); id. at 2836-37 (Breyer,J., dissenting); see also Brown I, 347 U.S. 483.
236 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2791 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and in the
judgment).
237 Id. at 2767 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). Interestingly, the plurality opin-
ion's focus on the inferiority that the racial classification denoted regardless of the tangi-
ble equality of the two schools could be read to suggest that the plurality recognizes the
antisubordination interpretation of Brown. See id.
238 Id. at 2836 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("For Brown held out a promise. It was a promise
embodied in three Amendments designed to make citizens of slaves. It was the promise of
true racial equality-not as a matter of fine words on paper, but as a matter of everyday life
in the Nation's cities and schools.").
239 See id. at 2767 (plurality opinion); id. at 2836 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
240 See id. at 2791 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
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that diverse educational settings represent an important component of
equal educational opportunity. 41 This interpretation implicitly recog-
nized that racially isolated educational environments have a subordinat-
ing effect on the students in those environments and that it is this sub-
ordination that equal protection prohibits. 242 In contrast, the justices in
the plurality argued that Brown sought to eliminate using race to make
school assignments and to usher in an era of colorblindness. 243 Simi-
larly, as will be described below, the Court's current approach to equal
protection primarily focuses on ensuring that the government has not
used a prohibited classification and on remedying intentional discrimi-
nation. 244 In response, many scholars have identified the shortcomings
of this approach and have contended that an antisubordination ap-
proach would better accomplish the purpose of the Equal Protection
Clause and more effectively address the myriad forms of discrimination
against a variety of groups. 245
241 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2791 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and in the
judgment) (stating that "[s]chool districts can seek to reach Brown's objective of equal
educational opportunity" and that he cannot endorse the plurality opinion because it "is at
least open to the interpretation that the Constitution requires school districts to ignore the
problem of de facto resegregation in schooling"); id. at 2800, 2836-37 (Breyer, J., dissent-
ing) (noting "Brown's promise of integrated primary and secondary education" and argu-
ing that Brown embodied "the promise of true racial equality-not as a matter of fine
words on paper, but as a matter of everyday life in the Nation's cities and schools" and that
"to invalidate the plans under review is to threaten the promise of Brown").
242 See id. at 2791 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and in the judgment); id. at 2821
(Breyer,J., dissenting).
243 Id. at 2768 (plurality opinion) (stating that the implementation of Brown required
that schools admit students "to the public schools on a nonracial basis." (quoting Brown v.
Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955))); see also id. at 2758 ("Allowing racial balanc-
ing as a compelling end in itself would 'effectively assur[e] that race will always be relevant
in American life, and that the ultimate goal of eliminating entirely from governmental
decisionmaking such irrelevant factors as a human being's race will never be achieved.'"
(quoting City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(internal quotation marks omitted))).
244 See infra notes 247-253 and accompanying text.
245 For arguments criticizing the Court's current approach to equal protection, see
Black, supra note 233, at 564-72; Brandon L. Garrett & James S. Liebman, Experimentalist
Equal Protection, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 261, 261 (2004) (describing the Court's current
approach to equal protection as a "rigid, tepidly enforced equal protection doctrine");
Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional
Struggles over Brown, 117 HARv. L. REv. 1470, 1547 (2004). According to Siegel:
The modern equal protection tradition is commonly understood to be
founded on an embrace of individualism associated with an anticlassification
principle and a repudiation of concerns about group inequality associated
with an antisubordination principle. History richly complicates this picture, as
it shows that courts have deployed the presumption against racial classifica-
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This Article agrees with those scholars who contend that an anti-
subordination approach should guide the interpretation of the Equal
Protection Clause because of the shortcomings of the Court's current
approach to equal protection and the numerous advantages of the anti-
subordination approach. 246 The Court's current approach to equal pro-
tection, which has been labeled an antidiscrimination, anticlassification,
or colorblind approach, emphasizes the impropriety of government use
of racial classifications. 247 The Court applies strict scrutiny to all racial
tion to express, to disguise, and to limit constitutional concerns about prac-
tices that enforce group inequality.
Id.
For arguments in favor of an antisubordination approach to equal protection, see
TRIBE, supra note 182, at 1515 (contending that the Equal Protection Clause includes an
"antisubjugation principle, which aims to break down legally created or legally reenforced
systems of subordination that treat some people as second-class citizens"); Ruth Colker,
Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1007
(1986) (advocating an antisubordination perspective under which "it is inappropriate for
certain groups in society to have subordinated status because of their lack of power in so-
ciety as a whole" and noting that the approach "seeks to eliminate the power disparities
between ... whites and non-whites, through the development of laws and policies that
directly redress those disparities"); Richard Delgado, Two Ways to Think About Race: Reflec-
tions on the Id, the Ego, and Other Reformist Theories of Equal Protection, 89 GEO. L.J. 2279,
2295-96 (2001) ("Whether an action or structure contributes to material oppression
seems a much more fruitful, and ultimately, worthy way of addressing America's most in-
tractable and complex problem: race."); Fiss, supra note 233, at 108; Neil Gotanda, A Cri-
tique of "Our Constitution Is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REv. 1, 63 (1991) ("[A] revised ap-
proach to race must recognize the systemic nature of subordination in American society.");
Darren Lenard Hutchinson, "Unexplainable on Grounds Other Than Race" The Inversion of
Privilege and Subordination in Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 2003 U. ILL. L. REv. 615, 682-98;
Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the
Right of Privaty, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1454 (1991); Cass R. Sunstein, TheAnticastePrinci-
ple, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2411-12 (1994).
246 This Article does not rely principally on the Framers' understanding of equal pro-
tection because of the ambiguity that scholars have noted in determining exactly what the
Framers envisioned and because the Framers would not have imagined that some practices
that have been invalidated under the clause would be found to violate equal protection. See
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 119 (1980);
NELSON, supra note 233, at 21; Black, supra note 233, at 549-50.
247 See, e.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 907 (1996) ("Racial classifications are anti-
thetical to the Fourteenth Amendment, whose 'central purpose' was 'to eliminate racial
discrimination emanating from official sources in the States.'" (quoting McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964)); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993) (stating that
the Fourteenth Amendment's "central purpose is to prevent the States from purposefully
discriminating between individuals on the basis of race"); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229, 239 (1976) ("The central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment is the prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of race.");
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967) ("The clear and central purpose of this amend-
ment was to eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial discrimination in the
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classifications, whether they harm or benefit minority groups. 248 When
allegations of racial discrimination are raised, the Court typically re-
quires plaintiffs to demonstrate intentional discrimination to establish a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
249
The Court currently focuses narrowly on intentional discrimina-
tion as the hallmark for defining an equal protection violation. 250 By
focusing equal protection analysis on intentional discrimination, the
Court has circumscribed how it defines discrimination and narrowed
the actions that are required to be taken to remedy it. To define dis-
crimination, the antidiscrimination framework assumes that racism
arises from an individual intent to take action based upon someone's
race. 25 1 Intentional discrimination, however, represents "the most nar-
States."); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 23 (1948) ("[T] he matter of primary concern [for
the Fourteenth Amendment] was the establishment of equality in the enjoyment of basic
civil and political rights and the preservation of those rights from discriminatory action on
the part of the States based on considerations of race or color."); see also Fiss, supra note
233, at 109, 119 (arguing that the Supreme Court's approach to equal protection adopts
an "antidiscrimination principle" under which arbitrary or invidious discrimination is pro-
hibited and that "also invokes the metaphor of blindness-as in 'color blindness'"); Ian F.
Haney L6pez, "A Nation of Minorities" Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary Colorblindness, 59
STAN. L. REv. 985, 987-88 (2007) (describing the Court's approach to equal protection as
an anticlassification or colorblind approach); Sean A. Pager, Antisubordination of Whom?
What India's Answer Tells Us About the Meaning of Equality in Affirmative Action, 41 U.C. DAvIs
L. REv. 289, 289 (2007) (describing the Court's current approach as an "antidiscrimina-
tion" approach); Cedric Merlin Powell, Blinded by Color: The New Equal Protection, the Second
Deconstruction, and Affirmative Action, 51 U. MIAMi L. REv. 191, 271 (1997) (calling the
Court's approach to equal protection a colorblind policy where "any use of race is pre-
sumptively unconstitutional"); Siegel, supra note 245, at 1473 (labeling the Court's current
approach an anticlassification approach); Justin P. Walsh, Swept Under the Rug: Integrating
Critical Race Theory into the Legal Debate on the Use of Race, 6 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 673,
698 (2008) ("[T]he Court has, in essence, adopted a colorblind individualism as its mode
of thinking.").
248 See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (applying strict scrutiny to strike down a contracting plan
to benefit minority contractors and stating that "[aibsent searching judicial inquiry into
the justification for such race-based measures, there is simply no way of determining what
classifications are 'benign' or 'remedial' and what classifications are in fact motivated by
illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics").
249 See, e.g., Davis, 426 U.S. at 239, 244-45 (holding that a showing of intentional dis-
crimination must be made to establish racial discrimination in violation of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause).
250 See Black, supra note 233, at 564 ("The Supreme Court's measure of racial equal
protection is the intent standard. The intent standard, however, is entirely inconsistent
with equal protection's meaning, purpose, and modern factual realities."); Hutchinson,
supra note 245, at 684.
251 See Daria Roithmayr, Locked in Segregation, 12 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 197, 199-200
(2004) ("The standard theoretical model assumes that racism is primarily a product of
individual bias, tastes or preferences. Under this 'individual intent' view, racism is rooted
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row and archaic manifestation of discrimination." 25 2 The Court's focus
on intentional discrimination undermines the ability of the equal pro-
tection doctrine to address other forms of discrimination that may be
equally harmful. 253
Numerous scholars have elucidated how an emphasis on inten-
tional discrimination neglects the myriad other forms of discrimination.
For example, one scholar has described how the Court's intent standard
narrows the understanding of the Equal Protection Clause because
"[i]ntent's paradigmatic focus is on discrimination rather than equality,
which skews its inquiry away from whether a racial minority member has
been given the fair consideration and protection of his government to
whether the government has implemented some design to harm
him."254 Similarly, Charles Lawrence has explained that such a limited
definition of discrimination does not make sense because racism often
operates at the unconscious level, where the attitudes and stereotypes
that individuals have absorbed influence their actions in subtle but in-
vidious ways. 255 He argues that discrimination law should be expanded
to address these actions when they constitute racial discrimination that
conveys a clear cultural meaning.256 Richard Delgado has explained
how even Lawrence's expanded definition of discrimination is flawed in
part because "it sees racism as a series of isolated actions and not an in-
tegrated system that elevates one group at the expense of another" and
it "ignores that race is the normal science of American life, not the ab-
errant, blameworthy exception, and how it serves as a valuable, if un-
stated, homeostatic mechanism for maintaining and replicating social
relations." 257 In addition, some scholars have described racial hierarchy
as a multiheaded monster with one head oppressing minorities and the
in an intentional decision to give some social significance to skin color, and in intentional
actions that correspond with that decision.").
252 Hutchinson, supra note 245, at 665; see also Black, supra note 233, at 563. ("[E]qual
protection is an affirmative guarantee, whereas discrimination is often conceptualized as a
negative right. The right to be free from discrimination under the Supreme Court's prece-
dent has only protected minorities when some action has been taken against them or some
conscious consideration of race has occurred. Thus, it has primarily protected minorities
in reaction to specified acts of others, whereas equal protection affirmatively demands that
one not be denied of some privilege, consideration, or benefit. Whether action or inac-
tion, ignorance or knowledge, or like or dislike caused the deprivation is irrelevant.").
253 SeeSTEPHANIE M. WILDMAN ET AL., PRIVILEGE REVEALED 19-20 (1996).
254 Black, supra note 233, at 569.
255 Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Uncon-
scious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 321-26, 328-44 (1987).
256 Id. at 324.
27 Delgado, supra note 245, at 2295.
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other maintaining a system of white privilege, and that ending one
without dismantling the other would not result in racial equality.258
Subordination can take many subtle and complex forms other than
intentional government action to harm minorities. 259 The disadvantages
of minorities in modern times do not primarily arise from government
action designed to harm minorities, but rather from structures of ine-
quality that government action subsequently maintains and rein-
forces. 26° Ultimately, the Court's current focus on intentional discrimi-
nation does not recognize the multifaceted nature of discrimination
when defining a violation of equal protection and instead narrows that
definition to action intended to harm a group or individual.2 61
In addition to overlooking other forms of discrimination, intent
can be very difficult to prove, and oftentimes victims of discrimination
do not possess such evidence.2 62 Also, the intentional discrimination
model cannot effectively explain persistent disparities in education,
housing, employment, and other areas of American life. 263 The antidis-
crimination model labels these disparities societal discrimination and
denies governments the ability to use a racial classification to remedy
them.
264
Focusing on intentional discrimination also limits the response to
discrimination. Under the intentional discrimination standard, equal
protection requires governments merely to remedy the harm to the
victim, 2 6 5 not to try to dismantle longstanding manifestations of dis-
258 See WILDMAN ET AL., supra note 253, at 19-20.
259 Colker, supra note 245, at 1008-10; Hutchinson, supra note 245, at 683-84; Walsh,
supra note 247, at 698.
260 See generally Daria Roithmayr, Barriers to Entry: A Market Lock-In Model of Discrimina-
tion, 86 VA. L. REv. 727 (2000); Roithmayr, supra note 251.
261 See Black, supra note 233, at 569; Delgado, supra note 245, at 2295; Lawrence, supra
note 255, at 324.
262 Hutchinson, supra note 245, at 686; Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimina-
tion: The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEo. L.J. 279, 290-91 (1997).
263 See Roithmayr, supra note 251, at 200 ("Because the intent standard model focuses
exclusively on intentional stereotyping, the model is poorly equipped to explain the persis-
tent disparities in housing, schooling, income and employment....").
264 See Croson, 488 U.S. at 505; Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986)
(plurality opinion) ("This Court never has held that societal discrimination alone is suffi-
cient to justify a racial classification. Rather, the Court has insisted upon some showing of
prior discrimination by the governmental unit involved before allowing limited use of
racial classifications in order to remedy such discrimination."); Roithmayr, supra note 251,
at 200.
265 See Sergio J. Campos, Subordination and the Fortuity of Our Circumstances, 41 U. MIcH.
J.L. REFORM 585, 614 (2008); Leti Volpp, Talking "Culture". Gende, Race, Nation, and the
Politics of Multiculturalism, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1573, 1595 (1996). Volpp says:
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crimination and racism. 266 The antidiscrimination model also fails to
recognize the "structural privileges granted to members of the majority
which do not, by nature, operate on an individualized basis." 267
Another shortcoming of the Court's current approach to equal
protection is that it uniformly applies the same strict scrutiny to claims
that benefit disadvantaged groups as to those that seek to harm them.26
The plurality in the 1989 case City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co. stated
that "the standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause is not
dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular
classification. '269 The antidiscrimination framework focuses solely on
the individual victim of discrimination and views the right to be free
from discrimination as a personal right without consideration of "the
historical or aggregated position" of an individual.270 This approach di-
vorces equal protection analysis from the context and meaning of race
and race relations in the United States, including how some have been
advantaged by race. 271 Scholars also have described how the Court's cur-
rent approach to equal protection fosters white racial domination and
minority subordination. 272
Because the Court currently interprets the Equal Protection
Clause to view racial subjugation and race-based action to remedy dis-
[T]he antidiscrimination principle looks only to whether a process was fair,
and not at its outcome; looks at a specific act or omission and not its context;
treats racism as an individual problem, rather than as a societal one; and pri-
vatizes racism, so that remedies are meted out solely on the level of the indi-
vidual.
See Volpp, supra, at 1595.
266 See Delgado, supra note 245, at 2289 ("Instead of looking for more refined levels of
intent and unconscious motivation-a ghost in the machine-why not look to see what the
machine is doing and take steps to dismantle it?"); Hutchinson, supra note 245, at 684;
Roithmayr, supra note 251, at 200.
267 Walsh, supra note 247, at 698.
268 See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (plurality opinion) (applying strict scrutiny to an affirma-
tive action plan to benefit minorities).
269 Id. at 494.
270 Campos, supra note 265, at 589-90.
271 See id. at 590; Powell, supra note 247, at 199; Girardeau A. Spann, Affirmative Inac-
tion, 50 How. L.J. 611, 635 (2007); Volpp, supra note 265, at 1594-95.
272 See Gotanda, supra note 245, at 2-3 ("A color-blind interpretation of the Constitu-
tion legitimates, and thereby maintains, the social, economic, and political advantages that
whites hold over other Americans."); Powell, supra note 247, at 195 (Through an unrealis-
tically acontextual assessment of racism in America, the principle of colorblindness per-
petuates racial subordination."); Spann, supra note 271, at 635 ('The Court, therefore,
reads the constitutional concept of equality as something that entitles Whites to retain the
surfeit of resources that they presently possess, notwithstanding the discriminatory manner
in which those resources were obtained.").
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crimination with equal hostility,273 the effect of this approach has been
to find unconstitutional those government programs that seek to ac-
complish a more just distribution of societal resources. 274 Thus, one of
the principal shortcomings of this approach is that it "denies the prom-
ises of equality to vulnerable social groups, despite the anticaste origins
of the Fourteenth Amendment," as Darren Hutchinson astutely ar-
gues.275 He has explained how "[t]he Court's elaboration of equality
has transformed the Equal Protection Clause from a beacon of hope
for oppressed communities into a document that blocks governmental
efforts to remedy subjugation and that effectively requires governmen-
tal actors to treat oppressed classes maliciously in order to violate its
provisions." 276 When considered along with the intentional discrimina-
tion requirement, the Court's current approach to equal protection
denies a finding of discrimination against vulnerable groups when in-
tentional discrimination cannot be shown while subjecting to a height-
ened level of scrutiny legislative action that seeks to address discrimina-
tory patterns through application of a racial classification. 277
In contrast to the current equal protection framework, an antisub-
ordination interpretation of equal protection enjoys substantial advan-
tages over the Court's current approach to equal protection. Antisubor-
dination analysis moves beyond formal equality to examine whether a
law advances substantive equality by analyzing "the concrete effects of
government policy on the substantive condition of the disadvan-
taged."278 An antisubordination approach invalidates government ac-
tion that reaffirms the existing disadvantage of historically oppressed
groups. 279 It supports government action that challenges the existing
273 L6pez, supra note 247, at 987-88.
274 See Hutchinson, supra note 245, at 646; Spann, supra note 271, at 635.
275 Hutchinson, supra note 245, at 681.
276 Id. at 699.
277 Colker, supra note 245, at 1058-59; Hutchinson, supra note 245, at 699.
278 Roberts, supra note 245, at 1454; see also Delgado, supra note 245, at 2295-96
("Whether an action or structure contributes to material oppression seems a much more
fruitful, and ultimately, worthy way of addressing America's most intractable and complex
problem: race."); Siegel, supra note 245, at 1547 (noting that her complex account of his-
tory and constitutional principles "teaches that concerns about group subordination are at
the heart of the modern equal protection tradition-and, at the same time, suggests im-
portant reasons why such concerns have been persistently disguised, qualified, and
bounded").
279 See Hutchinson, supra note 245, at 692; Siegel, supra note 245, at 1472-73, 1547; see
also Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2815 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("For Swann is predicated
upon a well-established legal view of the Fourteenth Amendment. That view understands
the basic objective of those who wrote the Equal Protection Clause as forbidding practices
that lead to racial exclusion. The Amendment sought to bring into American society as full
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disparity in power between whites and minorities. 280 Among the possible
interpretations of equal protection, antisubordination best "disman-
tle[s] the historical legacy of racial and other forms of domination. 2 81
Antisubordination analysis would lead the judiciary to respect (but not
abdicate review of) government action that seeks to remedy subordina-
tion while also closely scrutinizing those policies that reinforce it.
282
An antisubordination framework would also provide redress for
the adverse effect of government policies on particular groups and
move away from the Court's current emphasis on the intent of the gov-
ernment actor as the touchstone for defining an equal protection viola-
tion.28 3 It would also recognize that subordination changes over time
and it would appropriately seek to remedy new forms of subordina-
tion.28 4 For example, it would acknowledge that neutral policies can
contain illegitimate biases that harm and stigmatize and thus require
action to address such neutral policies. 285
The antisubordination framework moves beyond the antidiscrimi-
nation focus on remedying the harm to the victim and instead enables
governments to take a wider array of action to address subordina-
tion. 286 This results from antisubordination's scrutiny of social struc-
tures and practices and how they affect the societal position of indi-
viduals. 287 It would require government actors to remedy subordinating
structural inequalities. 288 For example, an antisubordination analysis
might guide governments to take prospective action to remedy subor-
members those whom the Nation had previously held in slavery." (citing The Slaughter-
House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71 (1872))).
280 Colker, supra note 245, at 1007.
281 Hutchinson, supra note 245, at 682.
282 See id. at 699; Powell, supra note 247, at 227.
283 Colker, supra note 245, at 1014-15.
284 Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification
or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 15 (2003) ("[Tlhe question whether a prac-
tice violates an antisubordination principle depends heavily on factual and historical con-
texts, and, in particular, on the laws and social mores that prevail in a given society at a
given moment in history."); Hutchinson, supra note 245, at 683-84.
285 Hutchinson, supra note 245, at 684.
286 See Campos, supra note 265, at 592, 614; Volpp, supra note 265, at 1594-95.
287 Campos, supra note 265, at 588; Leticia M. Saucedo, The Employer Preference for the
Subservient Worker and the Making of the Brown Collar Workplace, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 961, 1018
(2006) ("The anti-subordination principle acknowledges the different ways in which struc-
tures interact to keep protected classes subjugated."); Walsh, supra note 247, at 698 (noting
the Court's refusal to address structural privileges and that "[t]he better approach would
be to look for ways to create structural diversity," which would "break down those struc-
tural privileges and act to create diverse relationships").
288 Campos, supra note 265, at 593; Hutchinson, supra note 245, at 683; Walsh, supra
note 247, at 698.
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dination, maintain a continuous attack on subordinating policies with-
out the deadlines imposed on affirmative action policies, and review
the influence of institutions that contributed to the subordination
rather than simply the directly subordinating institution. 2 9 The ap-
proach seeks to dismantle racism and economic inequities rather than
uncover their motivations, even the unconscious ones.290
Though the anticlassification framework has dominated the Court's
equal protection jurisprudence, it is "not compelled or even suggested
by the language of the [Equal Protection Clause]," nor is it "securely
rooted in the legislative history of the Clause." 291 Further, accepting the
anticlassification theory does not require the categorical rejection of the
antisubordination theory.292 Indeed, scholars have suggested that the
two theories overlap to an extent and that, though anticlassification has
dominated jurisprudence, its development and application have been
informed and influenced by latent antisubordination principles. 293
The underlying presence of the antisubordination theory mani-
fests itself in the case law. Ruth Colker has contended that Brown im-
plicitly embraced an antisubordination framework by focusing on the
harmful effect of segregated schooling on minority children. 294 Reva
Siegel has suggested that Brown did not embrace the current anticlassi-
fication approach and reject an antisubordination framework; instead it
came to be characterized as an anticlassification case in response to so-
cial conflict and political pressures surrounding the interests advanced
289 Campos, supra note 265, at 614, 627-29.
290 See Delgado, supra note 245, at 2296 ("It is time to move away from limited concep-
tions of racism located in the individual psyches of particular perpetrators and to begin
the search for broad structures that submerge people of color, workers, and immigrants,
and replace these structures with ones that can fulfill our unkept promises of democracy,
equality, and a decent life.").
291 Fiss, supra note 233, at 118-19.
292 SeeBalkin & Siegel, supra note 284, at 10-11.
293 Id.; see also Pager, supra note 247, at 289 ("Appreciating the shortcomings of each of
these paradigms on their own paves the way for an integrated understanding of equality in
which antisubordination values give normative content to antidiscrimination doctrine.");
Siegel, supra note 245, at 1542-43 ("Antisubordination values are not foreign to the mod-
ern equal protection tradition, but a founding part of it, deeply tempered by other values,
including the need to have a Constitution that speaks to all.").
294 See, e.g., Colker, supra note 245, at 1014, 1022 n.71 (quoting Brown , 347 U.S. at
494); Barry Friedman, Neutral Principles: A Retrospective, 50 VAND. L. REv. 503, 531 (1997)
(stating that many academics have viewed Brown v. Board of Education as resting on an anti-
subordination principle because the harm resulted from the imposition of segregation on
the black minority by the white majority).
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by Brown and the limits on the reach of school desegregation. 295 She
contends that
[i] t is not simply that antisubordination values played a cen-
tral role in justifying Brown throughout the 1950s, or that, dur-
ing the 1960s and 1970s, antisubordination values were ex-
pressed through, and guided application of, the presumption
that racial classifications are unconstitutional. It is that, even
in the 1970s, when the Court began to use anticlassification
discourse to limit rather than express antisubordination val-
ues, it never embraced one understanding of equal protection
to the exclusion of the other.296
Scholars have elucidated how additional case law, including Grutter, re-
veals antisubordination influences.2 97 Grutter can be interpreted as hav-
ing included elements of an antisubordination framework when it rec-
ognized a compelling interest in considering the race of law school
applicants so as to avoid systematically closing doors to positions of
leadership on any group.2 98 Simultaneously, however, the Court
cloaked its reliance on antisubordination with anticlassification rheto-
ric. 299 Darren Hutchinson has argued that the oft-cited footnote four in
United States v. Carolene Products, which suggested that judicial review
might protect "discrete and insular minorities" from prejudice, 300 evi-
denced an antisubordination approach. 301 The Court's language, he
argued, parallels the antisubordination approach in focusing on a law's
effect on disadvantaged groups. 302
Additional scholars have noted how other Supreme Court opin-
ions reflect antisubordination principles.303 Scholars also have argued
295 Siegel, supra note 245, at 1481-99.
296 See id. at 1537.
297 See, e.g., id. at 1539 (analyzing how Grutters recognition of diversity as a compelling
interest relies upon an antisubordination framework); see also Hutchinson, supra note 245,
at 683, 692-93 (describing how the reasoning in the oft-cited footnote four in United States
v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) provides support for an antisubordination
approach).
298 See Siegel, supra note 245, at 1481-99.
'm See id.
-" 304 U.S. at 153 n.4.
301 Hutchinson, supra note 245, at 683, 692-93.
302 Id.
3 See, e.g., Berta E. Hernfndez-Truyol, Querying Lawrence, 65 OHIo ST. L.J. 1151,
1168, 1171-72, 1246-47 (2004) (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2002); Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); Loving, 588 U.S. 1) (noting
the influence of antisubordination principles in Loving, Plyler, Romer, and Lawrence); Denise
C. Morgan, Anti-Subordination Analysis After United States v. Virginia: Evaluating the Constitu-
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that an antisubordination framework does or should influence the un-
derstanding of the anticlassification framework. 30 4 Moreover, in Parents
Involved, when Justice Kennedy contends that schools are not required
to ignore racial isolation and notes the nation's continued obligation to
create an integrated nation that guarantees equal opportunity, he
moves beyond anticlassification's focus on intentional discrimination to
embrace government action to remedy social conditions that have a
subordinating effect consistent with an antisubordination frame-
work.305
Finally, and most importantly, this Article embraces an antisubor-
dination approach to equal protection because the education of
schoolchildren involves a particularly appropriate setting to apply an
antisubordination framework. The importance of education in Ameri-
can society has only grown since the Court noted its paramount impor-
tance in Brown.30 6 The education a child receives sets the foundation
for the child's future employment, health, housing, and social oppor-
tunities. Application of an antisubordination framework in education
would focus government attention on achieving substantive equality in
educational opportunities and dismantling structural inequality in edu-
cation, which in turn would help to level the playing field in other as-
pects of society. 307
tionality of K-12 Single-Sex Public Schools, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 381, 384 (arguing that the
Court articulated an asymmetrical antisubordination principle in United States v. Virginia);
Saucedo, supra note 287, at 1019 (arguing that Griggs v. Duke Power includes elements of
antisubordination because the Court required facially neutral policies that impose an ad-
verse impact on a protected group to be justified by business necessity only if less burden-
some alternatives are unavailable).
304 E.g., Pager, supra note 247, at 289 ("Appreciating the shortcomings of each of these
paradigms on their own paves the way for an integrated understanding of equality in
which antisubordination values give normative content to antidiscrimination doctrine.");
Siegel, supra note 245, at 1477 ("Antisubordination values are not foreign to the modern
equal protection tradition, but a founding part of it, deeply tempered by other values,
including the need to have a Constitution that speaks to all.").
305 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2791 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and in the
judgment). The next section of this Article explains why racial isolation in schools has a
subordinating effect. See infta notes 308-359 and accompanying text.
306 See 347 U.S. at 493; see also Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387, 405 (3d Cir. 1999) ("We
need no long list of citations to note the widespread recognition of the importance of a
good public school education for all of our young people-rich and poor, black and
white.").
307 See HORACE MANN, Report for 1848, in 4 LIFE AND WORKS OF HORACE MANN 222, 251
(1867).
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B. The Subordinating Effect of Racial Isolation, the Benefits of Integrated
Schools, and Examples of Race-Neutral Student Assignment Plans
In Parents Involved, Justice Kennedy described Brown's objective as
one of "equal educational opportunity," and, in furthering that objec-
tive, he noted that districts do not have to accept racial isolation in the
schools. 308 He also contended that
[i]f school authorities are concerned that the student-body
compositions of certain schools interfere with the objective of
offering an equal educational opportunity to all of their stu-
dents, they are free to devise race-neutral measures to address
the problem in a general way and without treating each stu-
dent in different fashion solely on the basis of a systematic,
individual typing by race.30 9
These statements implicitly acknowledge that racial isolation in schools
can deny equal educational opportunity.310
Nevertheless, students today increasingly attend schools that are
racially isolated. From the 1980-81 school year to the 2005-06 school
year, the percentage of black students attending schools in which a ma-
jority of the students are minorities rose from 63 to 73 percent.3 11 Simi-
larly, the percentage of Latino students attending majority-minority
schools rose from 68 to 78 percent.312 Although the attendance of Afri-
can American students in majority white schools rose steadily begin-
ning in the late 1960s and peaked in 1988 at 43.5 percent, by 2005 only
slightly more than a quarter (27 percent) of African American students
attended such schools.3 13 The percentage today is only slightly higher
than the 23.4 percent of African American students who attended ma-
jority white schools in 1968, when the nation's school desegregation
efforts were still in their nascent stages.314 Although southern and bor-
der states formerly experienced the greatest integration, currently
these regions are experiencing the largest increases in racial isola-
tion.3 15
308 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2791 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and in the
judgment).
ow Id. at 2792.
310 See id. at 2791-92.
311 ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 2, at 28.
312 Id. at 34.
313 Id. at 23.
314 Id.
315 Id. at 33.
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Although Justice Kennedy does not explain why a racially isolated
educational environment could deny equal educational opportunity,
this Article contends that avoiding racial isolation and promoting diver-
sity remains an important component of equal educational opportunity
because, as shown below, racially isolated educational settings offer in-
ferior educational opportunities to their students and produce inferior
outcomes, while diverse educational settings reap important benefits.3 16
Thus, racial isolation in schools can deny equal educational opportu-
nity because it exerts a subordinating effect on the inputs for and out-
puts from such schools. 317 Brown unequivocally declared that "in the
field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no
place," and that "[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently un-
equal."318 Today, even without the imprimatur of a law or official policy
that explicitly seeks to divide students along racial lines and provide
minority students substandard educational opportunities, racially iso-
lated schools remain inferior to other schools. 319 Therefore, even as
many communities strive to provide excellent educational opportuni-
ties to students in schools that may not become integrated, 320 if the na-
tion seeks to pursue equal educational opportunity and respond to Jus-
tice Kennedy's clarion call in Parents Involved,321 avoiding racial
isolation and promoting diversity must remain on its agenda. There-
fore, this Article disagrees with those that argue that continuing to fo-
cus on Brown's vision for creating racially integrated schools currently is
of little import 322 and instead joins the chorus of scholars that call for
renewed efforts to integrate the nation's schools.3 23
316 See infra notes 324-351 and accompanying text.
317 See infra notes 324-351 and accompanying text.
318 Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 495.
319 See, e.g., Wells & Frankenberg, supra note 5, at 180-83.
320 It is worth noting that this Article's examination of the harms of racial isolation and
the benefits of integration does not deny that some schools that are racially isolated have
achieved some effective educational outcomes. Nevertheless, racially isolated schools that
produce high academic achievement represent the exception, and such schools have a
limited ability to accomplish the broader civic objectives of schools, such as teaching stu-
dents to work with those unlike themselves. SeeJENNIFER HOCHSCHILD & NATHAN SCOV-
RONICK, THE AMERICAN DREAM AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 14 (2003).
521 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and in the
judgment) ("This Nation has a moral and ethical obligation to fulfill its historic commit-
ment to creating an integrated society that ensures equal opportunity for all of its chil-
dren.").
322 See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Unintended Lessons in Brown v. Board of Education,
49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. Rxv. 1053, 1053, 1064 (2005) (arguing that "[t]he Brown decision, as far
as the law is concerned, is truly dead and beyond resuscitation" and that "[t]he good news
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1. The Harms of Racial Isolation and the Benefits of Integration
Numerous scholars have provided a comprehensive review of the
research on racial isolation and the benefits of integrated school set-
tings, including the nonpartisan National Academy of Education, which
conducted an independent analysis of the social science research cited
in the many amicus briefs in the Parents Involved litigation. 3 4 This sec-
tion builds on those reviews by noting their principal findings along with
those of other research on the harms of racial isolation and the benefits
of diversity. 325 This section then briefly provides examples of some of the
today is that educators and parents are ignoring the siren song that integration is an essen-
tial component of a good school").
323 See, e.g., Gary Orfield, Why Segregation Is Inherently Unequal: The Abandonment of
Brown and the Continuing Failure of Plessy, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 1041, 1052 (2005) ("Soci-
ety must recognize that Plessy and the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has never worked,
and society, the courts, and the government must work together to end school segregation
wherever feasible."); Sharon Elizabeth Rush, The Heart of Equal Protection: Education and
Race, 23 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 1, 7 (1997) (arguing that a "'quality education,'
informed by Brown, is not possible without integration. Education teaches more than math
and verbal skills; it fosters emotional skills as well," and, further, that "a full set of emo-
tional talents cannot be gained in the context of involuntary segregation").
324 See generally NAT'L ACAD. OF EDUC., supra note 41; Jomills Henry Braddock II &
Tamela McNulty Eitle, The Effects of School Desegregation, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON
MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION 828 (James A. Banks & Cherry A. McGee Banks eds., 2004);
Maureen T. Hallinan, Diversity Effects on Student Outcomes: Social Science Evidence, 59 OHIo ST.
L.J. 733 (1998); Wells & Frankenberg, supra note 5 (reviewing the research on harms of
racial isolation documented in the hundreds of studies citied in the Parents Involved Su-
preme Court amicus briefs). For additional reviews of the literature, see generally Janet
Ward Schofield, Review of Research on School Desegregation's Impact on Elementary and Secondary
Students, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION, supra, at 597; Erica
Frankenberg, Voluntary Integration After Parents Involved: What Does Research Tell Us
About Available Options? (Dec. 3, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
325 Although most of the literature reviews repeatedly note when they are relying on
studies that controlled for the socioeconomic status of students, most of the reviews do not
appear to limit their analyses solely to studies that control for socioeconomic status. The
National Academy of Education analysis did note that most researchers included a set of
control variables in the studies they reviewed, but it also acknowledged that early studies
did not have an effective way to separate other factors from the impact of segregation in
schools. See NAT'L ACAD. OF EDUC., supra note 41, at 15. This analysis further commented
that the effectiveness of research with control variables to measure the impact of diversity
depended on how well the controls captured the myriad factors that influence student
outcomes. See id. When the reviews do not exclude studies that control for socioeconomic
status they might, for example, be finding harms from racial isolation that are due to the
concentrated poverty that typically accompanies racial isolation. See ORFIELD & LEE, supra
note 2, at 29-30 (noting that concentrated poverty typically accompanies racial isolation).
Conversely, when the reviews do not exclude studies that control for socioeconomic status,
they might be attributing benefits to racial integration that arise because of socioeconomic
integration. Given the repeated reliance on and reference to studies that do control for
socioeconomic status and the consistency of the findings across reviews, however, the exis-
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race-neutral approaches that districts have adopted for avoiding racial
isolation and enhancing diversity.326
Research establishes that racially isolated schools offer inferior edu-
cational opportunities and produce inferior outcomes.327 Racially iso-
lated schools suffer from substandard educational resources in critical
ways. For example, although access to good teachers represents "the
most important educational resource that schools can provide," racially
isolated schools experience higher levels of teacher turnover and employ
less experienced and less qualified teachers.3 28 Research also confirms
that inexperienced teachers negatively impact student outcomes.3 29 Pre-
dominantly African American and Latino schools also offer fewer classes
tence of harms and benefits from integration are well-established, although the magnitude
of the harms of racial isolation and the benefits of integration may not be precisely de-
fined in the research. See NAT'L ACAD. OF EDUc., supra note 41, at 18 (noting that, after
using controls for the effect of peers, socioeconomic background, and the characteristics
of teachers, researchers consistently find that the concentration of African American stu-
dents significantly and adversely impacts student achievement and that this is particularly
so for African American students); Hallinan, supra note 324, at 741-42 ("The data gener-
ally are analyzed using statistical models that control for relevant background factors, in-
cluding socioeconomic status, gender, and ability, as well as school factors, such as school
sector (public or private), school size, and geographic locale. The results of these studies
are remarkably consistent. In general, these studies support [the findings that b]lack stu-
dents attain higher academic achievement in majority white schools than in predominantly
or majority black schools [and that t]he earlier a black student is placed in a majority white
school or classroom, the higher the student's academic achievement."); see also Bradley W.
Joondeph, A Second Redemption?, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 169, 192 (1999) ("[T]hose studies
that have attempted to isolate the effects of desegregation have generally found that, con-
trolling for such relevant variables as the student's socioeconomic background and preex-
isting ability, school desegregation produces a modest but statistically significant increase
in achievement for minority children with no detriment to white children."). In addition,
any research discussed or cited in this Article apart from the literature reviews controlled
for the socioeconomic status of students. Finally, many other factors inside and outside of
schools also influence student achievement, such as school resources, access to curricu-
lum, and parents' educational background. Studies vary in how and whether they control
for such factors, which may account for the substantial variation in estimates of the impact
of racial segregation and integration. See NAT'L ACAD. OF EDUC., supra note 41, at 15-16.
326 See infra notes 360-417 and accompanying text.
327 See NAT'L ACAD. OF EDUC., supra note 41, at 18; Wells & Frankenberg, supra note 5,
at 180-83.
328 Wells & Frankenberg, supra note 5, at 180-81; see also NAT'L ACAD. OF EDUC., supra
note 41, at 20 (noting the higher teacher turnover and less experienced teachers at
schools with high concentrations of minority students); Roslyn Arlin Mickelson, The Effects
of Segregation on African American High School Seniors' Academic Achievement, 68 J. NEGRO
EDUc. 566, 577 (2001) (noting that teachers in racially isolated black schools in Charlotte,
North Carolina, were more likely to be new and untenured and less likely to be fully li-
censed and to possess a master's degree, and that racially isolated Black schools offer "dis-
proportionately fewer" human and material resources).
329 See NAT'L ACAD. OF EDUC., supra note 41, at 20.
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that prepare students for college, such as Advanced Placement and hon-
ors classes.
330
In addition to inferior inputs, racial segregation also negatively af-
fects academic outcomes.33' For instance, the National Academy of
Education's review of research on the impact of racial isolation and de-
segregation noted that several "researchers find that, after controlling
for factors such as socioeconomic status, peer effects, and teacher char-
acteristics, the school-level percentage of African American students
substantially and negatively affects student achievement, particularly the
achievement of other African American students. 3 32 Other research
notes that schools with a larger percentage of African American and La-
330 See Wells & Frankenberg, supra note 5, at 181.
331 See, e.g., NAT'L ACAD. OF EDUC., supra note 41, at 18.
332 Id.; see Braddock & Eitle, supra note 324, at 831 ("[R]esearch on the effects of de-
segregation on student academic achievement, measured by standardized tests, seems to
support the proposition that African American and Hispanic students learn somewhat
more in schools that are majority White as compared to their academic performance in
schools that are predominantly non-White."); Hallinan, supra note 324, at 741-42 (1998)
(noting that studies consistently find that "[b]lack students attain higher academic
achievement in majority white schools than in predominantly or majority black schools");
see also, e.g., Doris R. Entwisle & Karl L. Alexander, Summer Setback: Race, Poverty, School Com-
position, and Mathematics Achievement in the First Two Years of School; 57 AM. Soc. REv. 72, 82
(1992) (finding in a study of students in Baltimore that "after two years in segregated
schools, there is a 17-point gap between whites and African-Americans who started with the
same score .... while after two years in integrated schools, the 12-point advantage for
whites that whites enjoyed from the start is unchanged"); Eric A. Hanushek & Margaret E.
Raymond, Does School Accountability Lead to Improved Student Performance?, 24 J. POL'Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 297, 312 (2005) (finding in a national study that the "[h]igher
minority concentrations have a statistically significant negative impact on Blacks" in their
student achievement outcomes on the National Assessment of Educational Progress);
Roslyn Arlin Mickelson, Subverting Swann: First- and Second-Generation Segregation in Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Schools, 38 AM. EDUC. REs. J. 215, 239 (2001) (finding in a study of schools in
Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina, that "[t]he greater the proportion of a student's
elementary school education that takes place in a racially isolated Black elementary
school, the lower the student's scores on standardized tests and the lower her or his track
placement in secondary school"); Mickelson, supra note 328, at 577 (finding in a study of
schools in Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina, that attending a racially isolated black
elementary school has "a small but significant" adverse effect on high school achievement);
Eric A. Hanushek, John F. Kain & Steven G. Rivkin, New Evidence About Brown v. Board of
Education: The Complex Effects of School Racial Composition on Achievement 3 (2007)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with Hoover Institution) (finding in a study of Texas
students that "the black enrollment share adversely affects achievement, and its effects are
roughly twice as large for blacks as for whites" but finding that the concentration of
Hispanic students exerts a substantially smaller, almost negligible influence on student
achievement). The Entwisle and Alexander study found that the class differences "clearly
overshadow school racial settings in explaining minority/majority differences." Entwisle &
Alexander, supra, at 82.
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tino students promote fewer students to the next grade each year.333 Af
ter controlling for socioeconomic status and prior test scores, research
suggests that students who attended schools with predominantly minority
student bodies also are less likely to graduate from college. 33 4 Research
also supports the conclusion that early experiences in segregated
schools tend to lead adults to live mostly segregated lives.
3 35
Scholars offer several explanations for why racially isolated schools
produce inferior outcomes. A 2007 survey of the research on the harms
of racial segregation by Amy Stuart Wells and Erica Frankenberg notes
that racially isolated schools exist within broader societal structures that
are relatively deficient in health care, housing, and employment oppor-
tunities along racial lines, and these structures converge to impact ad-
versely the educational opportunities for students attending racially
isolated schools.336 The racial identity of a school also matters because
"the racial makeup of a school or neighborhood is still a marker of its
status in ... society" and parents often assess whether to send their
child to a school in racial terms. 337
Research from the Civil Rights Project documents how racially iso-
lated schools experience high concentrations of poverty, which brings to
schools a variety of inequalities that result in inferior educational oppor-
tunities for their students. 338 For instance, concentrated poverty brings
to the schoolhouse door "less qualified, less experienced teachers, lower
333 Wells & Frankenberg, supra note 5, at 182; see also Mickelson, supra note 328, at 577
(finding that attending a black elementary school had a negative effect on students'
grades in high school and that the longer that a student spent in a segregated black
elementary school, the less likely it was that the child would be placed in a college-bound
course of study).
s34 Eric M. Camburn, College Completion Among Students from High Schools Located in Large
Metropolitan Areas, 98 AM.J. EDUC. 551, 559-60 (1990) ("High school racial composition, as
measured by the percentage of whites in a student's high school, was found to be the
strongest predictor [of college graduation] among all high school characteristics stud-
ied."); Wells & Frankenberg, supra note 5, at 182.
s35 See Braddock & Eitle, supra note 324, at 833 ("There has been an accumulation of
strong and consistent research evidence that both majority and minority individuals whose
childhood experiences, in schools and neighborhoods, take place in largely segregated
environments are likely to also lead their adult lives in largely segregated settings."); see also
NAT'L ACAD. OF EDUc., supra note 41, at 32 (noting an association between early atten-
dance at a desegregated school and living and working in integrated settings).
336 Wells & Frankenberg, supra note 5, at 180 ("[T]here is strong evidence that the
broader context of racial inequality in housing, labor, health care, and education-what
sociologies call 'structural inequality' -has aJim Crow-like effect on public schools, ensur-
ing that they remain separate and unequal in many important ways.").
337 Id. at 184-85.
338 See ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 2, at 29-30 (noting that concentrated poverty typi-
cally accompanies racial segregation).
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levels of peer group competition, more limited curricula taught at less
challenging levels, more serious health problems, much more turnover
of enrollment, and many other factors that seriously affect academic
achievement. 3 3 9 James Ryan has noted additional disadvantages that
low-income students suffer, including inadequate health care and nutri-
tion, little parental involvement, the absence of an engaging home envi-
ronment, greater mobility, and more experience with drugs and violent
behavior.340 Although close to three-quarters of black and Latino stu-
dents attend "high-poverty schools" -schools where more than 40 per-
cent of the students qualify to receive a free or reduced-price lunch-
only slightly more than a quarter of white students attend such schools.
341
The research on diverse or integrated schools indicates that such
schools can provide important benefits. 342 Substantial research sup-
319 See id. at 29; see also James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the No Child Left Behind
Act, 79 N.Y.U. L. Riv. 932, 974 (2004) ("Study after study documents that high-poverty and
high-minority schools have less qualified and experienced teachers.").
40James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 285 (1999) (citing GARY
ORFIELD ET AL., DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION 54 (1996)).
341 Gary Orfield & Chungmei Lee, Why Segregation Matters: Poverty and Educational
Inequality 19 (The Civil Rights Project, 2005), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.
edu/research/deseg/WhySegregMatters.pdf.
342 See NAT'L ACAD. OF EDUC., supra note 41, at 20; Braddock & Eitle, supra note 324, at
839 ("There appears to be growing agreement among researchers that the opportunity to
learn with and from people from different racial and ethnic backgrounds can, under the
right conditions, enhance students' academic achievement and cognitive development,
increase cross-cultural competence, and promote dispositions and behaviors that will have
economic and social consequences for individuals and communities.... However, re-
search that directly links learning in diverse schools to student outcomes-both long term
and short term-is not extensive, and much of this research was conducted many years ago
and deals largely with African American-White relationships."); Hallinan, supra note 324,
at 741-42 (finding that studies consistently show that black students perform better aca-
demically in schools where more than half of the students are white than in schools where
a majority or predominance of the students are black and that "[r]elated research shows
that the advantage of a white majority school for minority students is intensified when the
white students are middle class and when minority students become friends with their
white peers"); Wells & Frankenberg, supra note 5, at 179 ("There is a large body of re-
search that examines the lives of students who experienced school desegregation and finds
both short-term benefits (in academics and intergroup relations) and long-term benefits
(increased mobility for students of color, positive racial attitudes, and higher comfort lev-
els in racially diverse settings)."); see alsoJonathan Guryan, Desegregation and Black Dropout
Rates, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 919, 932 (2004) (finding in a study of 125 large urban school
districts that "[t]he results suggest that black high school dropout rates declined more in
districts.., that were more effectively integrated under desegregation plans"); Hanushek,
Kain & Rivkin, supra note 332, at 29 (finding in a study of Texas students that equalizing
the racial composition of schools "would reduce the race achievement gap by roughly 13
percent"); David A. Weiner, Byron F. Lutz &Jens Ludwig, The Effects of School Desegrega-
tion on Crime 38-39 (Dec. 29, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), avail-
able at http://www.aeaweb.org/annual-mtg-papers/2007/0107_1300_0303.pdf (finding in
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ports the finding that the achievement of African American students
improves in less segregated schools, particularly in the early grades, al-
though scholars debate the magnitude of this impact, finding only
modest or occasional gains.3 43 For example, Jomills Braddock and
Tamela Eitle's extensive literature review found that "research on the
effects of desegregation on student academic achievement, measured
by standardized tests, seems to support the proposition that African
American and Hispanic students learn somewhat more in schools that
are majority White as compared to their academic performance in
schools that are predominantly non-white., 344 The National Institute
for Education's literature review similarly concluded that
although the apparent magnitude of the influence is quite
variable, there is a relatively common finding that African
American student achievement is enhanced by less segregated
schooling.... [T]hese positive effects for African American
students tend to be larger in earlier grades than in later
grades and larger in studies using experimental designs or
a national study that "estimates suggest that court-ordered school desegregation reduces
homicide victimization by around 20 percent for black youth and up to 35 percent for
white youth" and that "school desegregation at least on average generates beneficial and
quite sizable improvements in youth crime"). Research also indicates that socioeconomic
status influences academic achievement more than the racial composition of schools. See
Hallinan, supra note 324, at 743. This finding suggests that efforts to focus on racial and
class integration would yield greater gains for academic achievement for minority students
than focusing on either factor alone.
343 See NAT'L ACAD. OF EDUC., supra note 41, at 20; Braddock & Eitle, supra note 324, at
829-31; Ryan, supra note 340, at 297 ("'The popular view of desegregation is that it only
occasionally helps boost academic achievement among minority students and only occa-
sionally improves race relations."). The research also reveals that whites are not harmed by
desegregation efforts. See NAT'L ACAD. OF EDUC., supra note 41, at 20; Braddock & Eitle,
supra note 324, at 829, 831. Some research indicates that the benefits of integration accrue
in reading but not in math. See Schofield, supra note 324, at 610 ("[R]esearch suggests that
desegregation has had some positive effect on the reading skills of African American
youngsters. The effect is not large, nor does it occur in all situations, but a modest measur-
able effect does seem apparent. Such is not the case with mathematics skills . .. ."); see also
Braddock & Eitle, supra note 324, at 829 ("Extensive research and careful and increasingly
sophisticated reviews show that the academic performances of Whites and African
Americans are not harmed in desegregated schools and that African Americans typically
show achievement gains, especially in reading, as a result of school desegregation."
(emphasis added)). However, other research finds that African American children do bet-
ter in math at integrated schools. See Entwisle & Alexander, supra note 332, at 82.
344 Braddock & Eitle, supra note 324, at 831.
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longitudinal data sets than in cross-sectional studies or studies
that lack control groups.
345
Other research has shown that the benefits of diversity result from
educators' efforts to enhance the opportunity for contact between stu-
dents in ways that foster superior outcomes, rather than simply placing
students from different racial backgrounds into the same school with-
out attention to how and when students interact. 346
Although diverse schools cannot ensure that intergroup relations
improve, research suggests that such schools can still be constructive in
supporting this goal. 47 For instance, research on the short-term effects
of desegregation on socialization and intergroup relations has yielded
mixed outcomes, though recent students have shown positive outcomes
from diverse classrooms, including reductions in racial prejudice. 348 Re-
search on the long-term effects of desegregation found positive effects
on intergroup relations, including, "[u]nder some circumstances, and
345 NAT'L ACAD. OF EDUC., supra note 41, at 20; see also Entwisle & Alexander, supra
note 332, at 82 (finding that, although the gap in math scores between whites and blacks
in segregated Baltimore schools widened, the widening did not occur in integrated Balti-
more schools).
346 See Roslyn Arlin Mickelson, How Tracking Undermines Race Equity in Desegregated
Schools, in BRINGING EQUITY BACK: RESEARCH FOR A NEW ERA IN AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL
POLICY 49, 55 (Janice Petrovich & Amy Stuart Wells eds., 2005); see also NAT'L ACAD. OF
EDUC., supra note 41, at 9 (noting that, in contrast to desegregated schools that focus on
racial mixing, "[i] ntegrated schools are structured such that contact has some meaningful
chance to lead to improved outcomes; any benefits of racial diversity accrue as a conse-
quence of what educators do with regard to enhancing contact opportunities"); Hallinan,
supra note 324, at 744 (noting that research suggests that the improved outcomes in majority
white schools result from enhanced opportunities to learn rather than desegregation alone).
37 See NAT'L ACAD. OF EDUC., supra note 41, at 27; Braddock & Eitle, supra note 324, at
831-32.
348 See NAT'L ACAD. OF EDUC., supra note 41, at 21-27; Braddock & Eitle, supra note 324,
at 832 (noting that the research on the short-term effects on socialization and intergroup
relations "has produced mixed results," but that, in contrast to earlier research, "more recent
studies of the impact of desegregated classrooms have shown that children exposed to ra-
cially diverse peers in the classroom exhibited reduced adherence to racial stereotypes and
reduced racial prejudice"); Hallinan, supra note 324, at 745 (noting that "[tihe research is
fairly consistent in reporting that black and white students in desegregated schools are less
racially prejudiced than those in segregated schools" and that other studies "generally find
that interracial contact in desegregated schools leads to an increase in interracial sociability
and friendship"); see also Amy J. Strefling, The Influence of Integrated and De Facto Segre-
gated Schools on Racial Attitudes of White Students Toward African Americans 61 (1998)
(paper presented at Council for Administration Convention, available at http://eric.ed.gov/
ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/content storageO1/0000019b/80/17/68/bb.pdf (finding from
a study of a sample of sixty-four students from integrated schools and sixty-four students from
segregated public schools that "students experiencing a de facto segregated public school
education held less favorable attitudes toward African Americans than students who experi-
enced an integrated public school education").
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over the long term, ... increases in the likelihood of greater tolerance
and better intergroup relations among adults of different racial
groups." 349 Research finds that early experience in desegregated schools
encourages students to work or attend school in integrated settings, live
in integrated neighborhoods, and express confidence in their posses-
sion of the skills needed to navigate interracial relationships.35 0 To ob-
tain the benefits of intergroup interactions, researchers have identified
ways to foster positive intergroup interactions, including (1) ensuring
that students are cooperating to achieve shared goals, (2) maintaining
equal status among the participants in the group contact, (3) creating
the opportunity for students to get to know other group participants as
individuals, and (4) giving support for positive interactions from rele-
vant authorities. 51
Admittedly, some scholars dispute the harms of racial isolation and
the benefits of integration,3 52 but the weight of scholarly opinion sup-
349 See NAT'L ACAD. OF EDUC., supra note 41, at 32. The National Academy of Educa-
tion review notes that the vast majority of the studies did not adequately control for self-
selection bias, but it found adequate support for its conclusions because a study that did
adequately control for this bias found similar results. See id.; see also Braddock & Eitle, supra
note 324, at 833 ("There has been an accumulation of strong and consistent research evi-
dence that both majority and minority individuals whose childhood experiences, in
schools and neighborhoods, take place in largely segregated environments are likely to
also lead their adult lives in largely segregated settings.").
350 See NAT'L ACAD. OF EDUC., supra note 41, at 32; Braddock & Eitle, supra note 324, at
833-34; see also Hallinan, supra note 324, at 745 ("[S]tudies examine the effects of
desegregation on students' social integration and friendships. These studies generally find
that interracial contact in desegregated schools leads to an increase in interracial
sociability and friendship.").
3'51 See NAT'L ACAD. OF EDUC., supra note 41, at 21; Braddock & Eitle, supra note 324, at
831.
352 Some scholars dispute the findings that integrated school settings can create posi-
tive outcomes. See HAROLD B. GERARD & NORMAN MILLER, SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: A
LONG-TERm STUDY 297-98 (1975) ("Analysis of standardized reading achievement data
offers a picture that provides little encouragement for those who see desegregation as a
panacea for reducing the achievement gap that so ubiquitously characterizes minority
academic performance. While the achievement of Anglo children did not suffer, minority
students showed no overall benefit."); David J. Armor, Desegregation and Academic Achieve-
ment, in SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 147, 183 (Christine H. Rossell et
al. eds., 2002) ("Whether one examines data from historical studies, more recent national
studies, or district-level case studies, it is quite clear that the racial composition of student
bodies, by itself, has no significant effect on black achievement, nor has it reduced the
black-white [achievement] gap to a significant degree."); Thomas D. Cook, What Have
Black Children Gained Academically from School Integration?: Examination of the Meta-Analytic
Evidence, in SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND BLACK ACHIEVEMENT 6, 40-41 (U.S. Dep't of
Educ. ed., 1984) ("On the average, desegregation did not cause an increase in achieve-
ment in mathematics."); Edgar G. Epps, The Impact of School Desegregation on Aspirations, Self-
Concepts and Other Aspects of Personality, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1975, at 300, 307
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ports the conclusion that racial isolation inflicts harmful effects and
integration has beneficial effects. 353 Research establishes that racial iso-
lation in schools inflicts a subordinating effect on students in that such
schools typically offer substandard educational opportunities and pro-
duce inferior outcomes when compared to other schools. 354 It is this
subordinating effect that denies the students equal educational oppor-
tunity.355 Furthermore, the inferior opportunities and outcomes that
minorities experience in racially isolated schools further exacerbate the
preexisting disadvantage that minority students experience in soci-
ety.356 The inferior outcomes also undermine the ability of minority
students to enter competitive postsecondary institutions and profes-
sional career paths. 357 Conversely, the research also indicates that di-
verse student bodies can have a beneficial effect on the academic out-
comes of minority students and their life opportunities.358 The
evidence of the potentially harmful impact of racial isolation in schools
and the benefits of diversity explains why Justice Kennedy closely linked
equal educational opportunity and the racial composition of schools in
Parents Involved.359 When districts undertake race-neutral efforts to
avoid racial isolation and promote diversity, they can help to ensure
that students receive the equal educational opportunity guaranteed by
the Equal Protection Clause. The next section explores some of the
("The evidence on the impact of desegregation is inconsistent, but seems to warrant the
conclusion that desegregation has no effect on black self-esteem, or lowers it only
slightly."); Walter G. Stephan, Improving Intergroup Relations in the Schools, in SCHOOL DE-
SEGREGATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra, at 267, 271 ("Ihe research on short- and long-
term effects of desegregation makes it quite clear that desegregation is not a panacea for
problems in intergroup relations."); see also Brief of David J. Armor et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners at 9-29, Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (Nos. 05-908 & 05-915),
2006 WL 2453607; Brief of Drs. Murphy, Rossell & Walberg as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 5-16, Parents Involved, 127 S. CL 2738 (Nos. 05-908 & 05-915), 2006 WL
2459104.
353 See Hallinan, supra note 324, at 753 (noting, among other things, that research in-
dicates that minority students perform better academically in majority white schools and
that "[n]o comparable body of research is available that contradicts the major findings of
these studies or that demonstrates widespread negative effects of diversity on student
learning or race and ethnic relations").
354 See Wells & Frankenberg, supra note 5, at 182-83 ("[T]he social science research on
the harms of racial segregation clearly demonstrates a powerful point made by a prior
Supreme Court in the Brown v. Board of Education ruling: separate is inherently unequal.").
355 See id.
356 See Hutchinson, supra note 245, at 692; Siegel, supra note 245, at 1472-73, 1547.
357 See Wells & Frankenberg, supra note 5, at 180-82.
358 See NAT'L ACAD. OF EDUc., supra note 41, at 20, 32.
359 See 127 S. Ct. at 2791-92 (KennedyJ., concurring in part and in the judgment).
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approaches that districts may adopt to pursue the benefits of diversity
and to avoid the harms of racial isolation.
2. Race-Neutral Approaches to Avoiding Racial Isolation and
Promoting Diversity
Districts that seek to avoid racial isolation and promote diversity
should consider the full range of race-neutral options. These options
include socioeconomic integration, restructuring school attendance
boundaries, magnet schools, and interdistrict transfer programs. 360 A
brief description of these approaches follows. For some of these ap-
proaches, the research on the effectiveness of each approach is limited
because districts have only pursued such efforts for the last decade or
so.
3 6 1 This Article notes research and outcomes on each side of the de-
bate about these approaches.
Student assignment plans that do not consider race are likely to be
less effective than those that directly consider race and consequently
may leave a substantial degree of racial isolation in schools. 3 62 Piece-
meal efforts to integrate schools may destabilize neighborhoods and
encourage white flight because they cannot equalize the racial compo-
sition at all schools and ensure equality in the resources, staff, support,
and status of the school. 363 Race-neutral options are far from a panacea
360 This discussion does not provide an exhaustive list of race-neutral options. For dis-
cussions of these and other race-neutral options, see ANURIMA BHARGAVA ET AL., STILL
LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: VOLUNTARY K-12 SCHOOL INTEGRATION 34-61 (2007); Heeren,
supra note 16, at 175-87; MichaelJ. Kaufman, PICS in Focus: A Majority of the Supreme Court
Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Race-Conscious School Integration Strategies, 35 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 1, 13-18 (2007). Districts also might consider a number of other strategies
such as strategic site selection of schools and intradistrict recruitment efforts that enhance
diversity. See Kaufman, supra, at 13-18.
361 See Frankenberg, supra note 324, at 8.
362 NAT'L ACAD. OF EDUC., supra note 41, at 3 (noting that the research cited in the
briefs in the Parents Involved case suggests that "although assignments made on the basis of
socioeconomic status are likely to marginally reduce racial isolation and may have other
benefits-none of the proposed alternatives is as effective as race-conscious policies for
achieving racial diversity"); Wells & Frankenberg, supra note 5, at 179 (explaining that the
measures suggested by justice Kennedy in Parents Involved "will be far less effective without
the use of race-conscious student assignment plans to balance all schools simultaneously
and thus create more equality across the district"). For instance, research indicates that,
when Charlotte shifted from a race-conscious to a race-neutral plan, segregation increased.
See Roslyn Arlin Mickelson, The Academic Consequences of Desegregation and Segregation: Evi-
dence from the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools, 81 N.C. L. REv. 1513, 1558 (2003); Stephen
Samuel Smith & Roslyn Arlin Mickelson, All That Glitters Is Not Gold: School Reform in Char-
lotte-Mecklenburg, 22 EDUc. EVALUATION & POL'Y ANALYSIS 101, 108-09 (2000).
363 Wells & Frankenberg, supra note 5, at 184; see also AMY STUART WELLS & ROBERT L
CRAIN, STEPPING OVER THE COLOR LINE: AFRICAN-AMERICAN STUDENTS IN WHITE SUBURBAN
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for the racial isolation and lack of diversity in the nation's schools.
364
Many acknowledge that these plans will not be as effective at achieving
diversity and avoiding racial isolation as those that considered race di-
rectly; they recognize, however, that these plans represent a better al-
ternative than abandoning these goals altogether.3 65
Student assignment plans that integrate students based upon so-
cioeconomic status have grown in popularity over the past fifteen years,
particularly since 2000, their having been adopted in approximately
forty districts that educate 2.5 million students.3 66 In reviewing the re-
search on the impact of class integration, Richard Kahlenberg, a lead-
ing expert on public school choice, has noted that "[a] large body of
research has long shown that concentrations of poverty-even more
than concentrations of minority students--can impede academic
achievement, and that providing all students with the chance to attend
mixed-income schools can raise overall levels of achievement."3 67 James
Ryan similarly agrees that the research supports the academic benefits
of class integration for low-income students. 368
The school district in Wake County, North Carolina, adopted a
student assignment plan that ensured that no more than 40 percent of
each school's enrollees would be low-income students and that no
more than 25 percent would have achievement outcomes below their
grade level. 369 The plan accomplished this by redrawing attendance
SCHooLs 318-20 (1997); Jennifer J. Holme, Buying Homes, Buying Schools: School Choice and the
Social Construction of School Quality, 72 HARv. EDUC. REv. 177, 194-201 (2002); Martin Shnchez
Jankowski, The Rising Significance of Status in U.S. Race Relations, in THE BUBBLING CAULDRON:
RACE, ETHNICITY, AND THE URBAN CRisis 77, 87-90 (Michael Peter Smith & Joe R. Feagin
eds., 1995); Erica Frankenberg & Chungmei Lee, Race in American Public Schools: Rapidly
Resegregating School Districts 12 (2002) (The Civil Rights Project Research Paper), available at
http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/deseg/Race in-AmericanPublicSchoolsl
.pdf.
364 See, e.g., Frankenberg, supra note 324, at 4.
365 See, e.g., KAHLENBERG, supra note 5, at 3 ("The Supreme Court's decision to curtail
the use of race was unfortunate because there is no more efficient way to produce the
important goal of racially integrated schools than using race per se. It would be an enor-
mous shame, however, if the many districts now using race in student assignment took the
U.S. Supreme Court decisions invalidating voluntary race-conscious plans in Louisville and
Seattle to conclude that they should give up on school integration altogether."); NAT'L
ACAD. OF EDUC., supra note 41, at 3 (supporting race-neutral measures while acknowledg-
ing their limitations).
366 SeeKAHLENBERG, supra note 5, at 3, 14.
367 See id.
368 See Ryan, supra note 340, at 297-98 ("Research consistently shows that introducing
students from low socioeconomic backgrounds into higher-socioeconomic-status schools
has a positive impact, often quite significant, on the poor students.").
369 See KAHLENBERG, supra note 5, at 4.
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boundaries for five new schools.370 It successfully raised student
achievement and has created racially integrated schools.3 71 After the
racial classification was abandoned under the plan, racial segregation
rose, but the district has remained integrated.3 72 Similarly, the school
district in Cambridge, Massachusetts, maintained socioeconomically
and racially integrated schools when it shifted from using racial classifi-
cation to using a socioeconomic classification combined with parental
choice to assign students to schools; 3 73 the schools have increased in
racial segregation, however, since the board enacted the new policy.374
Nevertheless, racial integration under the plan surpasses that under a
neighborhood-residence student assignment plan. 375
Some districts, such as San Francisco, California, and Charlotte-
Mecklenburg, North Carolina, adopted more limited socioeconomic
plans when shifting from a race-based plan to a race-neutral plan and
qperienced increases in racial isolation. 376 Scholars debate whether
(iiioeconomic integration plans can serve as an effective approach to
achieve racial integration.3 77 Undoubtedly, further research needs to be
370 See id.
371 See id. at 4, 13. All student groups in the district-white and minority, low-income
and middle-class--outperform similarly situated students in districts throughout North
Carolina that do not focus on socioeconomic integration. See id. at 13. Furthermore, in
adopting the plan, some school board members and district administrators also began to
realize that the prior success of the plan had been its ability to integrate students by class
and achievement. They thus began to focus on ensuring that class and achievement inte-
gration became the focus of the plan, with racial integration as a beneficial byproduct but
no longer the focus. See id. at 11.
372 See Brief for the ACLU et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 14-15, Par-
ents Involved, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (Nos. 05-908, 05-915), 2006 WL 2927068; Frankenberg, supra
note 324, at 11; Impact of Race-Neutral Alternatives, FACT SHEET (NAACP Legal Defense &
Educ. Fund, Inc., New York, N.Y), at 2 [hereinafter NAACP FACT SHEET], available at http://
www.naacpldf.org/content/pdf/voluntary/Race-Neutral-Alternatives-fact-sheet.pdf.
373 See KAHLENBERG, supra note 5, at 32-33.
374 See Tracy Jan, An Imbalance Grows in Cambridge Schools: Placements Based on Income, Not
Race, BOSTON GLOBE, July 23, 2007, at Al.
375 See Frankenberg, supra note 324, at 11.
376 See KAHLENBERG, supra note 5, at 4, 41; Mickelson, supra note 362, at 1558; Smith &
Mickelson, supra note 362, at 108-09; NAACP FACT SHEET, supra note 372, at 1 n.***
("[M]ore than 90% of minority students in San Francisco attend schools with greater than
74% minority student enrollment, and more than 60% of minority students in San Fran-
cisco attend hypersegregated schools, with greater than 90% minority student enroll-
ment."); Frankenberg, supra note 324, at 9-10 (noting that ajudge ordered the multifactor
plan in San Francisco abandoned because it increased segregation in the district).
377 Compare KAHLENBERG, supra note 5, at 3, 14 (arguing that socioeconomic plans can
promote racial diversity and providing guidance on how to design plans to achieve racial
diversity), with NAT'L ACAD. OF EDUC., supra note 41, at 41 ("These researchers conclude
that, although promoting diversity with respect to socioeconomic status may result in wor-
thy and educationally beneficial ends, it is not likely to substantially reduce school segrega-
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conducted on this and other race-neutral approaches. 3 78 The mixed
results of and varying commentary on these plans suggest that socio-
economic integration plans will advance diversity and reduce racial iso-
lation in some districts but not in others.3 7 9 Like all race-neutral meas-
ures, the success of socioeconomic integration plans depends on the
particular demographics and circumstances in the district.3 80 Successful
plans avoid piecemeal approaches by encompassing the entire district in
the plan and by enabling parents to exercise choice among schools.381
School districts also may seek to promote diversity and avoid racial
isolation by drawing attendance-zone boundaries so as to bring together
students from a racially mixed group of neighborhoods and to address
segregated housing patterns, which represent the primary cause of seg-
regated schools. 382 The zones are typically designed to distribute racial
groups evenly.383 For instance, the school district in Rock Hill, South
Carolina, chose to redraw mandatory attendance zones when it planned
to open a new high school and has successfully reduced racial isolation
in some schools and achieved integration in others at both the high
school and elementary levels.384 Also, the Berkeley Unified School Dis-
trict draws the attendance zones for its elementary schools to bring to-
gether a diverse mix of students from the racially and socioeconomically
tion."), and Gary Orfield et al., Statement of American Social Scientists of Research on School
Desegregation to the U.S. Supreme Court in Parents v. Seattle School District and Meredith v.
Jefferson County, 40 URB. REv. 96, 108, 132-33 (2008) (noting that "studies evaluating the
actual implementation of socioeconomic integration plans have found that they have had
mixed results in maintaining racially diverse schools," as well as some of the disadvantages
of using free and reduced-price lunch data), and Sean F. Reardon et al., Implications of In-
come-Based School Assignment Policies for Racial School Segregation, 28 EDUC. EVALUATION &
POL'Y ANALYSIS 49, 49 (2006) (finding that class integration would not create racial diver-
sity in most large urban districts, and arguing that "in general, income integration is no
guarantee of even modest racial desegregation").
378 Gary Orfield, Response, POVERTY & RACE, Sept.-Oct. 2001, at 5-6 (calling for further
exploration of class desegregation).
379 See, e.g., KAHLENBERG, supra note 5, at 4, 13;Jan, supra note 374.
380 NAACP FACT SHEET, supra note 372, at 1.
381 See KAHLENBERG, supra note 5, at 4-5.
382 Stephen Samuel Smith et al., "Your Father Works for My Father". Race, Class, and the
Politics of Voluntarily Mandated Desegregation, 110 TEACHERS COLL. RECORD 986, 994-1006
(2008) (describing the conditions and developments that led the school district in Rock
Hill, South Carolina, to adjust the boundaries of mandatory school attendance zones);
Wells & Frankenberg, supra note 5, at 186 (recommending that districts take care "to stabi-
lize racially integrated neighborhoods by encouraging students in those communities to
attend nearby schools").
383 See Frankenberg, supra note 324, at 9.
384 Smith et al., supra note 382, at 1024.
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segregated neighborhoods in Berkeley, California.3 85 From 2005 to
2006, the plan resulted in eight of the eleven elementary schools enroll-
ing student populations within fifteen percentage points of the district-
wide average of 40 percent low-income students. 386 Research on redraw-
ing attendance zones to achieve diversity suggests that some districts will
find this approach effective, though others may find that it has adverse
effects such as destabilizing neighborhoods.
3 87
Some districts may be able to develop magnet schools to promote
diversity and avoid racial isolation. Magnet schools seek to enroll a di-
verse student population by developing specialized programs, such as a
specialized subject matter, theme, or unique pedagogical approach that
attracts students away from their private or neighborhood schools.
388
The National Center for Education Statistics counted 2,736 magnet
schools in the United States and its jurisdictions for the 2005-2006
school year, with the highest concentrations in California, Michigan,
Illinois, and New York.389 Through the Magnet Schools Assistance Pro-
385 Berkeley Unified School District, BUSD Student Assignment Plan/Policy, http://www.
berkeley.net/index.php?page=student-assignment-plan (last visited Feb. 18, 2009) [hereinaf-
ter Berkeley Student Assignment Plan]. "In the City of Berkeley, race and social class have
traditionally segregated residential housing patterns." See id.
386 See KAHLENBERG, supra note 5, at 34.
387 See Heeren, supra note 16, at 186 (noting that restructuring attendance zones "re-
mains ineffective in racially isolated communities"); Salvatore Saporito & Deenesh Sohoni,
Coloring Outside the Lines: Racial Segregation in Public Schools and Their Attendance Boundaries,
79 Soc. EDUC. 81, 96 (2006) (finding that white students tend to leave the public schools
at higher rates when the district racially balances school attendance boundaries); Smith et
al., supra note 382, at 1024 (finding that redrawing attendance zones in Rock Hill, South
Carolina, reduced racial isolation and promoted integrated school settings); Frankenberg,
supra note 324, at 9 ("Despite some evidence to the contrary, it is conceivable that a plan
based on geographical considerations might achieve racial diversity.... However, evidence
also demonstrates that under certain circumstances, including the pairing of adjoining
neighborhoods that contain different demographic makeups, that drawing school bound-
ary lines might destabilize pockets of racial integration within districts."); Richard Kahlen-
berg, How to Keep Brown Alive, SLATE, June 29, 2007, http://www.slate.com/id/2169443
(arguing that redrawing attendance zones will have little effect in a heavily segregated
district); MICHAEL B. DE LEEUW ET AL., RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION AND HOUSING DIs-
CRIMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES: VIOLATIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON
THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 11 (2007), http://www2.
ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/docs/ngos/usa/USHRN27.pdf (noting that attendance
zone planning can have a positive impact on a district because it eliminates "white en-
claves" and allows parents to live anywhere in the district and know that their child will
attend an integrated school).
388 YUDOF ET AL., supra note 136, at 414; Wells & Frankenberg, supra note 5, at 186
(2007).
389 LEE HOFFMAN & JOHN SIETSEMA, NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATS., U.S. DEP'T OF
EDUC., NUMBERS AND TYPES OF PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS FROM THE
COMMON CORE OF DATA: SCHOOL YEAR 2005-06, at 4-5 (2007), available at http://nces.
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gram, the U.S. Department of Education offers grants to districts to
operate magnet schools for the purpose of ending, reducing, or pre-
venting minority-group isolation. 390
Researchers debate the ability of magnet schools to serve as an ef-
fective integration tool.391 The U.S. Department of Education con-
ceded in 2003 that the fifty-seven schools that received magnet school
grants for the 1998-2001 cycle "overall ... made only modest progress
in reducing minority group isolation .... "392 Only 57 percent of the
grantees succeeded in preventing, eliminating, or reducing minority-
group isolation, and 35 percent of the schools only reduced minority-
group isolation by five percentage points or less. 393 Researchers have
identified certain conditions that increase the likelihood of success at
promoting diversity and avoiding racial isolation. To succeed, magnet
schools need to use an equitable approach for selecting students and
ed.gov/pubs2007/2007354rev.pdf. Information on magnet schools in seven states was
unavailable, and twelve states reported that they either do not designate magnet schools or
otherwise reported that this information was not applicable. See id.
390 20 U.S.C. § 7231(b) (1) (2006).
391 Compare Jeffrey R Henig, Race and Choice in Montgomery County, Maryland, Magnet
Schools, 96 TEACHERS COLL. RECORD 729, 731 (1995) (finding that magnet schools in
Montgomery County, Maryland, are more diverse than other schools in the county, but
that school choice could exacerbate racial segregation in the schools), and JORDAN RICK-
LES ET AL., UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA ALL CAMPUS CONSORTIUM ON RESEARCH FOR DI-
VERSITY, SCHOOL INTEGRATION AND RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION IN CALIFORNIA: CHAL-
LENGES FOR RACIAL EQUITY 3 (2004), available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/ucaccord/
pb/pb-002-0504 (finding that, in California, magnet schools "on average, are significantly
more integrated than regular schools"), and Salvatore Saporito, Private Choices, Public Con-
sequences: Magnet School Choice and Segregation by Race and Poverty, 50 Soc. PROBS. 181, 197
(2003) (finding that magnet schools were less racially segregated than neighborhood
schools), and CITIZENS COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, DIFFICULT CHOICES: Do MAGNET
SCHOOLS SERVE CHILDREN IN NEED? 11 (Corrine M. Yu & William L. Taylor eds., 1997)
(noting that a study of magnet schools in St. Louis, Cincinnati, and Nashville found that
those schools "in all three communities ... have been successful in creating desegregated
schools"), with Lawson Bush V et al., Magnet Schools: Desegregation or Resegregation? Students
Voices from Inside the Walls, 29 AM. SECONDARY EDUC. 33, 46 (2001) (finding, through inter-
views of students, that classes at magnet high schools remained segregated and that stu-
dents of different racial groups did not interact), and Christine Rossell, The Desegregation
Efficiency of Magnet Schools, 38 URB. AFF. REV. 697, 718 (2003) (finding that adding magnet
schools to a voluntary desegregation plan does not increase interracial exposure but that it
does increase white flight), andJudith B. Poppell & Sally A. Hague, Examining Indicators
to Assess the Overall Effectiveness of Magnet Schools: A Study of Magnet Schools in Jack-
sonville, Florida 3 (April 12, 2001) (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Am.
Educ. Research Ass'n) ("Most researchers question the effectiveness of magnet schools in
meeting desegregation goals.").
392 See BRUCE CHRISTENSON ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., EVALUATION OF THE MAGNET
SCHOOLS ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, 1998 GRANTEES, at x (2003).
393 See id. at xii-xiii.
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ensure that families have ,-, :,Ient and centralized information about
the magnet schools offered in the district.394 Magnet schools also need
to provide effective transportation support for students attending the
schools. 395 Also, some research suggests that magnet schools in non-
Hispanic, white neighborhoods are more likely to achieve integration
than those in minority neighborhoods, and that magnet schools with
racially and ethnically mixed groups of minority students, involved par-
ents, and a low student-teacher ratio are more likely to reduce racial
isolation. 396 Finally, elementary schools and whole-school, rather than
within-school, programs have been found to be more effective at pre-
venting, eliminating, or reducing racial isolation.3 97
Some communities also may adopt interdistrict race-neutral ap-
proaches, such as allowing students to transfer between districts. In-
terdistrict approaches have been adopted in cities such as Hartford,
Connecticut; Boston, Massachusetts; and St. Louis, Missouri, and have
gained suburban support because of the diversity that such programs
bring to white schools. 398 For instance, St. Louis adopted an interdis-
,iict transfer program that allowed students from the primarily poor
and African American St. Louis school district to transfer voluntarily to
the white and more affluent suburbs surrounding the city.399 The pro-
gram has achieved considerable success. 400 Although eleven of the dis-
tricts were almost all white when the program began, by the 1996-1997
school year (the thirteenth year of the program), fourteen of the six-
teen suburban districts maintained a black enrollment of at least 15
percent. 401 Students who transferred to suburban schools and magnet
schools graduated from high school at twice the rate of city students,
and transfer students attend college at "far higher rates" than city stu-
dents. 40 2 The greatest achievement gains for transfer students appeared
s94 SeeYuDoF ET AL., supra note 136, at 415 (citingJanet R. Price &Jane R. Stern, Mag-
net Schools as a Strategy for Integration and School Reform, 5 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 291, 299-300
(1987)); Douglas A. Archbald, School Choice, Magnet Schools, and the Liberation Model: An
Empirical Study, 77 Soc. EDuc. 283, 304 (2004).
395 Archbald, supra note 394, at 304.
396 See CHRISTENSON ET AL., supra note 392, at xiii; RICKLES ET AL., supra note 391, at 4.
397 See CHRISTENSON ET AL., supra note 392, at viii.
398 Wells & Frankenberg, supra note 5, at 186.
399 SeeWELLS & CRAIN, supra note 363, at 18.
400 See id.
401 See id.
402 See William H. Freivogel, Billion-Dollar Program Began with a Mother's Concern for Her
Son: Her Lawsuit Led to Largest School Choice Program in Country, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH,
Jan. 13, 2004, Special Section, at 38; see also WELLS & CRAIN, supra note 363, at 338 (noting
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in high school reading and math, while elementary transfer students
have not demonstrated significant gains. 40 3 Although the program was
set to end at the end of the 2008-2009 school year, in June 2007, the
sixteen school districts voted unanimously to extend the program for
another five years. 404
A more modest approach may be found in Minneapolis, Minne-
sota. 405 There, the school district has implemented a small-scale plan
that focuses on interdistrict transfers and magnet schools that resulted
from the district's settlement of a lawsuit that charged Minneapolis with
racial and economic segregation. 4°6 The plan has enabled approxi-
mately 2000 low-income students to attend suburban schools over the
four years in which the plan has been implemented. 40 7 Those students
who enrolled in suburban schools under the plan, on average, scored
twenty-three percentage points higher on reading than similarly situ-
ated students who did not participate in the plan. 4° s Although some
interdistrict efforts have been successful, some question whether these
approaches will prove successful in the future if districts cannot limit
students' choices on the basis of race, given the influence of race on
parents' decisions to select a particular school. 409
Race-neutral student assignment plans undoubtedly can present
numerous challenges. For example, complex plans can confuse families
as to their operation. 410 Or, race-neutral student assignment plans may
increase the distance that students must travel to school.411 Further-
more, race-neutral plans undoubtedly will fail to address the multifac-
eted challenges that plague minority communities. 412
The effectiveness of any race-neutral approach will depend on a
myriad of factors, including the demographics, geography, and political
will of the citizenry.413 It follows that a race-neutral approach that works
in one neighborhood might possibly increase segregation and destabi-
that African American students who transferred to suburban schools showed greater aca-
demic gains than African American students in the St. Louis schools).
403 SeeFreivogel, supra note 402; see also WELLS & CRAIN, supra note 363, at 338.
404 See Paul Hampel, Districts Vote to Extend Desegregation Program, ST. Louis PosT-
DIsPATCH,June 23, 2007, at A12.
405 KAHLENBERG, supra note 5, at 38-39.
406 See id.
407 See id. at 39.
408 See id.
409 Wells & Frankenberg, supra note 5, at 186.
410 Heeren, supra note 16, at 179.
411 Id. at 186.
412 Id. at 176.
413 See, e.g., NAACP FACT SHEET, supra note 372, at 1.
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lize housing integration in another neighborhood. Nevertheless, a race-
neutral approach, as compared to inaction, will almost always promote
diversity and avoid racial isolation and thus advance the antisubordina-
tion function of the Equal Protection Clause.
Now that the Supreme Court has limited the use of racial classifi-
cations, if schools are to avoid racial isolation and promote diversity, a
renewed emphasis should be placed on the effective use of race-neutral
efforts, as well as on research on those efforts. This will require districts
to experiment with a variety of approaches to determine what race-
neutral approaches work best without sacrificing other goals and inter-
ests of the district, such as respecting parental preferences and
neighborhood stability.41 4 Many districts may choose a combination of
these efforts to achieve their goals. 41 5 For example, a district may draw
attendance boundaries to promote socioeconomic integration. Re-
search reveals that districts with a comprehensive approach to integra-
tion created the most integrated and racially stable schools and hous-
ing.41 6 When this occurs, whites lose the incentive to move to white
neighborhoods, and parents know that they can live in any neighbor-
hood in the district and that their child will not be forced to attend a
racially isolated school.417 Thus, districts may find that adopting a com-
prehensive approach is necessary to accomplish their goals.
A district's adoption of a race-neutral approach can help the dis-
trict provide equal educational opportunity by reducing racial isolation
and its attendant harms while harnessing some of the benefits of inte-
grated schools. This is one of the reasons that districts should be given
wide latitude to adopt such approaches. Section C explains that gov-
ernments also should be given wide latitude to adopt these race-neutral
414 See Frankenberg, supra note 324, at 8 (noting that it has been less than a decade
since educators began exploring race-neutral student assignment plans).
415 Reardon et al., supra note 377, at 68 (noting that, although income-based integra-
tion plans are not likely to lead to racial integration in most cities, a district that combined
income integration with free and effective transportation to any school in the district to
any student, as well as with parental choice, might be able to achieve racial integration).
416 Wells & Frankenberg, supra note 5, at 184 (citing FRANKENBERG & LEE, supra note
363, at 12; Myron Orfield & Thomas Luce, Minority Suburbanization and Racial Change:
Stable Integration, Neighborhood Transition, and the Need for Regional Approaches 8 (May
6, 2005) (paper presented at Race and Regionalism Conference, Minneapolis, Minnesota),
available at http://www.irpumn.org/website/conference/materials/MinoritySubn_050605w
MAPS.pdf; Diana Pearce, Breaking Down the Barriers: New Evidence on the Impact of Met-
ropolitan School Desegregation on Housing Patterns 40 (1980) (unpublished report submit-
ted to the Nat'l Inst. of Educ.)).
417 DE LEEUW ET AL., supra note 387, at 11.
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approaches because they can avoid some of the harms and costs of us-
ing a racial classification.
C. The Advantages of Race-Neutral Efforts over Racial Classifications
Justice Kennedy asserted in Parents Involved that race-neutral ac-
tions inflict less harm than racial classifications but did not explain the
rationale for this assertion. 418 This section marshals arguments for why
race-neutral efforts do not inflict most of the harms of racial classifica-
tions. In light of the fact that race-neutral efforts can avoid most of the
harms of a racial classification while advancing equal educational op-
portunity, governments should enjoy wide latitude to adopt race-
neutral efforts to avoid racial isolation and enhance diversity.419
1. The Disadvantages of Racial Classifications
Both the Supreme Court and scholars have noted that racial classi-
fications are disfavored for several reasons. 420 For example, the plurality
in Croson explained that "[c]lassifications based on race carry a danger
of stigmatic harm."421 Stigmatic harm may arise from affirmative action
programs because they "cast[] a cloud" on the abilities of minorities. 422
In addition, Robin Lenhardt has argued that regardless of whether one
is a minority, stigma may arise from a racial classification simply based
upon the government's recognition of racial difference. 423
Also, racial classifications sometimes suggest that a government
actor is basing decisions on stereotypes. 424 Kim Forde-Mazrui has pro-
vided a compelling explanation for the stereotypical assumptions that
cause the Court to condemn racial classifications:
418 127 S. Ct. at 2791-92 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
419 Id. at 2792 ("Executive and legislative branches, which for generations now have
considered these types of [race-neutral] policies and procedures, should be permitted to
employ them with candor and with confidence that a constitutional violation does not
occur whenever a decisionmaker considers the impact a given approach might have on
students of different races.").
420 See, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (plurality opinion); Campos, supra note 265, at 633.
421 Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (plurality opinion).
422 Campos, supra note 265, at 633; see also Daria Roithmayr, Direct Measures: An Alterna-
tive Form of Affirmative Action, 7 MIcn. J. RAcE & L. 1, 15 (2001) ("[Riace-conscious prefer-
ences stigmatize people of color as unqualified or not deserving of selection 'on their mer-
its.").
423 R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79
N.Y.U. L. REv. 803, 870-71 (2004).
424 See Croson, 488 U.S. at 510 (plurality opinion).
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The stereotypical assumption potentially expressed by the
[benign racial] classification is that all or most racial minori-
ties are inferior or otherwise disadvantaged on the basis of
their race itself, not necessarily because of some underlying
disadvantage that correlates to race. With respect to whites,
such classifications potentially send the message that whites,
no matter what tangible difficulties many face, are necessarily
privileged. Blacks are presumed disadvantaged to the point of
deserving preferential treatment regardless of how privileged
individual black beneficiaries may be, and whites are pre-
sumed advantaged regardless of the difficult circumstances
many endure. Such over- and under-inclusive generalizations
about blacks and whites that posit a direct relationship be-
tween race and advantage or disadvantage represent the kinds
of "stereotypes" the Court condemns. By expressing this mes-
sage, intentionally or not, racial classifications may cause or
reinforce stereotypical thinking, which in turn leads people to
treat others based on stereotypical beliefs, and furthers us
from the day when race no longer matters. 425
Thus, racial classifications can promote stereotypes because some be-
lieve that they fail to accurately capture the disadvantage that the classi-
fication seeks to remedy.426 A racial classification also may promote
stereotypes because it suggests that some cannot succeed without special
consideration of a factor that does not relate to individual success.
427
Racial classifications also can "promote notions of racial inferiority
and lead to a politics of racial hostility."428 As with the promotion of
stereotypes, ideas about racial inferiority may arise, for instance, when a
racial classification conveys a message that a minority needs special con-
sideration to gain access to a benefit, such as admission to a postsecond-
ary institution. 429 Racial hostility may arise because an affirmative action
policy grants a preference to those who do not "need" it, such as rela-
tively privileged minorities, and withholds the preference from those
who are materially disadvantaged, such as low-income whites. 430
425 Forde-Mazrui, supra note 35, at 2357-58.
426 See id.
427 Benjamin Baez, The Supreme Court and Affirmative Action: Narratives About Race and
Justice, 18 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 413, 442 (1999).
428 Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (plurality opinion).
42 Baez, supra note 427, at 442.
430 See Forde-Mazrui, supra note 35, at 2357-58.
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The Supreme Court has explained that racial classifications are
forbidden because judging someone by his or her race undermines the
worth and dignity of individuals when personal qualities and merit rep-
resent the appropriate measure. 431 Classifications based upon race raise
concerns because the decision is based upon "an immutable character-
istic which its possessors are powerless to escape or set aside. 432
Justice Kennedy's opinion in Parents Involved echoes these concerns
about the harms of racial classifications. For instance, he argues that,
when a racial classification requires individuals "to march in different
directions" because of their race, the classification can result in "a new
divisiveness" as well as a "corrosive discourse" that results in race serving
as a means of political bargaining. 433 Further, he questions whether ra-
cial categories are meaningful and notes that individuals lack the power
to change a racial classification. He contends that "[c] rude measures of
this sort threaten to reduce children to racial chits valued and traded
according to one school's supply and another's demand."434 Justice
Kennedy did not contend in Parents Involved that race-neutral actions
exist free from these potentially serious harms. 435 Instead, he stated that
these "measures that do not rely on differential treatment based on in-
dividual classifications present these problems to a lesser degree."436 Justice
Kennedy did not explain, however, why race-neutral measures do not
inflict the same harms.437
The Court's repeated insistence that race-neutral measures must
be examined before a racial classification may be used implicitly recog-
nizes that these measures do not involve the same harms as racial classi-
fications. Instead, the manner in which the government's goal is pur-
sued can substantially influence the Court's review of such efforts.438 As
the discussion below demonstrates, the Court has correctly implied that
431 Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000); see also Holning Lau, Formalism: From Ra-
cial Integration to Same-Sex Marriage, 59 HASTINGs L.J. 843, 868-69 (2008) (noting that the
concurring opinions of Justices Kennedy and Thomas in Parents Involved indicate that
"race-based essentialism is also an evil in itself that demeans individuals and, therefore,
warrants heightened scrutiny").
432 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 360 (1978) (Brennan, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
433 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and in the
judgment).
434 Id.
435 Id.
436 Id. (emphasis added).
437 See id.
438 See Ryan, supra note 69, at 343.
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race-neutral government action involves fewer harms than racial classi-
fications.
2. The Advantages of a Race-Neutral Approach
Race-neutral approaches may cause less harm than racial classifica-
tions for several reasons. By avoiding the consideration of race in gov-
ernment decisionmaking, such approaches can avoid stigmatizing mi-
norities because they avoid calling into question the qualifications of
minorities or the reasons that minorities receive special considera-
tion. 43 9 In place of race, race-neutral actions may link more closely to
the underlying concern that led the government to adopt a racial clas-
sification and thus more effectively accomplish the goal of the govern-
ment action.440 This link also would shift the focus away from minori-
ties and racial status to the underlying concern, such as residential
segregation. 441 Furthermore, focusing on a concern shared by indi-
viduals of all races, such as poverty, encourages recognition of com-
monalities and common interests across racial lines and conveys the
suggestion that race is irrelevant.442
Race-neutral actions also may create less divisiveness when they
focus on a tangible disadvantage because doing so removes the appear-
ance that some racial minorities, such as those who are privileged, are
receiving a preference when they do not warrant it, while those who
warrant the privilege, disadvantaged whites for example, are denied a
439 See J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Law of Civil Rights and the Dangers of Separatism in
Multicultural America, 47 STAN. L. REv. 993, 1014 (1995) ("An approach which concerns
itself with disadvantaged individuals does not suffer the drawbacks of traditional race-based
5ction such as injustice to dispreferred groups, stigmatization of preferred ones, and fla-
grant race consciousness."); Steven T. Collis, Note, A Narrow Path to Diversity: The Constitu-
tionality of Rezoning Plans and Strategic Site Selection of Schools After Parents Involved, 107
MICH. L. REv. 501, 517 (2008) ('Justice Kennedy's openness to a relaxed review of siting
and rezoning no doubt stems from his sense that these methods, as with changing voting
district lines, do not produce stimatization, one of his chief concerns.").
440 See Heeren, supra note 16, at 176 (noting that class "diversity has also been shown to
lead to racial diversity in schools without the negative implications many see in singling out
individuals based on race"); Eboni S. Nelson, What Price Grutter ?, 32 J.C. & U.L. 1, 9
(2005).
441 See Liu, supra note 206, at 72 (noting that the race-neutral student assignment plan
in Berkeley, California, directly responds to the residential segregation in the district).
442 See Forde-Mazrui, supra note 35, at 2374; cf Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris,
The New Racial Preferences, 96 CAL. L. REv. 1139, 1194 (2008) ("Contemporary racial dis-
course in the United States proceeds from the assumption that both colorblindness and
racial neutrality are realizable. For some, both have already been achieved, making race
irrelevant.").
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privilege. 443 By including whites as beneficiaries of race-neutral action,
the hostility generated by the exclusivity of racial preferences is miti-
gated. 444 Race-neutral action avoids stereotyping minorities as always
disadvantaged and in need of special assistance because it sends the
message that the district is targeting the disadvantage or other neutral
criteria rather than using race as a proxy for it. 445 By directly targeting
disadvantage or other criteria, race-neutral action also avoids messages
of racial inferiority that arise when a racial preference grants benefits to
minorities. 446 Race-neutral actions also avoid decisions about which
races to include and exclude as beneficiaries of a racial classification
and about how to define race. 447
If student assignments rely on nonracial characteristics, a person
of any race may possess that characteristic, and the community may
view the government action as one open to benefiting all members of
society and thus inherently more fair than distributing benefits and
burdens based upon race. 448 In a related manner, when school boards
use factors such as class or geography to assign students to schools, they
no longer rely on immutable characteristics, and instead rely upon fac-
tors that an individual can control. 449 Thus, the elimination of race as
the criterion upon which the government acts avoids offending the
dignity of individuals and instead can "focus on race as a structural fea-
ture of the social landscape, not as a personal attribute of an individual
student."450 In addition, the focus on nonracial criteria reduces the risk
443 See Forde-Mazrui, supra note 35, at 2371-72; see also Nelson, supra note 440, at 38-39.
4" See Forde-Mazrui, supra note 35, at 2371-72; see also Nelson, supra note 440, at 38-
39; KG. Jan Pillai, Affirmative Action: In Search of a National Policy, 2 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs.
L. REv. 1, 41 (1992) ("A race-neutral program ... would be impervious to political sling-
shots of those who constantly play the 'race card' by stirring up the hostile sentiments of
economically squeezed middle- and working-class whites against racial quotas.").
45 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1060,
1091 (1991) ("[R]ace-consciousness is self-defeating to the extent that it reinforces rather
than undermines racism. Affirmative action, it is argued, may have this effect because it
inevitably creates the impression of a lowering of standards in order to benefit minori-
ties."); Forde-Mazrui, supra note 35, at 2371-72; Nelson, supra note 440, at 9 ("Race-neutral
measures, such as consideration of an applicant's socioeconomic status, acknowledge these
disparities and attempt to remedy them by providing educational opportunities and pref-
erences to those students who have been adversely affected by such circumstances.").
446 SeeWilkinson, supra note 439, at 1014.
447 See Carlon, supra note 222, at 1166-68 (discussing difficulties of drawing lines be-
tween races); Forde-Mazrui, supra note 35, at 2374.
448 See Forde-Mazrui, supra note 35, at 2357-58.
449 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 360-61 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and in the judg-
ment).
450 Liu, supra note 206, at 72; see Forde-Mazrui, supra note 35, at 2371.
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that the government seeks to achieve invidious ends because the action
targets the disadvantage or other criteria rather than race. 451
Given the nation's distribution of societal benefits along lines of
class and geography that sometimes correspond with race, 452 the use of
nonracial criteria, even when adopted to promote diversity and avoid
racial isolation, may give greater comfort to those who find an explicit
reliance on the race of individuals inconsistent with the dignity of indi-
viduals. 453 By focusing on criteria other than race-at least explicitly-
school boards also may avoid some of the "racial exhaustion" that issues
of race often encounter. 454
Some racial hostility may remain if individuals feel that a charac-
teristic was chosen simply as a proxy for race. 455 Hostility also may arise
if members of the public believe that the government's limited time
and money should not be spent to address the challenges confronting
racial minorities. 456 Finally, some may view race-neutral efforts with hos-
tility because they are convinced that the nation has achieved racial
equality.457 Ultimately, though, toleration of some lingering racial hos-
tility may represent a necessary cost for continuing to allow and even
encourage governments to address racial inequity and discrimination
in American society. In this regard, it is important to remember that
the Court has not suggested that governments should not continue to
address discrimination and racial injustice; in fact, it has recognized
that governments can take such action. 458 The Court's insistence that
451 See Forde-Mazrui, supra note 35, at 2371-72; Sullivan, supra note 35, at 1052 ("The
more whites from lower socioeconomic backgrounds or inferior high schools swept in by
the race-neutral proxy, the less salient any white applicant's claim to have suffered racial
discrimination will be.").
452 See, e.g., San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973).
453 See Ryan, supra note 69, at 343 ("One sees in Grutter and Graiz, and Bakke before
them, evidence of a belief that it is better if the use of race is hidden rather than overt.").
454 See generally Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Racial Exhaustion, 86 WASH. U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2009) (arguing that Americans have grown tired of confronting issues of
race and racial inequalities in American society, but that history also reveals that Ameri-
cans have always stressed the importance of limiting such efforts).
455 See Cimino, supra note 133, at 1306 ("[1]f class-based preferences are perceived as a
covert substitute for racial preferences, they might in fact be considered equally stigmatiz-
ing."); Forde-Mazrui, supra note 35, at 2377 (noting that race-neutral plans "may still stoke
resentment among whites who perceive such programs as racial favoritism by proxy");
Heeren, supra note 16, at 176 ("[T]he use of [socioeconomic status] as a substitute for race
can be seen as a clumsy placeholder that 'hides the ball' by using race-neutral means to
pursue racially-driven ends.").
456 See Forde-Mazrui, supra note 35, at 2377.
457 Carbado & Harris, supra note 442, at 1194.
458 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) ("The unhappy
persistence of both the practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimination against
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governments first consider race-neutral measures also reveals its accep-
tance of race-specific goals as a legitimate government objective as well
as its recognition that ignoring race and racial injustice does not repre-
sent a path to equal protection of the law and racial equality.459 On bal-
ance, race-neutral action best avoids the harms of racial classifications
while keeping the pursuit of racial equality on the national agenda.46
If governments are going to address racial inequality, they must
identify and address the racial implications of social problems. Efforts
to address racial discrimination and inequality may always confront
some hostility.461 Nevertheless, race-neutral efforts only allow indirect
measures to address racial inequality and represent the approach least
likely to cause additional harms.
D. Applying Rational Basis Review to Race-Neutral Efforts to
Avoid Racial Isolation and Promote Diversity
Given the ability of race-neutral efforts to advance the provision of
equal educational opportunity and to avoid many of the harms of racial
classifications, school districts should enjoy wide latitude to adopt race-
neutral student assignment plans. The provision of this latitude re-
quires courts to apply rational basis review to those race-neutral plans
that advance a benign purpose. 462 This Article contends that courts
should make a threshold inquiry into the purpose and effect of race-
neutral student assignment plans. When a school district can demon-
strate that a plan was adopted to achieve and actually advances a benign
minority groups in this country is an unfortunate realty, and government is not disqualified
from acting in response to it." (emphasis added)).
459 See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 302 (2003) ("The Constitution is both
color blind and color conscious." (quoting United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ.,
372 F.2d 836, 876 (5th Cir. 1966))); Reno, 509 U.S. at 642 ("Despite their invocation of the
ideal of a 'color-blind' Constitution, appellants appear to concede that race-conscious
redistricting is not always unconstitutional." (internal citations omitted)).
460 See Forde-Mazrui, supra note 35, at 2378. Of course, not just any racial goal pursued
through a race-neutral approach will be upheld. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 498-99 (plurality
opinion). In Croson, when the Court pointed the City of Richmond toward a race-neutral
approach, it had evidence that the city sought to increase participation by minority busi-
nesses in the construction required for public projects. Id. Thus, the Court had evidence
that the government actor was undertaking a benign race-specific goal. Id.
461 Forde-Mazrui, supra note 35, at 2377 ("Any law motivated by a racially discrimina-
tory purpose poses a risk of illegitimate motivations, the perpetuation of racial stereotypes,
and the aggravation of race relations."); Hutchinson, supra note 454.
462 Heeren, supra note 16, at 180 (contending that a race-neutral plan will be subject to
rational basis review); Winters, supra note 114, at 722-23 (arguing that rational basis review
would apply to a socioeconomic integration plan even if the district used class to achieve
racial integration).
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purpose, such as avoiding racial isolation, courts should apply rational
basis review to the plan. When the plan was adopted to achieve and ac-
tually advances an invidious purpose, such as dividing students along
racial lines, courts should subject the race-neutral action to strict scru-
tiny consistent with the Court's past precedent. 463
By making a threshold inquiry into the purpose and effect of the
race-neutral action and applying rational basis review only when a
school district can demonstrate a benign purpose and effect, courts
appropriately would continue to foreclose those actions that seek to
divide the races, while providing latitude to districts to address the na-
tion's "moral and ethical obligation to fulfill its historic commitment to
creating an integrated society that ensures equal opportunity for all of
its children." 464 Under rational basis review, a court subjects the ends
and the means to only a minimal level of scrutiny to ensure that the
action is "rati,.tally related to a legitimate state interest."46 Rational
basis review represents the determination that courts should not serve
as a substantive check on government action and instead that the gov-
ernment's decision should almost always remain the final one.466 It ac-
465 Shaw, 509 U.S. at 643-44 (noting the presumptive invalidity of racial classifications
and that "[t] his rule applies as well to a classification is ostensibly neutral but is an obvious
pretext for racial discrimination"(quoting Pers. Admin'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,
272 (1976))); Davis, 426 U.S. at 244-45 (holding that the Court will apply strict scrutiny to
a race-neutral law if the law was adopted to accomplish a discriminatory purpose).
By allowing the application of the Equal Protection Clause to recognize the distinction
between benign and invidious actions when determining the standard of review, this Arti-
cle's proposed approach represents one way to effectuate the distinction Justice Breyer
contends the Court has recognized throughout its case law. Justice Breyer wrote in Parents
Involved:
The Equal Protection Clause, ratified following the Civil War, has always dis-
tinguished in practice between state action that excludes and thereby subor-
dinates racial minorities and state action that seeks to bring together people
of all races. From Swann to Grutter, this Court's decisions have emphasized
this distinction, recognizing that the fate of race relations in this country de-
pends upon unity among our children, "for unless our children begin to
learn together, there is little hope that our people will ever learn to live to-
gether."
Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2834-35 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Milliken v. Bradley,
418 U.S. 717, 783 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting)). This Article seeks to operationalize
recognition of the distinction between actions that bring people together and those that
divide by allowing the standard of review to differ depending on which of these two differ-
ent objectives is pursued.
464 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and in the
judgment).
465 City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
466 See id.
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complishes this by granting substantial deference to the legislature. 467
The standard provides a strong presumption of legitimacy by placing
the burden on the plaintiff to establish that the statute is irrational be-
cause it does not relate to a legitimate government interest. 468 If the
court finds any set of facts that reasonably justify the government's ac-
tion, the classification will be upheld. 469
Some scholars have noted, however, that the Court's rational basis
review includes two types of scrutiny: one in which the Court does not
conduct an assessment of the statute but merely acquiesces in the legis-
lative judgment and another in which the court conducts a limited re-
view of the government action and requires more than the appearance
of rationality.470 In fact, the Court itself has admitted that its rational
basis jurisprudence has been less than consistent or uniform. 471 In-
deed, it has rarely and unpredictably invoked this more meaningful
version. 472 This Article contends that once the threshold inquiry dem-
onstrates that the purpose and effect of a race-neutral student assign-
ment plan is to reduce racial isolation or enhance diversity, the more
rigorous application of rational basis review appropriately provides
school districts wide latitude to adopt race-neutral efforts to avoid racial
isolation and increase diversity while requiring them to show more than
the mere appearance of rationality.
Moreover, in Parents Involved, Justice Kennedy cited to a voting
rights decision, Bush v. Vera, in support of his contention that race-
467 See Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 425-26 (1961); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 140, at 678-79; Shaman, supra note
162, at 1024.
468 See McGowan, 366 U.S. at 425-26; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 140, at 672;
Shaman, supra note 162, at 1023.
469 See McGowan, 366 U.S. at 426.
470 See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 162, at 482 ("[T]he Court's rational basis jurisprudence
wavers between its typical deference to government decisionmaking and the occasional insis-
tence on meaningful review, without a unifying theory for meshing the two seemingly distinct
approaches." (citations omitted)); Matthew F Leitman, A Proposed Standard of Equal Protection
Review for Classifications Within the Criminal Justice System That Have a Racially Disparate Impact: A
Case Study of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines' Classification Between Crack and Powder Cocaine, 25
U. TOL. L. REv. 215, 218 (1994) ('he Supreme Court recently has applied a number of dif-
ferent versions of the rational basis test, which vary in the amount of deference given to the
legislative classification."); Shaman, supra note 162, at 1023.
471 See U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 176-77 n.10 (1980).
472 See Goldberg, supra note 162, at 517 ("[D]ivergent emphases [in rational basis re-
view] reflect a persistent tension about the nature of rational basis review, which has left
the doctrine with a somewhat unpredictable feel and, at times, without sufficient focus on
whether a meaningful connection exists between government action and the purported
justifications for that action."); Shaman, supra note 162, at 1028.
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neutral actions will not likely lead a court to apply strict scrutiny.473 In
the discussion cited in Bush v. Vera, the plurality makes several points
that are noteworthy in determining the circumstances under which Jus-
tice Kennedy might apply strict scrutiny to a race-neutral student as-
signment plan. In Bush v. Vera, the plurality explained that strict scru-
tiny applies when redistricting legislation segregates individuals for
voting and disregards standard districting principles; strict scrutiny
does not apply, however, simply because of the legislature's mere "con-
sciousness of race" or "to all cases of intentional creation of majority-
minority districts."474 Instead, strict scrutiny only applies when race was
the predominant and controlling factor over other districting princi-
ples. 475 This suggests that the plurality viewed race as a predominant
factor as sufficiently similar to the direct use of a racial classification to
treat the two actions the same.
In the context of student assignment plans, this suggests that,
given the Court's application of strict scrutiny to redistricting legisla-
tion that segregates the races, 476 the Court will likely apply strict scru-
tiny to a student assignment plan that seeks to segregate the races. In
addition, just as strict scrutiny does not apply to the intentional crea-
tion of all majority-minority districts and instead only applies when race
predominates, 477 strict scrutiny will not apply to a race-neutral student
assignment plan with a benign purpose and instead will only be applied
if the race-neutral approach is tantamount to the district using race it-
473 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and in the
judgment) (citing Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 958 (1996) (plurality opinion)). Scholars
have offered various interpretations of whatJustice Kennedy's reference to a voting rights
opinion in Parents Involved and his voting rights opinions generally suggest for the consti-
tutional future of race-neutral student assignments. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 14, at 744
('Justice Kennedy's [Parents Involved] opinion allows school authorities to consciously at-
tempt to produce as much integration as possible through means that eschew individual
racial classifications."); Pamela S. Karlan, The Law of Small Numbers: Gonzales v. Carhart,
Parents Involved in Community Schools, and Some Themes from the First Full Term of the Rob-
erts Court, 86 N.C. L. REv. 1369, 1391 (2008) ("IfJustice Kennedy intends to move general
equal protection doctrine toward the approach currently underlying the redistricting
cases, then equal protection law may be shifting implicitly toward a model in which the
goal of integrating... schools.., justifies race-conscious government action as long as the
action does not rely too explicitly on race."); George La Noue & Kenneth L. Marcus, 57
CATH. U. L. REv. 991, 1013 (2008) (contending that, by invoking Bush v. Vera in Parents
Involved, Justice Kennedy "suggests that only if the 'predominant' motivation of a govern-
mental education program is racial will [the Court] require strict scrutiny review").
474 Vera, 517 U.S. at 958.
45 Id. at 958-59.
476 See id. at 958.
477 See id.
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self. Therefore, this Article's proposed approach is consistent with the
views expressed by justice Kennedy in Parents Involved.
One might question whether, under this proposal, a court would
sustain a district's furtive desire to segregate students on the basis of
race, so long as the district can state a benign purpose. This scenario
can be avoided in two ways. First, the threshold inquiry should examine
both the purpose and effect of the student assignment plan. If a benign
purpose is stated but the clear effect of the plan is racial balkanization,
a court would legitimately set aside the district's statement of a benign
purpose. Second, even if a limited threshold inquiry misses an invidi-
ous purpose behind a student assignment plan, a court can apply a
meaningful interpretation of rational basis review to uncover the in-
vidious purpose and any stereotyping, as the Court has done in some
prior cases. 478 Such an application of rational basis review may appro-
priately be considered a heightened form of rational basis review.479
The adoption of the more rigorous form of rational basis review looks
beyond the stated purpose of the plan to ensure that the plan accom-
plishes the desired effect. 480 Thus, this application of rational basis re-
view avoids the criticism that it has not evaluated the link between the
government's goal and its action. 481 If this review revealed that the race-
neutral plan increased racial isolation or decreased diversity, a court
would invalidate the plan.
At a minimum, however, this review would still provide substantial
latitude to school districts to adopt race-neutral student assignment
plans, except when such plans serve to balkanize students along racial
lines between schools rather than increase the exposure of students to
those from different racial groups. When the plan has mixed effects-
478 See supra notes 153-159, 179-181 and accompanying text.
479 See supra notes 153-159 and accompanying text; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note
140, at 673 ("The claim is that in some cases where the Court says that it is using rational
basis review, it is actually employing a test with more 'bite' than the customarily very defer-
ential rational basis review."); TRIBE, supra note 182, at 1443-44 (noting that, although
under the traditional application of the rational basis test the Court upholds any classifica-
tion "based upon a state of facts that reasonably can be conceived to constitute a distinc-
tion," in the 1980s the Court's application of rational basis "sometimes took on a new,
more penetrating character"); Leitman, supra note 470, at 219-22 (describing two forms of
rational basis review).
480 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 634-35; City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473
U.S. 432, 446, 450 (1985); U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
481 Goldberg, supra note 162, at 490 ("[T]he deferential formulation of rational basis
review can skew judicial analysis where the government appears to have acted to achieve a
legitimate goal.... [T]he standard's emphasis on deference ... leads courts to skip over
the required step of evaluating the link between the permissible goal and the govern-
ment's action.").
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perhaps reducing racial isolation in some schools while increasing it in
others-as long as the overall effect is the reduction of racial isolation
and the enhancement of diversity, courts should uphold such plans.
By applying rational basis review to race-neutral student assign-
ment plans that advance a benign goal, courts will be deferring to the
expertise of school districts in designing and implementing education
policy. Judicial restraint in reviewing these plans allows the democratic
process to determine the proper approach to achieve these goals.
482
Thus, although some scholars have criticized rational basis review for
granting too much deference to the legislature, 483 this deference oper-
ates as an advantage in the context of a benign race-neutral student
assignment plan. Admittedly, this would require courts to uphold plans
that they would not themselves develop and adopt, but doing so would
recognize that school districts should retain primary decision-making
authority over such plans, and that the role of the courts should be lim-
ited to invalidating plans that seek and accomplish an improper pur-
pose.
Given the racial goal behind race-neutral student assignment
plans, some might contend that courts should apply a more rigorous
level of review, such as strict scrutiny, to ensure that the purpose and
482 See Schweiker, 450 U.S. at 230 ("Unless a statute employs a classification that is inher-
ently invidious or that impinges on fundamental fights, ... this Court properly exercises
only a limited review power over Congress, the appropriate representative body through
which the public makes democratic choices among alternative solutions to social and eco-
nomic problems."); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 140, at 679; see also Archer, supra note 68, at
661 ("[T]here is a long line of precedent acknowledging that school administrators know
better than courts what kind of learning environment is best for children and, as a result,
are afforded considerable deference by the courts."); William Benjamin Bryant, Doubting
Thomasville's Ability-Grouping Program: Holton v. City of Thomasville School District, 59
MERCER L. REV. 1391, 1406 (2008) (noting a shift from judicial remedies to legislative
remedies for students seeking a high-quality education); Wendy Parker, Connecting the Dots:
Grutter, School Desegregation, and Federalism, 45 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 1691, 1693 (2004);
Spann, supra note 222, at 634 (arguing that "the political branches of government possess
the power to overcome Supreme Court impediments to racial justice," and hoping that
"they also possess the will to exercise that power").
483 See, e.g., EVAN GERSTMANN, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE CONSTITUTION 16 (2004)
("Courts will uphold laws that everybody agrees cause more harm than good, or laws that
reflect outdated concerns, so long as they further, even slightly or tangentially, a legitimate
goal of government."); Goldberg, supra note 162, at 490 ("[T]he deferential formulation
of rational basis review can skew judicial analysis where the government appears to have
acted to achieve a legitimate goal. In these cases, the standard's emphasis on deference at
times leads courts to skip over the required step of evaluating the link between the permis-
sible goal and the government's action."); Gunther, supra note 212, at 8 (noting that the
rational basis standard has afforded "minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in
fact"); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 140, at 679 ("[lIt also can be argued that the
Court has gone too far in its deference under the rational basis test.").
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effect of such plans are legitimate. 484 If the Court took this position, it
would send the signal that courts are suspicious of school districts that
attempt to address the nation's legacy of racial inequality by seeking to
avoid racial isolation and enhance diversity. To subject all efforts to cre-
ate diverse schools and avoid racial isolation to the same exacting scru-
tiny that racial classifications must face would place a straightjacket on
school districts that endeavor to tackle these complex issues. 485
Some may criticize the application of the rational basis test to race-
neutral student assignment plans that advance a benign purpose be-
cause, under rational basis review, the Court typically considers irrele-
vant the reasons that the legislature passed the statute; instead, the ra-
tionale for a statute "may be based on rational speculation unsupported
by evidence or empirical data."486 Thus, some may contend that this
would enable a school board to hide a discriminatory purpose toward a
particular racial group.487 The more rigorous interpretation of rational
basis review, however, can be applied to uncover animus toward a group
and avoid this shortcoming.488
Some also have criticized rational basis review as a test that a court
can manipulate to achieve a court's desired outcome. 489 This criticism
is not unique to rational basis review. 490 Although one can effectively
manipulate any judicial standard, once a benign purpose is shown, ju-
484 See Croson, 484 U.S. at 493 ("Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification
for such race-based measures, there is simply no way of determining what classifications
are 'benign' or 'remedial' and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate
notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics."); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291 (plurality
opinion) ("Racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call
for the most exacting judicial examination.").
485 See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2802 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[R]eal-world efforts
to substitute racially diverse for racially segregated schools (however caused) are complex
.. .. 1').
486 FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993); see also Clark Neily, No Such
Thing: Litigating Under the Rational Basis Test, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 898, 908 (2005) ("The
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that under the rational basis test, it is irrelevant why a
particular law was actually passed-it only matters whether it could theoretically have been
passed for proper purposes.").
487 See, e.g., Beach, 508 U.S. at 315.
488 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 634-35; Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446, 450; Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534.
49 See, e.g., Neily, supra note 486, at 910 ("A final indictment of the rational basis test is
the Supreme Court's record of blatantly misapplying it in order to achieve preferred out-
comes.").
490 Scholars have criticized intermediate scrutiny for the same reason. See, e.g., George
C. Hlavac, Interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause: A Constitutional Shell Game, 61 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 1349, 1375 (1993);Jay D. Wexler, Defending the Middle Way: Intermediate Scru-
tiny as Judicial Minimalism, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 298, 325 (1998).
Boston College Law Review
dicial deference provides the appropriate judicial lens for reviewing
race-neutral student assignment plans.
Some might criticize the proposed approach for providing such
leeway to districts that the politically powerful could place the imple-
mentation burden of the plan on the less politically powerful group. 491
For example, rational basis review could allow a district to impose the
transportation burden of a race-neutral student assignment plan on the
minority community while white students are permitted to attend
schools close to home.492 Many post-Brown desegregation plans placed
the burden of integration on minority communities, particularly the
transportation burden. 493 A court could interpret such a burden as an
intent to harm the minority community and could invalidate the plan
for this reason.494 A court should exercise caution, however, before tak-
ing such action and should first consider the effectiveness of alterna-
tives to the district's approach. The existence of effective alternatives
that can distribute the burden of implementation more evenly would
militate in favor of finding an invidious intent. But in the absence of
such alternatives, the court should defer to the school district, leaving
the political process to determine whether the minority community
would prefer bearing the implementation burden rather than remain
in racially isolated schools.
Finally, some might criticize the proposed approach because apply-
ing rational basis to a benign student assignment plan and strict scrutiny
to an invidious student assignment plan contradicts the Court's inter-
pretation of equal protection to require applying a uniform standard to
491 See Lia B. Epperson, True Integration: Advancing Brown's Goal of Educational Equity in
the Wake ofGrutter, 67 U. PITr. L. REv. 175, 206 (2005).
492 See id.
493 Id.
Certain specific tactics post-Brown reinforced patterns of racial hegemony
by placing the intolerable burden of integration on African-American stu-
dents. Such policies included the "freedom-of-choice" plans first used to
eradicate segregation, which placed the onus on black children to voluntarily
desegregate schools, and which were used to control the extent of desegrega-
tion. By 1968, the Court held that such plans were unconstitutional because
they placed an undue burden on African-American students.... Even after
the Court's ruling in Green, school districts continued to implement strategies
to place the intolerable burden of effectuating the Court's mandate on Afri-
can-American children through disproportionate transportation burdens.
Id.
494 See, e.g., Davis, 426 U.S. at 239, 244-45 (holding that a showing of intentional dis-
crimination must be made to establish racial discrimination in violation of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause).
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benign or invidious government action.495 The proposed approach con-
tends that the Court should embrace some antisubordination principles
when it decides the legal standard for benign race-neutral student as-
signment plans. An antisubordination approach guides the Court to
support substantial leniency and discretion for race-neutral efforts that
advance a benign purpose while strongly disfavoring race-neutral efforts
that advance an invidious purpose. 496 Although the Court has rejected
some elements of an antisubordination approach by subjecting actions
that harm or benefit minorities to the same exacting scrutiny, numerous
scholars have argued that an antisubordination approach informs some
of the Court's current jurisprudence regarding race even while the
Court subjugates the antisubordination analysis to its anticlassification
analysis. 497
Although this Article adopts an antisubordination framework, ap-
plying rational basis review to race-neutral efforts to avoid racial isola-
tion and promote diversity in schools is consistent with the Court's cur-
rent anticlassification approach. As discussed above, the Court's
current approach to equal protection emphasizes the unconstitutional-
ity of using a racial classification by applying strict scrutiny to all racial
classifications regardless of the beneficiary of the classification. 498 Strict
scrutiny, however, also encourages governments to adopt a race-neutral
approach to achieve their goals rather than a racial classification. 499
Unless the Court has been encouraging governments to exchange one
constitutionally suspect approach with another, its approach to strict
scrutiny signals that race-neutral government actions typically will sat-
isfy the Court's interpretation of the requirements of equal protection.
This approval and even encouragement of the use of race-neutral ac-
tion renders rational basis review the appropriate standard for review-
495 The plurality opinion in Croson stated that "the standard of review under the Equal
Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by a par-
ticular classification." 488 U.S. at 494 (plurality opinion).
496 Hutchinson, supra note 245, at 684 ("Under an antisubordination approach, the
Court would view remedial usages of a disfavored category in a different fashion: govern-
mental efforts to dismantle entrenched patterns of inequality and discrimination would
not trigger the heightened (and fatal) sensitivity that invidious and oppressive purposes
warrant.").
497 See, e.g., Balkin & Siegel, supra note 284, at 10-11; Colker, supra note 245, at 1011;
Hutchinson, supra note 245, at 646, 692-93; see also supra notes 294-305 and accompanying
text. But see Campos, supra note 265, at 587-88 ("Today the antisubordination principle
exists almost exclusively in scholarship, with little hope of influencing the Court.").
498 See supra notes 189-191 and accompanying text.
499 See supra notes 200-204 and accompanying text.
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ing race-neutral student assignment plans when they pursue the benign
purpose of avoiding racial isolation and promoting diversity. 500
The application of strict scrutiny to invidious race-neutral student
assignment plans would enable the Court to adopt this Article's pro-
posed approach without overruling any case law.501 At the same time,
the application of rational basis review to benign student assignment
plans would allow the Court to recognize some of the antisubordination
influences within past case law502 and remedy some of the shortcomings
of the anticlassification approach, particularly the weakness that the an-
ticlassification approach treats government action that harms and helps
minorities under the same exacting and often fatal scrutiny.503
If the proposed approach were adopted, courts might help to rein-
vigorate the nation's commitment to integrated schools, equal educa-
tional opportunity, and, ultimately, the promise of Brown. The applica-
tion of rational basis review to benign student assignment plans
indicates that, as a society, such plans are desirable and thus encourages
the adoption of such plans. The application of rational basis to benign
plans also fosters experimentation by school districts with race-neutral
student assignment plans without fear of liability if their initial efforts
are not as successful as they hope. Districts need latitude to find the
best approach for the communities the districts serve.
CONCLUSION
The determination of the appropriate legal standard for race-
neutral student assignment plans will shape how federal, state, and lo-
cal governments approach the pursuit of racial goals for generations,
not only in education but also in employment, housing, and other con-
500 See supra notes 462-497 and accompanying text.
501 The Court has never squarely confronted the constitutionality of benign race-
neutral government action. In Davis, the Court held that strict scrutiny applies to race-
neutral government action with a discriminatory purpose. 426 U.S. at 244-45. If the Court
adopted this Article's proposal, it could limit the applicability of Davis to those race-neutral
government actions with an invidious purpose, particularly in light of its encouragement
of the adoption of race-neutral action when it applies strict scrutiny by requiring govern-
ments to show that they undertook "serious, good faith consideration of workable race-
neutral alternatives." Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003). At the same time, the
application of rational basis to benign student assignment plans would allow the Court to
recognize some of the antisubordination influences within past case law, see supra notes
294-305 and accompanying text, and remedy some of the shortcomings of the anticlassifi-
cation approach, see supra notes 250-277 and accompanying text.
502 See supra notes 294-302 and accompanying text.
503 See supra notes 246-277 and accompanying text.
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texts, 50 4 just as the Court's decision to apply strict scrutiny to racial clas-
sifications has established the legal parameters in which affirmative ac-
tion programs must operate. The plurality in Parents Involved in Com-
munity Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 adopted a colorblind approach
to the Constitution with the contention that "when it comes to using
race to assign children to schools, history will be heard."505 The history
and modern-day reality of racially isolated schools within the United
States reveals that those schools overwhelmingly provide minority stu-
dents with inferior educational opportunities. Therefore, when deter-
mining the appropriate standard to apply to districts that take action to
remedy racial isolation and promote diversity, courts should be mindful
that their decisions will strongly influence not only who sits next to
whom in schools across the country, but also the availability of a key
mechanism to improve the quality of educational opportunities for
many minority students. A decision to apply a typically "fatal in fact"
legal standard to benign race-neutral efforts also would cause the na-
tion to forfeit the educational, societal, and democratic benefits of in-
tegrated educational settings.506
This Article contends that school districts should be provided wide
latitude to adopt race-neutral student assignment plans that pursue a
benign purpose because these plans can avoid some of the harms of
racial isolation while advancing the provision of equal educational op-
portunity guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause. To determine
which plans pursue a benign purpose, courts should consider both the
goals and effects of the student assignment plan. Once a district has
demonstrated that the plan has the goal and effect of avoiding racial
isolation and enhancing diversity, courts can help to ensure that dis-
tricts enjoy this wide latitude by applying rational basis to these plans.
Courts should apply strict scrutiny to those plans that have the purpose
or effect of balkanization. Scholars, civil rights advocates, and others
criticized Parents Involved as the abandonment of Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation and its vision of integrated schools and equal educational oppor-
tunity,50 7 but this need not be the case if this Article's proposed ap-
proach were adopted.
504 Banks, supra note 35, at 581; Forde-Mazrui, supra note 35, at 2334.
505 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2767 (2007) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
506 See id. at 2820-24 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
507 See, e.g., David J. Hoff, Decision Sparks Divided Reactions, EDUC. WK., June 28, 2007,
http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2007/06/28/43scotusreaxweb.h26.html ("School offi-
cials and traditional civil rights groups decried the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling today over-
turning policies intended to diversify student enrollments in the Jefferson County, Ky., and
Boston College Law Review
Ultimately, courts must remember that the responses to the ques-
tions raised by race-neutral efforts to diversify schools and avoid racial
isolation do not merely involve issues of legal doctrine and constitu-
tional interpretation for scholars, judges, and school districts to ponder.
The responses will also dramatically influence the nation's commitment
to equal educational opportunity, an integrated society and the charac-
ter of the nation that our children will inherit. Most people in this coun-
try support bringing students of different racial backgrounds together
in public schools. 508 Therefore, the Supreme Court's decision in Parents
Involved brings the nation to a crossroads in its history: will it continue to
pursue integrated educational settings and equal educational opportu-
nity, or will it allow the current racial resegregation of public schools to
continue unabated? The road chosen will determine the character of
the nation that is passed on to future generations and ultimately
whether the nation continues its unfinished civil rights agenda. There-
fore, the analysis of these critical issues should proceed with the circum-
spection, wisdom, and vision that these sensitive questions demand. The
nation's schoolchildren demand no less.
Seattle school districts."); Robert Lowe, Backpedaling Toward Plessy, RETHINKING SCHOOLS, Fall
2007, at 14, 17 ("Although it is not a radical step backward, the desegregation decision does
further constrain the meaning of Brown and the meaning of public education as well."); Lynne
Varner, Op-Ed., Should Schools Be Allowed to Consider Race When Assigning Students to Its Schools?,
SEA rLE TiMES, Jan. 16, 2007, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/opinion/2003524669-
sunlynnel4.html ("[L]istening to some of the justices scrape away at the underpinnings of
Brown v. Board of Education, the landmark decision that did away with segregated schools, I saw
the 'sacred text in the American legal canon,' as The New York Times called Brown, slip away into
irrelevancy"); Press Release, The Civil Rights Project, Joint Statement of Nine University-Based
Civil Rights Centers on Today's Supreme Court Rulings on Voluntary School Desegregation
(Mc~arland v. Jefferson County Public Schools & Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
School District No. 1) (June, 28 2007), available at http://www.civilrightsproject-ucla.edu/policy/
court/voltintjoint full -statementphp. ('The legacy of the widely celebrated Brown decision,
though, has been undermined in a series of Supreme Court decisions over the past three dec-
ades which includes today's ruling.").
508 See Wells and Frankenberg, supra note 5, at 185 ("[T] he vast majority of people in
this country say they believe that children of different racial and ethnic backgrounds
should go to school together.").
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